Military Intelligence from Libya and Terrorism - The “Oil” residency in the materials of the Main Military Counterintelligence Directorate

Author(s): Pavel Žáček / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

On the basis of an international treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, at the end of October and the beginning of November 1977, 625 Czechoslovak military experts arrived in Tripoli. Led by Brigadier General Juraj Lalo, they were meant to assist the Libyan armed forces improve their training and to improve the battle readiness of the air force, armoured forces, and artillery.1 The Czechoslovak “normalisation” regime had no excessive illusions about the nature of its north African partner. The only thing that perhaps united them both was their acute anti-Americanism or possibly their opposition to Israel. Besides ensuring the required inflow of foreign currencies with security forces – in a manner similar to their Soviet and East German counterparts – until the year 1989, they strived to take advantage of the relatively opportune political situation in their sphere of interest for the benefit of their power politics.

Oroszország déli törekvései és a fekete-tengeri szorosok problémája (1700-1774)

Author(s): Erzsébet Bodnár / Language(s): Hungarian Publication Year: 0

A forradalom kritikus dalnoka: a „koronás Wargha”

Author(s): Ágnes Deák / Language(s): Hungarian Publication Year: 0

A katonák nyugdíja az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchiában - a magyar törvények alapján

Author(s): Monika Kozári / Language(s): Hungarian Publication Year: 0

Párizs keleti partnereiről a két világháború között

Author(s): István Majoros / Language(s): Hungarian Publication Year: 0

Koszorús Ferenc – A becsület útján

Author(s): Géza Gecse / Language(s): Hungarian Publication Year: 0

The unparalled military intervention on July 6, 1944 by Colonel Ferenc Koszorus and the Hungarian First Armored Division under his command foiled a coup-like action planned by State Secretary Laszlo Baky. Backed by thousands of gendarmerie, Baky was poisd to deport approximately 250,000 Jews, including refugees, living in Budapest to the Nazi German death camps. A few debate as to who should be deemed primarily res-ponsible for the so-called Koszorus „action”. Should it be the Regent Ad-miral Miklos Horthy, who ordered the First Armored Division into action, or Colonel Koszorús, who after volunteering his services and requesting an order to block Baky, successfully carried out the order. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that this casualty-free military operation in German oc-cupied Hungary resulted in the survival of thousands.The article written by Géza Gecse describes the tragic situation in oc-cupied Hungary in 1944. He also sheds light on incontrovertible facts de-monstrating that consistent with their duty of loyalty, there were patriotic and humanitarian Hungarian soldiers who were prepared to act at great danger to themselves even in this dark and perilous time.

PROTIV LOGIKE RATA - PLEDOAJE ZA SUZDRŽLJIVOST, ALI NE NASPRAM IZRAELA

Author(s): Jürgen Habermas / Language(s): Croatian Publication Year: 0

Međunarodna reakcija na suzdržljivost Njemaca i vlade Savezne Republike spram rata u Zalivu kod nas u zemlji naišla je na dvostruki odjek. Savezni predsjednik postavlja simetrične normative i zahtijeva ravnodušno-defanzivno razumijevanje. Drugi kliču ljekovitoj prisili realnosti koja poslijeratne Njemce stavlja pod nadzor i iz njihovih introvertovanih sumnji ponovo dovodi u osporenu ulogu političke sile. Ovdje bi se radije vidjela egzistencijaina ozbiljnost i nesmetani angažman jedne moćnije Njemačke. Do velike Njemačke tada je samo još jedan korak. U razboritim glavama se ponovo budi patos ranog Ernsta Jingera.

ZALIVSKI RAT, NJEMAČKA I IZRAEL

Author(s): Ernst Tugendhat / Language(s): Croatian Publication Year: 0

Pitam se, »kako je došlo do ovakvog slučaja političke kulture?«, »do ovog bankrotskog objašnjenja intelektualaca? Osjećam se gotovo podsjećen na 1914 godinu. Doduše bez tadašnje oduševljenosti ali sa istom zaslijepljenošču. Kako ste svi Vi, sa određernim nijansama, skrenuli na oficijelnu liniju?« - »Možda«, misli moj prijatelj, »jer je ona tačna.« - »Možda«, odgovorio sam, »ali jeste li jasno mislili, ili je to samo potonulo zadovoljstvo tobože ponovo stečenom normalizacijom ono što vas određuje? Predstavi sebi najprije sljedeće: Godinu dana kasnije. Jedna žena stoji sa svojim djetetom uz prozor. Oni gledaju napolje. Napolju je tamno, čađ. Napolje ne treba ići, zbog ultravioletnih zraka. Žena priča djetetu kako je bilo ranije i šta se desilo. Dijete pita: 'A zašto niko protiv toga nije ništa učinio? '

Roman Starzyński (1890–1938) – działacz niepodległościowy, żołnierz i polityk

Author(s): Witold Jarno / Language(s): Polish Publication Year: 0

Восстание Петра и Бояна в 976 г. и борьба комитопулов с Византией

Author(s): Petar Hristov Petrov / Language(s): Russian Publication Year: 0

Antifašistička borba

Author(s): Adna Nalić / Language(s): Bosnian Publication Year: 0

U Bosni i Hercegovini period Drugog svjetskog rata obilježavaju drugarice, ilegalke, komunistkinje, borkinje, partizanske ljekarke i narodne heroine. Žene počinju da se uključuju u politiku postajući članice Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i javlja se sve veća želja da javno djeluju. Prvi put se javlja ideja o ravnopravnosti spolova te se dovode u pitanje stereotipi i tradicionalne vrijednosti, što rezultira stvaranjem organizacije Antifašističkog fronta žena.

Србија под Немачком окупацијом у Другом светском рату

Author(s): Dragan Aleksić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

One of the main features of the German administration in Serbia in WWII was the fact that the occupation policy wasn’t directed from one center. Since the agencies of the military administration were not under unitary command in Serbia, nor did they have clearly delimitated spheres of action, their influence on occupation policy depended on the authority of their positions, i.e. on the place of the superimposed agencies in the complex pecking order of power in the Third Reich. Internal relations between individual occupation factors and the power of their influence were of importance for concrete implementation of the occupation policy and its consequences for the population. The spheres of activity of the occupation administration were divided among four agencies which fulfilled occupation tasks parallely without mutual coordination and often with conflicting interests. Each agency had its main office in Berlin and each had to fulfill its tasks directly, sidestepping the military administration in Serbia. Since security of the troops was endangered by a strong resistance movement and since due to the long protracted war the needs of German war economy steadily increased, the police and economic administration played the leading role in the hierarchy of German occupation agencies.

Москва и антифашистское движение И. Броз Тито (январь – начало октября 1944 г.)

Author(s): Andrej Borisovič Edemski / Language(s): Russian Publication Year: 0

The author uses documents of Vjacheslav Molotov’s collections from Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (Rossiyskii gosudarstvenniy arhiv sotsialno-politicheskoy istorii / RGASPI. Fond 82) and Archive of Russian Foreign Policy (Arhiv vneshnei politiki Possiiskoy Federatsii /AVPRF: Fond 06), and several others more consistently than before. On the base of synthesis of these documents with already published Soviet and Yugoslav archival documents and the results of still valuable early research conducted by Nikola Popovic, Yuriy Girenko, Leonid Gibianskiy and Vladimir Volkov this article sheds more light on interrelations and coordination between Soviet leadership and J. Broz Tito from January 1944 to beginning of Belgrade operation October 1944. Several stages of these interrelations are discovered and reviewed this time in some cases more detailed than in previous research. The article discusses main events from January 1944 when decision on formation of Soviet military misson to Yugoslavia was made to end of February when it had beem landed to location of Tito’s headquarters assuming that key trends in this period were coordination of Tito’s activity in international field during end of January–early February. Despite the fact that each stage was important during 1944 it seems that April was extraordinary one because of coming of Yugoslav military mission to the USSR, inner Soviet discussions on the ways and means to improve the assistance to Yugoslav people army, and, the third one, Soviet decision to inform Tito by Stalin (that time codename „Friend”) and Molotov (codename „Alekseev”) that not Bulgaria but Yugoslavia is main Soviet ally on the Balkans during this war and after it. According to documents the end of May and early June when two meetings of Stalin with Yugoslav mission was the point when the final shift in understanding of British activity was made. The stage of July–August when the main stress of Yugoslav liberation forces has been shifted on Serbia the Soviets gave Tito free hand in his contacts with Britain and at the same time gave him full support in Yugoslavia by concentrating all assistance in his hands since only after Tito’s approval this assistance might be get by regional detacheemnts. Despite the fact that author could not obtain Soviet documents on secret Tito’ visit to Moscow in September 1944 he continues the reconstruction of context of these events by involving available indirect data around Tito’s meetings with Soviet leaders that time. The article ends with analysis of already published Soviet military documents on preparations of the Red Army early October 1944 before entering Yugoslavia as friendly country on which despite of they were already have been published were not paid attention by researchers until nowdays.

Први Титов сусрет са Стаљином

Author(s): Nikola B. Popović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Tito met Stalin for the first time in Moscow between September 21 and 27 1944. Tito himself said about it: „That was the first time in my life that I met Stalin and talked to him. Until then I only saw him from distance, such as at the 7th Congress of the Commintern. This time I had several meetings with him, a couple of them in his office in the Kremlin. He also invited me twice to his private house to dinner.” Judging by this statement, Tito was shown great courtesy. Tito’s idea was to meet Stalin in private. It is possible he talked about that with general Kornjejev, chief of the Soviet military mission with the Supreme Staff of the People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Units of Yugoslavia. Tito informed Stalin about the aim of this conversation in his letter of July 5, 1944. Thus, in the beginning he states that the British were doing their best to strengthen the position of the King and the Chetniks and to weaken the People’s Liberation Army, so that for that reason one couldn’t count on their (British) allied help. Right after that he wrote: „We’ll need your utmost help to solve the problem of Serbia which is very important for us, since the final success and the creation of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia depends on that.” The letter was ended with the following words: „There are many important matters I would like to discuss with you in person.” Stalin accepted the proposal as well as the topic of the talks. It was political, military and material aid of USSR to the People’s Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia. All Tito’s pleas for aid met with favourable response. Everything that happened between USSR, the People’s Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia and the Royal Yugoslav Government from September 28 onwards was the consequence of Tito’s conversation with Stalin. The direct consequence of talks between Tito and Stalin was the TASS statement of September 28 about the agreement of the „Soviet Command” and the People’s Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia. With this statement the Soviet government de facto recognized People’s Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia as the Yugoslav government. This act had great consequences for the development of the People’s Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the advance of the Red Army into Serbia (Kruševac, Čačak, Belgrade) in October 1944 was the fruit of Tito’s agreement with Stalin. The material aid of USSR for the People’s Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia which followed and lasted until the end of the war had also been agreed upon in Moscow. If Tito asked for „large aid” from Stalin, he got it and sealed it during his talks with him between September 21 and 27, 1944.

Београд 20. октобра 1944. године

Author(s): Momčilo Mitrović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The work represents a Historiographie description of Belgrade during the 1944 and 1945. In addition to portraying the city immediately after the liberation, the author describes the war damage on houses, and cultural and industrial monuments and buildings in the capital. The city's cultural features are presented along with its communal capacities and the organization of providing supplies for the inhabitants, in addition to information regarding health service, education, traffic, etc. Local sources are combined with the reports of Fitzroy Maclean, Chief of the British Military Mission, who entered Belgrade a few days after the liberation.

Војвођански Немци у октобру 1944.

Author(s): Zoran Janjetović / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Due to indoctrination, unsatisfying minority position in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, national enthusiasm because of Hitler’s victories and the whole historical situation which was caused by these and other factors, the Vojvodina Swabians sided with Germany and its allies. Because of that, they enjoyed more or less privileged status in the territory of the Vojvodina after April 1941. However, it was coupled with duty to support the war effort of the Axis powers. In August 1944 the situation started to change dramatically for the worse for them due to the capitulation of Romania. Evacuation started to be contemplated. Detailed plans for evacuating German population from the Banat and from Syrmium were made during September, whereas no such plans (except for Novi Sad) were made for the Backa, so as not to undermine the morale of the allied Hungary. Although the Red Army units were already standing on the border of the Yugoslav Banat in late September, the Volksdeutsche were not given permission to start evacuating. Until this day it is not known who was responsible: Hitler, Himmler or the Senior Chief of the SS-Police in Belgrade, Behrends. The reason was certainly the unwillingness to burden the Reich with refugees and to show, in an indirect way, that the German war machinery was grinding to a halt. When the permission to start evacuating the Banat was finally granted on September 28/29, it was already too late for part of the Volksdeutsche; another part, crushed by weeks long anxiety didn’t want to be evacuated any more. In the Bacska flight and evacuation of the Volksdeutsche started simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Hungarian authorities. The main advocates of the evacuation were people active in Volksdeutsche organizations and relatives of the Waffen-SS members. Those who thought they had done no harm to anyone refused to be evacuated. For that reason, only one half of the Germans left the Bacska. On the contrary, in Syrmium the evacuation was executed according to the plan between mid-October and early November. Some 90% of the Germans left, and large quantities of goods were also evacuated. The remaining Volksdeutsche in the Banat and the Bacska were subject to mass shootings, rape, pillaging, arrests and manhandling by members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Red Army. Their freedom of movement was restricted and they were taken to forced labor. Internment of the Swabian population into concentration camps began. On October 17, 1944 Military Administration was imposed in the Banat and the Bacska. It was supposed to fortify the power of the PLA and to use all resources of the province for further war effort. It had a distinct anti-minority taint, and the Hungarians suffered together with the Germans during the first weeks of the new regime – albeit to a smaller extent. The treatment of the Hungarians was relaxed in late November, whereas it became even more rigid for the Germans. In that way October 1944 brought freedom to the Serbian population and the beginning of Calvary for the Volksdeutsche.

Участие СССР в депортации Немцев с территории Югославии после Второй Мировой Войны (1944–1946 г.)

Author(s): Jelena Jurjevna Guskova / Language(s): Russian Publication Year: 0

The fact about deportation of Germans from territory of Yugoslavia the come to power communists is known. However in the Russian archives documents on participation in it of Moscow contain. Recently published documents allow to restore this process in detail enough. On December, 16th, 1944 the State Committee of Defense of the USSR has accepted the decision about mobilization and internment for use on works in the USSR „all able-bodied Germans in the age of - men from 17 till 45 years, women from 18 till 30 years which are being on released Red Army of territory of Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia“. The management of operation has been assigned to comrade Beriju. Directly for Yugoslavia and Bulgaria answered Tolbukhin and Biruzov. Till 19 January, 1945 from the Balkan countries 67930 Germans have been sent to the USSR, including from Yugoslavia – 10935 persons. The Interned Germans worked in the USSR till the spring 1946.

Искуство сучељавања: Црвеноармејци и становништво Србије

Author(s): Aleksej J. Timofejev / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

The mutual perception of the Red Army soldiers and Serbian population in fall 1944 had far-reaching consequences. The people who came to the Balkans in the ranks of the Red Army in fall 1944 differed from the „pre-revolutionary Russians”. The slump in living standards of peasants and workers supplied in fact the Soviet state with the necessary means for developing the heavy industry and armaments production. During 1930s Russia was transformed from a semiagricultural country into a industrial giant able to produce more quality armament than the leading industrial powers of Europe. For many Red Army soldiers coming to the Balkans was the first opportunity to compare the life in capitalism with the achievements of the Communist system. Soldiers and officers represented relatively young population. Youth coupled with large wartime experience increased the self-assuredness and even self-assertiveness of the soldiers, and particularly of officers. Apart from their comparative youth, officers and soldiers of the Red Army shared common problems: fatigue, poor nourishment, problems with regular clothes and shoes. Trophies helped with solving these problems. It was not all about belts, sausages and typewriters. In the corps of general Zhdanov 65% of the means of non-combat transport were commandeered enemy cars. There were individual problems with immoral behaviour and pilfering, although their number was minimal compared to the general mass of the soldiers. Alcohol was the general problem. The Red Army soldiers knew next to nothing about Yugoslavia before coming to the Balkans. The sole exception was the propaganda message about the partisan movement and Tito transmitted in a few articles before crossing the Serbian border on the Danube. After a while a informal closeness developed between the Red Army soldiers and the partisans, which sometimes turned into collective drinking bouts. All Soviet participants in the combats in Yugoslavia remembered the forthcoming attitude on the part of the population. Perception of the Red Army soldiers by Yugoslav (Serbian) civilians and soldiers had another predispositions and was considerably different. From the materials at our disposal, a general conclusion can be drawn that Yugoslavs, and Serbs in the first place, felt a bit disappointed in USSSR and even in Russians after the Red Army had passed through their territory. Criminal or antisocial behaviour of some Red Army soldiers had to leave a bitter taste, even amidst great joy because of liberation from the German occupation. Partisan repression also contributed to that. However, it would be wrong to claim that the final Yugoslav, and above all Serbian, perception of the Soviet soldiers was just negative. The longawaited liberation and the meeting with the „Russians” couldn’t be completely marred by excesses of individuals and haughty and cautious behaviour of the Soviet officers. The material aid and military assistance lent by the Soviet state to the People’s Liberation Army in the last phase of the war also contributed to the creation of a more positive image of USSR, although occasional confusions and misunderstandings occurred here too. Joy to „see the back” of the Germans, mixed with positive feelings for the Russians and lack of knowledge about the character of the Communist regime, led to touching scenes.

Отношение Вашингтона к участию Красной армии в освобождении Югославии

Author(s): Aleksej A. Kostin / Language(s): Russian Publication Year: 0

The participation of the Red Army in the liberation of Yugoslavia is one of the topics from WWII which have a political flip-side. The news about Red Army's advance into the Yugoslav territory came as no surprise to the White House. The Americans were informed by the British and by their own intelligence service about the trip of the leader of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito to Moscow. In the State Department there were no doubts about the consequences of Tito's visit to Moscow, and already on September 20, 1944 the possibility of scaling down the len-lease aid for Yugoslavia was discussed. The Americans considered the possibility of the Soviet participation in the liberation of the Balkans already in late 1943. President's position voiced at the conferences in Kairo and Teheran prove that Roosevelt, believing in complete success of the Red Army in Romania, deemed its advance in Yugoslavia very likely. The Western Allies could prevent the Red Army's advance only at the cost of the break-up of the Anti-Hitler coalition. Taking into account the complexity of the military actions in the Balkans, a delay of the Allied armies in the case of operations in Istria and Dalmatia, could lead to the Red Army's turning toward Holland, Belgium and France after the fall of Berlin. The information of the US intelligence service say Yugoslavia was liberated largely thanks to the Red Army. American agents claimed the Yugoslav partisans had no heavy armament necessary for larger military actions, which directly caused low military efficiency of the People's Liberation Army. The information of the American intelligence service directed the Washington analysts to better understand the mutual interest of Moscow and the Yugoslav partisans in each other. Relying on the Soviet military and political support Tito conquered power, and the Soviet leadership strove to spread Communist influence through the victory of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. After all, the State Department considered the presence of the Soviet military forces in Yugoslavia as an „important factor” which had to be taken into account in the process of making US policy toward Yugoslavia.

Совјетски савез и формирање југословенских снага безбедности (1944–1945)

Author(s): Dmitar Tasić / Language(s): Serbian Publication Year: 0

Parallel with the „wartime“ formation of the „New“ or Tito’s Yugoslavia and its armed forces, the process of founding of the security apparatus was also going on. The fact that the war against the occupiers was at the same time a civil war and a thoroughgoing socialist revolution, additionally stressed the importance of well organized and well trained security and intelligence agencies. No doubt, ties established with USSR during the war as well as the known experiences of the October Revolution, civil wars in USSR and in Spain, had a strong impact on the way the Yugoslav security apparatus was formed and used. The split with USSR which came about in 1948 and which influenced this sphere too, would entail stressing autochthonous development or unconscious neglect or total omission of the foreign (speak: Soviet) influence in subsequent research.