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Tengelyi László Kant-képének és időfelfogásának erkölcsfilozófiai hozadékáról
In his early works, László Tengelyi made an attempt to create a theory aiming to unify the “diacritical system” of Merleau- Ponty and the “an-archic” ethics founded by Lévinas upon the thought of “radical alterity”. Later on, Tengelyi turned away from this theory that he himself developed. In my paper, I would like to argue that this ethical approach of his is indeed both possible and relevant, and that one can call it a diacritical ethics. My thesis is based – within the framework of a kind of “philosophical replay” – on two elements: on the radical temporality of the “diacritical model”, and on Tengelyi’s interpretation of the late Kant, whom he calls “the thinker of antinomies”. I believe it is precisely Kant’s wellelaborated antinomies that can reveal the main differences (the main oppositions) of our ethical decisions as well as the temporal dimensions of our ethical theories. Three differences are to be detected and distinguished here, namely those in respect of [1] ethics, [2] morality, and [3] virtue. One can call these differences unbridgeable gaps: gaps [1] between theories founded upon the immanent (present-focused) and transcendent (future-focused) ground; [2] between the theories of deontologism (their measure is always a priori) and consequentialism (their measure is always a posteriori); and [3] between the theories of free will (all these notions reckon with the beginning) and (beginningless) determinism. Nevertheless, these antinomies are not to be resolved. Rather, they exist as limits for considering our ethical problems. It is by these limits that a diacritical space of our ethics is, from time to time, constituted and reconstituted. It is only within these limits that our diacritical ways appear, moving always between the past and future, sometimes crossing each other in radical turns, which Tengelyi calls “destinal events in life history”. The conclusion of the paper is that as the diacritical ways of our “life histories” exist always diachronically in a diacritical space, which is also limited by our thinking of temporality, the theory of a diacritical ethics is a possible, coherent and acceptable approach.
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János Erdélyi, a 19th century Hegelian classic of the historiography of Hungarian philosophy has summarised his narrative in the following scheme. The first epoch was the prehistory of Hungarian thought, formulated in a foreign language, Latin; the second one was the long period of the turn from Latin to Hungarian; and the third and last one is when Hungarian philosophy writes its own history, beginning with the foundation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. After Erdélyi’s masterpiece on Hungarian philosophy, there have been no serious candidates for a new synthesis until the second half of the 20th century. This paper offers an overview of the last two centuries of the history of Hungarian philosophy in the mirror of its paradigmatic errors. First, it discusses the case of Boëthius de Dacia as a Hungarian mediaeval philosopher, and then the misinterpretation of the early modern works of János Pósaházi and József Rozgonyi, following the pattern of the history of reception. According to the hypothesis of this paper, all these paradigmatic errors have been caused by a wrong formulation of the connection between the universal and the national narratives of the history of philosophy. After an overview of the usual solutions to this problem in the Hungarian historiography of philosophy, the author outlines a new method for establishing the paradigm of an East-Central-European history of philosophy, above, but not instead of the national narratives, which can also modify the universal narrative in several details.
More...„Utasok” és „kirándulók” a magyar filozófia történetében
The essay deals with four significant personalities in the history of Hungarian philosophy in the 20th century: Imre Pauer, Ákos Pauler, Bódog Somló, Béla Tankó. Its argumentation distinguishes two types of philosophers. The “passenger” consistently perseveres in his first chosen philosophy: he is not diverted by new philosophies. The “excursionist”, on the other hand, inconsistently, leaves behind his original philosophy, and chooses himself a new one. The conclusion of the essay: Pauer and Tankó are “passengers”, Somló and Pauler are “excursionists”.
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Although his main favourites were German, French and English thinkers, Ákos Pauler, the most respected Hungarian philosopher of the first decades of the 20th century, had also substantial connection with Italian philosophers and works. Treating the topic of the Italian line, according to the chronological order, the following items should be analysed: 1. Pauler’s longer sojourns in Italy before the First World War, when he attended different conferences and made personal relationships with different philosophers, especially with Mario Calderoni. 2. Benedetto Croce’s influence on Pauler and the Hungarian philosopher’s criticism on Croce’s position relating to the problems of pure logic and aesthetics. 3. Pauler’s view on Mussolini and its import for the political ideas of the Hungarian thinker. 4. The reception of Pauler’s Grundlegung der Philosophie in the philosophical school of Naples (Cleto Carbonara, Nicola Abbagnano) and Pauler’s answers to their criticisms. 5. Antonio Rosmini-Serbati’s and Giovanni Peano’s influence on Pauler in his later years in the fields of theistic metaphysics and symbolic logic. The paper focuses on the influences of the early phase of Ákos Pauler’s activity and it deals with the first two points.
More...Tengelyi László munkássága az 1980-as és 90-es években
The article aims to give a picture of László Tengelyi’s early works. The first part analyses Tengelyi’s relationship to Kant and to the problem of evil in Kantian moral philosophy. The key concepts of his early works are moral autonomy, guilt, fate, history of life, and intersubjectivity. The second part presents Tengelyi’s first original work after his significant Kant-interpretations. His Guilt as Fate Event (1992) concentrates on the problem of evil, rejecting the classical conception of the metaphysical tradition based on the “privation thesis”. By showing that evil cannot be reduced to privation, nonbeing, and nullity, Tengelyi opens up another, latent tradition, that of the tragic view of culpability. The conception of guilt as an eminent event of fate is supposed to be able to substitute the privation thesis of traditional metaphysics. The elaboration of this concept is Tengelyi’s first step toward creating his own philosophy.
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In this interview, László Tengelyi answers the question of the Hungarian Phenomenological Society: “how did you arrive to the phenomenological tradition and to phenomenological thinking?” The form of the answer is an essay which was written in 2006. Tengelyi describes his first encounter with Husserl and Heidegger through Nicolai Hartmann’s aesthetics and ontology. This attraction was deepened during his 1988-89 stay in Leuven with the support of the Soros Foundation. Rudolf Bernet and other prominent phenomenologists (Klaus Held, Bernhard Waldenfels, Marc Richir) convinced him that phenomenology is one of the possible ways of original thinking. What distinguishes phenomenology from other contemporary schools of thought (structuralism, analytical philosophy, critical social philosophy) is its inner relation to the whole tradition of Western philosophy. That is why phenomenology, “with its historical saturation”, is able to maintain a kind of spiritual vigilance in the philosophical practice.
More...Marquard, Fehér és Lyotard a modernitás/posztmodernitás diszpozíciójáról
The paper compares Jean-François Lyotard’s, Odo Marquard’s and Ferenc Fehér’s conception of aesthetics from the viewpoint of the disposition of modernity/postmodernity. None of the authors considers the comparison between modernity and postmodernity mechanically. While Marquard and Fehér claim the modernity of the postmodern, Lyotard affirms the postmodernity of the modern, with a view to Nietzsche’s basic insight that reality can only be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon.
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In this essay, I try to sketch the outlines of two conflicting inquiries concerning the historical position of Mannerism. My basic idea is that they share a common goal of constituting a multifaceted theory of investigating art history. The first is based on the Kantian tradition of unified aesthetics (epistemological, moral and aesthetical studies are grounded in the same architecture of knowledge) and describes the works of art as they are given to our intuitions as the documents of a certain world view or Weltanschauung. The second is rather built on the idea that we have to emphasize the various ways in which the works of art were made and denies that such a world view could be reconstructed. Here I only present a historical case study of the first line of questioning, stating that the young Arnold Hauser was a fierce advocate of artistic style as the bearer of moral, ethical questions. In this way Mannerism is the document of a transitional, critical period in European art history and European culture. If this is correct, Mannerism could be interpreted as a model for investigating and comprehending contemporary instances of transition and crisis. Finally, I trace back this view (as a criseological approach to contemporary culture) to some ideas of the young Georg Lukács.
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