Series:Helsinške Sveske

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №01: Serbian Elite

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №01: Serbian Elite

Author(s): Olivera Milosavljević,Radmila Radić,Obrad Savić / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; memorandum; responsibility; SANU; regime; Serb question; political history; Slobodan Milošević; national program;

(English edition) The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) came to the political forefront some 10 years ago. Criticized by the “old regime” for the manner in which it raised the Serb question and its project of national homogenization (1986), and then encouraged by the “new regime” to continue its efforts, the Academy as an institution consented in the most critical years which determined the future of the common Yugoslav state (1987-1991) to act as a “collective mind” in judging and positively evaluating the execution of the “project” by Slobodan Milošević. It was this moment in the Academy’s political activity that caused internal turmoil and led to the crystallization of several groupings within its politically active membership. If the primary rift in 1992 was marked by being for or against Milošević personally, with both sides on the whole approving his “national project,” the breach is now much deeper at all levels. Nowadays the opinions of the members of the Academy differ on virtually all issues: the evaluation of Milošević’s rule, the point at which it became “bad” or “less bad,” the role of the Academy in society, the Memorandum, the nature of the wars in Yugoslavia, what constitutes victory or defeat, the importance and responsibility of intellectuals, population problems, and even election of their own officers. The Academy no longer comes out with common political stands, its present and former presidents deny that it is a “collective mind” and often cite ignorance of the situation as the reason why they cannot make public statements. Members even react to addresses delivered by officers at the Academy’s assemblies and meetings. It is therefore impossible today to reply to questions regarding the political orientation of the Academy, whether or not it at present has a “national program,” how it envisages Serbia’s future, since one would inevitably have to ascribe the views of a particular group of politically active academicians to the institution as a whole. Just as there was no doubt that such a group existed up to 1991 and encountered little overt opposition within the Academy, it is now certain that there are no more undisputed (national-political) authorities in the institution; only individuals remain with their personal opinions which are binding on no one but themselves. After a long series of failures, erroneous prognoses and an impermissibly uncivilized public settling of accounts, their personal authority as the “minds of the nation” has at best been seriously shaken, if it exists at all. For the reasons cited above, this paper is an overview of the stands predominating among the leading members of the Academy, its former and current presidents, and the stands of the politically active academicians. These academicians were in what used to be the dominant current in the Academy and are now only individuals who have closed their political circle – from their former belief that the generation which was nearing its allotted span had been called upon to reveal to the nation the road it should take, to the realization that the responsibility for all the defeats that have occurred in the meantime lies either on one man or is “collective.” Of their once staunch support for Slobodan Milošević, all that remains are their confused replies to the question: “Why do I protest?”

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №01: Serbian Elite

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №01: Srpska Elita

Author(s): Olivera Milosavljević,Radmila Radić,Obrad Savić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; memorandum; responsibility; SANU; regime; Serb question; political history; Slobodan Milošević; national program;

(Serbian edition) The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) came to the political forefront some 10 years ago. Criticized by the “old regime” for the manner in which it raised the Serb question and its project of national homogenization (1986), and then encouraged by the “new regime” to continue its efforts, the Academy as an institution consented in the most critical years which determined the future of the common Yugoslav state (1987-1991) to act as a “collective mind” in judging and positively evaluating the execution of the “project” by Slobodan Milošević. It was this moment in the Academy’s political activity that caused internal turmoil and led to the crystallization of several groupings within its politically active membership. If the primary rift in 1992 was marked by being for or against Milošević personally, with both sides on the whole approving his “national project,” the breach is now much deeper at all levels. Nowadays the opinions of the members of the Academy differ on virtually all issues: the evaluation of Milošević’s rule, the point at which it became “bad” or “less bad,” the role of the Academy in society, the Memorandum, the nature of the wars in Yugoslavia, what constitutes victory or defeat, the importance and responsibility of intellectuals, population problems, and even election of their own officers. The Academy no longer comes out with common political stands, its present and former presidents deny that it is a “collective mind” and often cite ignorance of the situation as the reason why they cannot make public statements. Members even react to addresses delivered by officers at the Academy’s assemblies and meetings. It is therefore impossible today to reply to questions regarding the political orientation of the Academy, whether or not it at present has a “national program,” how it envisages Serbia’s future, since one would inevitably have to ascribe the views of a particular group of politically active academicians to the institution as a whole. Just as there was no doubt that such a group existed up to 1991 and encountered little overt opposition within the Academy, it is now certain that there are no more undisputed (national-political) authorities in the institution; only individuals remain with their personal opinions which are binding on no one but themselves. After a long series of failures, erroneous prognoses and an impermissibly uncivilized public settling of accounts, their personal authority as the “minds of the nation” has at best been seriously shaken, if it exists at all. For the reasons cited above, this paper is an overview of the stands predominating among the leading members of the Academy, its former and current presidents, and the stands of the politically active academicians. These academicians were in what used to be the dominant current in the Academy and are now only individuals who have closed their political circle – from their former belief that the generation which was nearing its allotted span had been called upon to reveal to the nation the road it should take, to the realization that the responsibility for all the defeats that have occurred in the meantime lies either on one man or is “collective.” Of their once staunch support for Slobodan Milošević, all that remains are their confused replies to the question: “Why do I protest?”

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №02: Potential For Changes

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №02: Potential For Changes

Author(s): Slobodan Inić,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; social awareness; social crisis; demography; generations; regression; egalitarism; ethnicity; mind-set; history; interpretation; west; manipulation; transition; political crisis; recession; NATO; Kosovo; civic alliance;

(English edition) This report contains the analysis of data collected during the month of October 1999. One should have in mind this time frame-when considering the findings, drawing different generalizations or setting guidelines for possible actions. Sets of values of members of the observed generation, their social awareness, perception of the past and present, their stance on the West, and above all their potential to bring about changes are essentially determined by some long-standing and less intensive structural factors. To put it simply a generation of people who today have between 25 and 35 years, and who represent the future of the country, was to a large extent formed under the influence of structural features of the society eroded by constant wars and war threats, protracted economic crisis, internal conflicts and strife and total confusion in the sphere of social awareness and public moral. The generation which in the last decade came of age in such a society per force had to reflect its essential characteristics, despite a relative autonomy which each age groups had as its inherent characteristic. Young people and even relatively young people, to which the respondents of this survey belong, have a determined biological and psychological potential which can help them partially overcome the given moment of time and which usually indicates some of their future contents and values in the present day. In that sense one could expect that the mind-set of the observed generation substantially differs from so-called social conscience. But in conditions of an ever-deepening social crisis, in which the process of coming-of-age unfolded under pressure of retrograde, rather than progressive social factors, the aforementioned advantages of such a generation are less manifest, since their potential crumbles under pressure of a regressive society. One must bear in mind the aforementioned and thus avoid to treat unjustly the observed age group: they are expected to be the creators of the Serbian society at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, but it is pretty obvious that their social actions will be affected by a sorry legacy of the social and moral collapse. In fact they were not less predestined than the earlier generations to be unequipped for the contemporary world. They simply developed under much less favorable conditions. But this should not minimize their responsibility for the future development of society in Serbia. On the other hand such adverse development factors should be borne in mind if one truly wishes to understand the traits of this generation, instead of bluntly condemning them. My intention is not to prejudge results evidenced by this survey, but it bears mentioning that it is easier to reject the middle generation in Serbia, like Serbia proper, than to try to understand and render assistance to both.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №02: Potential For Changes

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №02: Potencijal za promene

Author(s): Slobodan Inić,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; social awareness; social crisis; demography; generations; regression; egalitarism; ethnicity; mind-set; history; interpretation; west; manipulation; transition; political crisis; recession; NATO; Kosovo; civic alliance;

This report contains the analysis of data collected during the month of October 1999. One should have in mind this time frame-when considering the findings, drawing different generalizations or setting guidelines for possible actions. Sets of values of members of the observed generation, their social awareness, perception of the past and present, their stance on the West, and above all their potential to bring about changes are essentially determined by some long-standing and less intensive structural factors. To put it simply a generation of people who today have between 25 and 35 years, and who represent the future of the country, was to a large extent formed under the influence of structural features of the society eroded by constant wars and war threats, protracted economic crisis, internal conflicts and strife and total confusion in the sphere of social awareness and public moral. The generation which in the last decade came of age in such a society per force had to reflect its essential characteristics, despite a relative autonomy which each age groups had as its inherent characteristic. Young people and even relatively young people, to which the respondents of this survey belong, have a determined biological and psychological potential which can help them partially overcome the given moment of time and which usually indicates some of their future contents and values in the present day. In that sense one could expect that the mind-set of the observed generation substantially differs from so-called social conscience. But in conditions of an ever-deepening social crisis, in which the process of coming-of-age unfolded under pressure of retrograde, rather than progressive social factors, the aforementioned advantages of such a generation are less manifest, since their potential crumbles under pressure of a regressive society. One must bear in mind the aforementioned and thus avoid to treat unjustly the observed age group: they are expected to be the creators of the Serbian society at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, but it is pretty obvious that their social actions will be affected by a sorry legacy of the social and moral collapse. In fact they were not less predestined than the earlier generations to be unequipped for the contemporary world. They simply developed under much less favorable conditions. But this should not minimize their responsibility for the future development of society in Serbia. On the other hand such adverse development factors should be borne in mind if one truly wishes to understand the traits of this generation, instead of bluntly condemning them. My intention is not to prejudge results evidenced by this survey, but it bears mentioning that it is easier to reject the middle generation in Serbia, like Serbia proper, than to try to understand and render assistance to both.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №03: Russia, Serbia, Montenegro

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №03: Russia, Serbia, Montenegro

Author(s): Jelica Kurjak,Olga Popović-Obradović,Mijat Šuković / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Balkans; European Policy; Yugoslavia; conflicts; NATO; Constitutionality; Serbia; Montenegro; Federation; Equal States; freedoms and rights, separation;

(English edition) Russia’s long presence in the Balkans - from the eleventh century onwards - can be analysed in terms of its two salient features: continuity and, as far as the role of the Russian state in Balkan (especially Serbian) affairs is concerned, inconstancy. Russia has been trying to push out its frontiers as far as the warm seas ever since Muscovy Russ and the principality of Kiev began to expand. Its imperialistic policy has carried its influence as far south-west as the Adriatic Sea across and with the help of Balkan states. Various Balkan states have found in Russia both friend and foe; this depended on their attitude towards Russia’s rivals among the great powers and towards other Balkan countries at the time. At one time the latter found Russia’s support invaluable, at another they regarded it counter-productive. Russia was particularly adept in capitalising on Balkan crises and wars, in which it took an active part, to strengthen its position in the Balkans; its consequent peace-making efforts were almost always hailed by local populations with great relief. This policy has given rise to a number of myths in some Balkan countries (especially among the Serbs) about there being a selfless "mother Russia" always ready to rush to one’s rescue. However, historical evidence shows Russia to have been far less amiable and benevolent than some local political elites concerned primarily with furthering their day-to-day political objectives made out at the time. In the pursuance of its "Balkan strategy" Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, sought to realise its political interests; the fact that at some periods these interests coincided with the interests of some Balkan nations cannot be used to defend the thesis that Russia has been an a priori friend of Balkan states, especially of Serbia and/or Montenegro. Once the need for an outlet to the warm seas ceased being a strategic priority, Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, found another justification for its presence in the Balkans: having emerged from the Second World War as a major world power, it took part in the partition of Europe into two political systems and controlled one-half of the Balkan peninsula for over fifty years ostensibly to protective those parts from the other, imperialistic side. Throughout that period Russia’s political vocabulary and rhetoric abounded with stock ideological phrases to justify this presence in some Balkan country or other. Finally, the closing years of the twentieth century, witnessing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY, proved once again that Russia is an unavoidable protagonist in Balkan tragedies. As a great power, Russia strove permanently to add territory and then to protect its gains by all available means. Whenever it found it impossible to expand territorially, Russia sought to widen the zones of its political, economic and military influence. Russia either waged war or played nations against each other to realise its strategic objectives in the role of victor or peacemaker as the case may be; whether on the winning or the losing side, Russia always made the most of a situation. To be sure, besides paying rich dividends this policy occasionally backfired: in times of war, for instance, Russia usually paid a heavy price in human lives as well as found it necessary to deal with increasingly strong separatist movements on its soil (especially in 1991-93). But even in such times of adversity Russia found the strength to make the most of the setback. On the other hand, whenever it emerged victorious it tried to keep all the spoils. This dual line became especially prominent after the cold war and the end of the bipolar division of the world, when Russia failed to learn to play the part of one of the major forces in Europe; it is still finding it difficult to accept its new role of a respectable factor. The contradictory nature of Russia’s imperialistic policy vis-à-vis the Balkans was shown up in particular during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY. The analyses that follow show that even when Russia seemed to be losing ground it managed to realise its interests at least partially if not in whole.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №03: Russia, Serbia, Montenegro

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №03: Rusija, Srbija, Crna Gora

Author(s): Jelica Kurjak,Olga Popović-Obradović,Mijat Šuković / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Russia; Balkans; European Policy; Yugoslavia; conflicts; NATO; Constitutionality; Serbia; Montenegro; Federation; Equal States; freedoms and rights, separation;

Russia’s long presence in the Balkans - from the eleventh century onwards - can be analysed in terms of its two salient features: continuity and, as far as the role of the Russian state in Balkan (especially Serbian) affairs is concerned, inconstancy. Russia has been trying to push out its frontiers as far as the warm seas ever since Muscovy Russ and the principality of Kiev began to expand. Its imperialistic policy has carried its influence as far south-west as the Adriatic Sea across and with the help of Balkan states. Various Balkan states have found in Russia both friend and foe; this depended on their attitude towards Russia’s rivals among the great powers and towards other Balkan countries at the time. At one time the latter found Russia’s support invaluable, at another they regarded it counter-productive. Russia was particularly adept in capitalising on Balkan crises and wars, in which it took an active part, to strengthen its position in the Balkans; its consequent peace-making efforts were almost always hailed by local populations with great relief. This policy has given rise to a number of myths in some Balkan countries (especially among the Serbs) about there being a selfless "mother Russia" always ready to rush to one’s rescue. However, historical evidence shows Russia to have been far less amiable and benevolent than some local political elites concerned primarily with furthering their day-to-day political objectives made out at the time. In the pursuance of its "Balkan strategy" Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, sought to realise its political interests; the fact that at some periods these interests coincided with the interests of some Balkan nations cannot be used to defend the thesis that Russia has been an a priori friend of Balkan states, especially of Serbia and/or Montenegro. Once the need for an outlet to the warm seas ceased being a strategic priority, Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union, found another justification for its presence in the Balkans: having emerged from the Second World War as a major world power, it took part in the partition of Europe into two political systems and controlled one-half of the Balkan peninsula for over fifty years ostensibly to protective those parts from the other, imperialistic side. Throughout that period Russia’s political vocabulary and rhetoric abounded with stock ideological phrases to justify this presence in some Balkan country or other. Finally, the closing years of the twentieth century, witnessing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY, proved once again that Russia is an unavoidable protagonist in Balkan tragedies. As a great power, Russia strove permanently to add territory and then to protect its gains by all available means. Whenever it found it impossible to expand territorially, Russia sought to widen the zones of its political, economic and military influence. Russia either waged war or played nations against each other to realise its strategic objectives in the role of victor or peacemaker as the case may be; whether on the winning or the losing side, Russia always made the most of a situation. To be sure, besides paying rich dividends this policy occasionally backfired: in times of war, for instance, Russia usually paid a heavy price in human lives as well as found it necessary to deal with increasingly strong separatist movements on its soil (especially in 1991-93). But even in such times of adversity Russia found the strength to make the most of the setback. On the other hand, whenever it emerged victorious it tried to keep all the spoils. This dual line became especially prominent after the cold war and the end of the bipolar division of the world, when Russia failed to learn to play the part of one of the major forces in Europe; it is still finding it difficult to accept its new role of a respectable factor. The contradictory nature of Russia’s imperialistic policy vis-à-vis the Balkans was shown up in particular during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the FRY. The analyses that follow show that even when Russia seemed to be losing ground it managed to realise its interests at least partially if not in whole.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №05: "Otpor", in or beyond politics

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №05: "Otpor" - više ili manje od politike

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; "Otpor"; movement; resistance; activism; political organisation; socio-political consciousness; Orthodox Church; pro-european orientation; ethnicity; minorities; RS; regime;

The popular movement Otpor (Resistance) is a phenomenon which has left its mark on Serbia’s political stage at the very end of the last decade of the 20th century. Having been established in 1998, it attracted media attention, launched various actions and, especially, grew in numbers and organized structurally at the height of a police crackdown against its members in the spring of 2000. Otpor has played a major part in persuading the ‘silent majority’ to go to the September 2000 polls in order to bring forward the end the neo-socialist regime. Although the full significance of the part played by Otpor can only be assessed on the basis of comprehensive and reliable information about the events and activities leading to the September 24 election results which greatly facilitated the October 5 overthrow, such data as were available fully justify the assessment given above. This study is the result of an empirical questionnaire-type survey carried out in the latter part of October 2000. Irrespective of whether Otpor as such will continue to grow and operate – for the situation has changed radically since its formative days – its organization and the attitudes and frame of mind of its members are a topic which it not without interest. At present, Otpor is highly popular among the general public and is often seen as possessing charismatic attributes. However, it has been pointed out that unreserved praise is sometimes a sign that the recipient is about to perform his swan-song; undivided flattery as a rule is counterproductive in the case of those social actors, especially large political organizations, who are perceived as serious obstacles to groups already controlling large resources of society or at least those who aspire to increase their control of such resources. The absence of any public criticism of Otpor so far may mean that it is regarded as someone who has played his role and is now expected to exit the stage as a relative autonomous political factor; this, of course, does not mean that certain factions and individual members of Otpor may not be recruited by some political parties and other interested organizations. After all, Otpor is still needed as a reserve echelon until the December republican elections in Serbia to throw its weight behind certain political goals such as loosening the grip of the defeated extreme left- and right-wing groupings on these resources, or at least to help the so-called democratic opposition to remain together as the challenge of its political adversaries weakens. However, generally speaking, the absence of any principled opposition to Otpor leads us to the conclusion that its effective influence is less and less; we must bear in mind that the extent of criticism levelled against somebody is a most reliable indicator of his influence on public life. Needless to say, all foretelling is risky; we have all been surprised by events we considered the least likely of a number of possibilities at the time of their prediction. At least we hope that the material presented here will give a true picture of the organization because we believe that it was collected during a period coinciding with the organization’s developed stage.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: The Hague Tribunal Discord Between Us and The World

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: The Hague Tribunal Discord Between Us and the World

Author(s): Milivoj Despot,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

Keywords: Hague Tribunal;ex – Yugoslavia; war crimes; international law; UN; security council; US; victims of war; protection; Serbia; NATO; Carla Del Ponte; Vojislav Koštunica; Slobodan Milošević; intellectuals;

Much was written and said about the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal). And as it usually happens with respect to momentous events, essential things about the Hague Tribunal were committed, notably in view of the fact that in recent wars in the territory of ex- Yugoslavia many crimes were committed and that their perpetrators and accomplices are to be brought to justice and punished. But according to some weird logic, much hyped are opinions of many politicians and some jurists, that the Hague Tribunal is not an institution of justice, but rather a foreign political instrument for trying Serbs, and as such "it should be totally disregarded and vilifed". Exceptions from this general line of thinking were public discussions on the Hague Tribunal staged by some renowned NGOs and institutions and published in some dailies and magazines. The Hague Tribunal was established as an adequate response of international community to drastic violations of international law. During recent wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. The authorities in place hushed up those crimes, downplayed atrocities and covered up the truth. A very small number of people knew what had really happened. As trials were not held before national courts, the International Criminal Tribunal was set up to establish facts in lawful proceedings, to make them public and bring to justice perpetrators of the crimes. There is also another question: Do the trials before the Hague Tribunal have a special significance? Diplomatic means and sanctions were used to put en end to war and ensure peace. But neither were successful. The Dayton and the Paris accord stopped the war, but did not consolidate the peace. Consolidation of peace is not a declaration, but a process. In that process a specific place was accorded to the Hague Tribunal. Within general efforts aimed at re-establishing peace and security in the territory of former Yugoslavia, decisions of the Hague Tribunal have a repressive importance regarding war criminals and a preventive importance regarding every high-ranking politician and military officer. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, international law, thanks to momentous transformation of legal provisions relating to conduct of states and individuals in armed conflicts, and under strong influence of affirmation of human rights stipulated by international covenants, established international individual criminal responsibility of those who gravely violated humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts. If the Hague Tribunal carries out its repressive and preventive tasks and consequently contributes to international justice and legality, stances on war and peace shall be different. In those terms the practice of the Hague Tribunal complements future efficiency of permanent International Criminal Court. Irrefutable legal assumption is that the Hague Tribunal acts as an authorised ad hoc international criminal court and that its decisions should consolidate respect of human rights, peace and international justice. Its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, its orders and warrants transmitted to the states, members of the UN, and obligations of those states to comply with those orders, are in keeping with the international law. Awareness of the obligation that perpetrators of crimes must be handed over to the Hague Tribunal, leads to the replacement of the legal assumption by the truth.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: The Hague Tribunal Discord Between Us and The World

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: Haški Tribunal, naš nesporazum sa svetom

Author(s): Milivoj Despot,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Hague Tribunal;ex – Yugoslavia; war crimes; international law; UN; security council; US; victims of war; protection; Serbia; NATO; Carla Del Ponte; Vojislav Koštunica; Slobodan Milošević; intellectuals;

Much was written and said about the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal). And as it usually happens with respect to momentous events, essential things about the Hague Tribunal were committed, notably in view of the fact that in recent wars in the territory of ex- Yugoslavia many crimes were committed and that their perpetrators and accomplices are to be brought to justice and punished. But according to some weird logic, much hyped are opinions of many politicians and some jurists, that the Hague Tribunal is not an institution of justice, but rather a foreign political instrument for trying Serbs, and as such "it should be totally disregarded and vilifed". Exceptions from this general line of thinking were public discussions on the Hague Tribunal staged by some renowned NGOs and institutions and published in some dailies and magazines. The Hague Tribunal was established as an adequate response of international community to drastic violations of international law. During recent wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. The authorities in place hushed up those crimes, downplayed atrocities and covered up the truth. A very small number of people knew what had really happened. As trials were not held before national courts, the International Criminal Tribunal was set up to establish facts in lawful proceedings, to make them public and bring to justice perpetrators of the crimes. There is also another question: Do the trials before the Hague Tribunal have a special significance? Diplomatic means and sanctions were used to put en end to war and ensure peace. But neither were successful. The Dayton and the Paris accord stopped the war, but did not consolidate the peace. Consolidation of peace is not a declaration, but a process. In that process a specific place was accorded to the Hague Tribunal. Within general efforts aimed at re-establishing peace and security in the territory of former Yugoslavia, decisions of the Hague Tribunal have a repressive importance regarding war criminals and a preventive importance regarding every high-ranking politician and military officer. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, international law, thanks to momentous transformation of legal provisions relating to conduct of states and individuals in armed conflicts, and under strong influence of affirmation of human rights stipulated by international covenants, established international individual criminal responsibility of those who gravely violated humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts. If the Hague Tribunal carries out its repressive and preventive tasks and consequently contributes to international justice and legality, stances on war and peace shall be different. In those terms the practice of the Hague Tribunal complements future efficiency of permanent International Criminal Court. Irrefutable legal assumption is that the Hague Tribunal acts as an authorised ad hoc international criminal court and that its decisions should consolidate respect of human rights, peace and international justice. Its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, its orders and warrants transmitted to the states, members of the UN, and obligations of those states to comply with those orders, are in keeping with the international law. Awareness of the obligation that perpetrators of crimes must be handed over to the Hague Tribunal, leads to the replacement of the legal assumption by the truth.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Minorities and Refugees In Vojvodina

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Minorities and Refugees In Vojvodina

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; Vojvodina; NGO; minorities; refugees; nationalism; radicalization; ethnicity; financial standing; inequality; mind-set;

Presence of over half a million refugees and displaced persons in Serbia is a palpable and live criticism of our recent national program and its implementation. Their fate demonstrates that the nation is not homogenous, that there are no common national interests, but rather different goals with different price tags. It bears stressing that the price paid by the aforementioned population groups was the highest one. Conduct and fate of refugees and their choices, if any, in a drastic way indicate disastrous failure of the idea of annexation of so-called Western Serb countries to the ethnic Serb state. In those terms they are the most convincing critique of domestic nationalism, for they indicate consequences thereof better than any other population groups. If one is to believe different facts and figures, more than three fourth of refugees and displaced persons until recently wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, and only one fifth expressed their wish to return to their homes. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia through its continuing project "I want to go home" helped a sustained return of a large number of refugees, in the face of inertia and political obstacles in several involved countries. Moreover the NGO through this survey tried to look into ways of future return of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Minorities and Refugees In Vojvodina

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Manjine i izbeglice u vojvodini

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; Vojvodina; NGO; minorities; refugees; nationalism; radicalization; ethnicity; financial standing; inequality; mind-set;

Presence of over half a million refugees and displaced persons in Serbia is a palpable and live criticism of our recent national program and its implementation. Their fate demonstrates that the nation is not homogenous, that there are no common national interests, but rather different goals with different price tags. It bears stressing that the price paid by the aforementioned population groups was the highest one. Conduct and fate of refugees and their choices, if any, in a drastic way indicate disastrous failure of the idea of annexation of so-called Western Serb countries to the ethnic Serb state. In those terms they are the most convincing critique of domestic nationalism, for they indicate consequences thereof better than any other population groups. If one is to believe different facts and figures, more than three fourth of refugees and displaced persons until recently wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, and only one fifth expressed their wish to return to their homes. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia through its continuing project "I want to go home" helped a sustained return of a large number of refugees, in the face of inertia and political obstacles in several involved countries. Moreover the NGO through this survey tried to look into ways of future return of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: In the Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: In the Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babović,Miloš Vasić,Filip Švarm / Language(s): English

Keywords: Yugoslavia; army; Serbia; regime; Slobodan Milošević; war-time; peace-time; "serbization"; nationalities; transformation; police forces; international dimension; paramilitary groups;

Even if one were to maintain that some psychological, political and professional features of Yugoslav Army resembled those of the armies of some European states undergoing transition, then one must also admit that the Yugoslav Army does not have its counterpart anywhere in the world when it comes to the YA origins, background, war experience and the current political engagement. One could say without any exaggeration that it is a phenomenon among the armies of the world, as much as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a phenomenon among other countries in the world. At least this assertion applies to the state and its army during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was created not through transformation, as the versions of the domestic (both active and retired) military professionals imply (see, for example, Veljko Kadijević, My perception of the war, Beograd 1993 page 113) but by simple downsizing and (mere renaming) of the former Yugoslav People's Army to the Serbian-Montenegrin combat and high officers cadres. That process evolved in a frightening wanton war destruction and wandering “of the armed force of all our peoples and nationalities” from Karavanka mountains in Slovenia to Danube and Drina. The Army of Yugoslavia after ten years of its existence is still searching for its own identity.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: In the Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: U trouglu državne sile - vojska, policija, paravojska

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babović,Miloš Vasić,Filip Švarm / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Yugoslavia; army; Serbia; regime; Slobodan Milošević; war-time; peace-time; "serbization"; nationalities; transformation; police forces; international dimension; paramilitary groups;

Even if one were to maintain that some psychological, political and professional features of Yugoslav Army resembled those of the armies of some European states undergoing transition, then one must also admit that the Yugoslav Army does not have its counterpart anywhere in the world when it comes to the YA origins, background, war experience and the current political engagement. One could say without any exaggeration that it is a phenomenon among the armies of the world, as much as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a phenomenon among other countries in the world. At least this assertion applies to the state and its army during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was created not through transformation, as the versions of the domestic (both active and retired) military professionals imply (see, for example, Veljko Kadijević, My perception of the war, Beograd 1993 page 113) but by simple downsizing and (mere renaming) of the former Yugoslav People's Army to the Serbian-Montenegrin combat and high officers cadres. That process evolved in a frightening wanton war destruction and wandering “of the armed force of all our peoples and nationalities” from Karavanka mountains in Slovenia to Danube and Drina. The Army of Yugoslavia after ten years of its existence is still searching for its own identity.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №14: "Vlachs" or Romanians from Eastern Serbia and "Vlach Question"

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №14: Vlasi ili Rumuni iz istočne Srbije i “Vlaško pitanje”

Author(s): Dragomir Dragić / Language(s): Romanian,Serbian

Keywords: "Vlachs"; Romanians; Serbia; east; Yugoslavia; census; Romania; ethnicity; language; representative bodies; culture; interethnic relations;

(Serbian and Romanian edition) Uoči popisa stanovništva u Saveznoj republici Jugoslaviji, odnosno u Republici Srbiji, neophodno je detabuizirati tzv. “vlaško pitanje”. Naime, postoji neodrživo nasleđe u tumačenju forme i sadržaja ovoga pitanja. U ovoj brošuri Forum za kulturu Vlaha (na vlaškom: Forumu' pėntru Cultura a Rumâńilor) govori o Vlasima u istočnoj Srbiji, tačnije rečeno između Morave, Dunava i Timoka, kao produktu romanizacije, a ne o nekoj kategoriji “vlaha” koji nemaju takav etnički predznak. Nekih drugih “vlaha” i nema na pomenutom prostoru, sem ako se ne izmisle. Romanizacija kao fenomen započeo je sa rimskim zaposedanjem Ilirika, na istočnoj obali Jadrana, u III veku pre nove ere, a na prostorima gde i danas žive na jezicima nepripadnika tzv. Vlasi, posle 168. godine p.n.e. Tada je nestala antička Makedonija da bi se na jugu Balkanskog poluostrva instaliralo Rimsko carstvo. Ovo carstvo se u prvom veku nove ere proširilo do Dunava, a sa Trajanovim osvajanjima, od 101. do 105. godine nove ere, i preko Dunava. Tako je nastala Trajanova Dakija koja opstaje do 271. godine n.e. Te godine, iz strateških razloga, po odluci imperatora Aurelijana, Rimljani i deo romanizovane populacije napuštaju prostore severno od Dunava, pa se južno od Dunava uspostavlja Aurelijanova Dakija. Ovde se nastavlja proces romanizacije autohtone populacije Tračana, kao i onih koji su iz različitih motiva došli ili su dovedeni sa raznih drugih strana Rimske imperije. Verovatno je taj proces osnažen i promenom u rimskoj legislaciji kroz unifikaciju statusa rimskih građana Ediktom imperatora Karakale 212. godine. Tako su se u jugoistočnoj Evropi rodili “Vlasi”. Zbog intenzivnosti tog procesa na karpatsko-podunavskom prostoru, istorijski gledano ovo šire područje se može označiti prostorom gde su se pojavili “Vlasi”, tj. to je “vlaški matični prostor”. U današnje vreme, imajući u vidu istorijske i antropološko-kulturološke promene koje su se dogodile u proteklih dva milenijuma, tako se može kvalifikovati samo današnja Rumunija. U etnogenetskim procesima, za koje se smatra da su se okončali od VII-X veka, ovaj balkanski element je dobio novo ruho. Njegovom uobličavanju u novi etnički entitet doprinos su dali i Sloveni u svom pomeranju na Balkanskom poluostrvu. U toku ili pri kraju takvog procesa došlo je do razdvajanja severnog i južnog ogranka ove populacije, koja se pod imenom Vlaha pominje u istoriji 976. godine, povodom pogibije Davida, brata cara Samuila. Još iz najranijih vremena Germani su susedne Kelte i Rimljane nazivali WALHOS. Kasnije se ova etnička odrednica suzila na romanizovane populacije koje su dobile svoju latinsku identifikaciju ROMANUS. Od ova dva naziva nastale su hipostaze koje poznajemo i u današnje vreme, uključujući i slovenski naziv “Vlah, Vlasi”, odnosno “vlaški”, na rumunskom književnom jeziku “Român, Români”, na rumunskom narodnom govoru “Rumân, Rumâni” (kao npr. u Dosoftejevom Psaltiru u stihovima na rumunskom iz 1673., te u Šerbanovoj Bibliji na rumunskom iz 1688., itd.), naime na muntenskom, krišanskom, maramureškom, moldavskom i banatskom narečju rumunskog jezika.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №15: National minorities and law

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №15: National minorities and law

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; minorities; legal regulations; international law; federal act; rights and freedoms; native language; education; Vojvodina; central Serbia; political parties; judiciary;

October 2000 political changeover did not produce the fundamental break with Milosevic's policy. There are numerous examples thereof, notably as regards Republika Srpska, Kosovo and Montenegro. Insistence on that orientation in the face of factual defeat had a negative impact on status of inter-ethnic relations in Serbia proper. National policy aiming at creating an ethnically pure Serb state ended with a catastrophic balance: hundreds of thousands of dead, several million displaced persons and refugees. In the past decade minorities, notably Croats (during the war in Croatia), Bosniaks (during the war in B&H) and Albanians (during the whole decade) bore the brunt of "ethnic-cleansing" policy. By extension, relations between the majority people and some minorities were exacerbated. In the meantime minorities have radicalised their stands and are waiting for resolution of their problems by dint of international community brokerage. Most conspicuous example of the aforementioned was South Serbia, in which the danger of conflict spill-over was great for a while. But thanks to NATO and other international organisations actions and efforts tension has eased and cooperation and revival of economy have been initiated owing to enormous political and financial support of the West. Serbia has entered the period of facing up to difficult and long-term consequences of nationalistic and war policy of the former regime. The entire society has been devastated, and institutions of system destroyed. Long wars, international isolation and bombardment campaign have impacted the general social mood, which is marked by high intolerance, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and emergence of neo-Nazi groups. This is all due to the political vacuum and absence of vision of Serbia's future. Such a general atmosphere affects national minorities, who feel increasingly threatened. The last census, according to unofficial information, indicates that Serbia remains a markedly multi-ethnic country. This may be explained by massive emigration or brain-drain of young and educated Serbs. About 400,000 refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, contrary to some expectations, have not to a larger extent changed the demographic structure of the country. Despite emigration of minorities, their percentage remained the same, in view of de-assimilation of Vlahs and Romany (they stopped identifying with Serbs). This means that the minority issue would remain the hot issue, notably if the nationalistic block continues to persist on realisation of ethnically pure state. Some ethnic communities have been territorially homogenised, hence some of them, in some areas constitute the majority population. Some national minorities, notably Albanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Hungarians, Bosniaks/Muslims, and Romanians inhabit border areas. Thus their territorial homogenisation is a complex political fact. Despite current authorities efforts to fine-tune national minorities-related domestic legislation to the European standards, situation in that regard is slowly changing because of badly impaired inter-ethnic relations in the last decade. Ethnic distance had been increased, but as of late it started dwindling, but not everywhere and not with respect to all minorities.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №15: National minorities and law

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №15: Nacionalne manjine i pravo

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; minorities; legal regulations; international law; federal act; rights and freedoms; native language; education; Vojvodina; central Serbia; political parties; judiciary;

October 2000 political changeover did not produce the fundamental break with Milosevic's policy. There are numerous examples thereof, notably as regards Republika Srpska, Kosovo and Montenegro. Insistence on that orientation in the face of factual defeat had a negative impact on status of inter-ethnic relations in Serbia proper. National policy aiming at creating an ethnically pure Serb state ended with a catastrophic balance: hundreds of thousands of dead, several million displaced persons and refugees. In the past decade minorities, notably Croats (during the war in Croatia), Bosniaks (during the war in B&H) and Albanians (during the whole decade) bore the brunt of "ethnic-cleansing" policy. By extension, relations between the majority people and some minorities were exacerbated. In the meantime minorities have radicalised their stands and are waiting for resolution of their problems by dint of international community brokerage. Most conspicuous example of the aforementioned was South Serbia, in which the danger of conflict spill-over was great for a while. But thanks to NATO and other international organisations actions and efforts tension has eased and cooperation and revival of economy have been initiated owing to enormous political and financial support of the West. Serbia has entered the period of facing up to difficult and long-term consequences of nationalistic and war policy of the former regime. The entire society has been devastated, and institutions of system destroyed. Long wars, international isolation and bombardment campaign have impacted the general social mood, which is marked by high intolerance, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and emergence of neo-Nazi groups. This is all due to the political vacuum and absence of vision of Serbia's future. Such a general atmosphere affects national minorities, who feel increasingly threatened. The last census, according to unofficial information, indicates that Serbia remains a markedly multi-ethnic country. This may be explained by massive emigration or brain-drain of young and educated Serbs. About 400,000 refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, contrary to some expectations, have not to a larger extent changed the demographic structure of the country. Despite emigration of minorities, their percentage remained the same, in view of de-assimilation of Vlahs and Romany (they stopped identifying with Serbs). This means that the minority issue would remain the hot issue, notably if the nationalistic block continues to persist on realisation of ethnically pure state. Some ethnic communities have been territorially homogenised, hence some of them, in some areas constitute the majority population. Some national minorities, notably Albanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Hungarians, Bosniaks/Muslims, and Romanians inhabit border areas. Thus their territorial homogenisation is a complex political fact. Despite current authorities efforts to fine-tune national minorities-related domestic legislation to the European standards, situation in that regard is slowly changing because of badly impaired inter-ethnic relations in the last decade. Ethnic distance had been increased, but as of late it started dwindling, but not everywhere and not with respect to all minorities.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №16: The point of discord - on the controversy run on the pages of "Vreme" from 1st August to 21st November 2002

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №16: Tačka razlaza - povodom polemike vođene na stranicama lista "Vreme" od 1. avgusta do 21. novembra 2002. godine

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; media; magazine; "Vreme"; polemics;

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №17: How to attain European standards - the Situation of Serbian Prisons 2002-2003.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №17: Kako do evropskih standarda - zatvori u Srbiji 2002-2003.

Author(s): Marija Jelić,Milosav Kiurski,Nataša Novaković,Marijana Obradović / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; prison; KPZ; VPD; district prison; Niš; Požarevac; Sremska Mitrovica; Belgrade; Padinska Skela; Ćuprija; Šabac; Sombor; Kruševac; Valjevo; Novi Sad; quality of life; security; lawfulness; social resettlement; outside world contact; personnel;

(Serbian edition) Throughout the totalitarian rule of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and his henchmen, which lasted for over a decade, the country’s prisons remained shut to public scrutiny. Information about the state of human rights of the prisoners and the conditions in which they served their sentences was the exclusive privilege of the state authorities directly involved and of the individuals and institutions concerned with the matter for purposes of scientific research. The question of prisoners’ human rights was completely marginalized by war, crimes, economic hardship and daily violations of citizens’ human rights and freedoms up to 5 October 2000. For many a convict, being locked away to serve a sentence of imprisonment did not mean mere deprivation of liberty for a set period of time, but also the start of a cruel struggle for survival in the gloom of lawlessness, corruption, torture, inhuman conditions and society’s total lack of interest in his or her life behind bars. It was only after widespread prison rioting broke out in November 2000 that the public’s attention was drawn to the conditions in which the prisoners served their sentences. The prisoners put out announcements throwing light on the substandard and inhuman conditions prevailing in Serbia’s penitentiaries and prisons. During the riots, groups and individual prisoners made statements complaining that the prison conditions were far below the levels set by relevant international standards and domestic prison rules. The prisoners alleged serious violations of their physical and psychological integrity, humiliating and degrading treatment, unjust punishment and general arbitrary treatment by prison personnel. They complained of, among other things, torture by beating, lack of minimum personal hygiene facilities, absence of medical treatment and health care, and corruption among prison administrative staff. Some of the allegations and complaints were partly confirmed by competent officials of the Ministry of Justice. As a palliative for the utterly unsatisfactory prison conditions, federal and republican amnesty laws were duly introduced to be finally adopted respectively on 26 February 2001 and 13 February 2001. Nonetheless, although a number of convicts were fully amnestied and a percentage of sentences commuted, the conditions in which prisoners served their sentenced remained unchanged. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the inhuman conditions in Serbia’s prisons endured and multiplied also owing to the country’s isolation of many years, during which time no international organization other than the International Red Cross was granted access to its prisons. Domestic non-governmental organizations were also kept at arm’s length and only rarely allowed to see what went on inside. In view of the circumstances enumerated above, it was clearly necessary to introduce continuous monitoring of prisons by an independent, non-governmental institution in order to obtain a realistic picture of the prison conditions. The new government is aware that admission to the Council of Europe and to other international organizations depends in part on the conditions in which sentenced persons serve their prison sentences, as well as that the public must be informed about those conditions. So, after presenting the concept and objectives of the Prison Monitoring project, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia was granted permission in May 2001 to visit institutions for the enforcement of criminal sanctions. This meant that for the first time in the history of this state an NGO could apply for and be granted permission to visit places of detention, custody and imprisonment without any restrictions, to interview prisoners with no personnel being present, and to talk to personnel without the presence of administration officers. Between June 2001 and October 2003, the Helsinki Committee paid a total of twenty-one visits to institutions for the enforcement of sanctions entailing the deprivation of liberty. During the period covered by this report (April 2002 to October 2003) the Helsinki Committee visited twelve institutions (one maximum-security prison, two closed prisons, three open prisons, two district prisons, one psychiatric prison, one reformatory, and one juvenile prison). In launching the project, the Helsinki Committee was principally guided by Article 64 of the European Prison Rules which states: ‘Imprisonment is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself. The conditions of imprisonment and the prison regimes shall not, therefore, except as incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in this.’ The Helsinki Committee hopes that its efforts to complete the project and publish this book will make a small but valuable contribution towards achieving this goal.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №17: How to attain european standards - the Situation of Serbian Prisons 2002-2003.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №17: How to attain european standards - the Situation of Serbian Prisons 2002-2003.

Author(s): Marija Jelić,Nataša Novaković,Marijana Obradović,Milosav Kiurski / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; prison; KPZ; VPD; district prison; Niš; Požarevac; Sremska Mitrovica; Belgrade; Padinska Skela; Ćuprija; Šabac; Sombor; Kruševac; Valjevo; Novi Sad; quality of life; security; lawfulness; social resettlement; outside world contact; personnel;

(English edition) Throughout the totalitarian rule of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and his henchmen, which lasted for over a decade, the country’s prisons remained shut to public scrutiny. Information about the state of human rights of the prisoners and the conditions in which they served their sentences was the exclusive privilege of the state authorities directly involved and of the individuals and institutions concerned with the matter for purposes of scientific research. The question of prisoners’ human rights was completely marginalized by war, crimes, economic hardship and daily violations of citizens’ human rights and freedoms up to 5 October 2000. For many a convict, being locked away to serve a sentence of imprisonment did not mean mere deprivation of liberty for a set period of time, but also the start of a cruel struggle for survival in the gloom of lawlessness, corruption, torture, inhuman conditions and society’s total lack of interest in his or her life behind bars. It was only after widespread prison rioting broke out in November 2000 that the public’s attention was drawn to the conditions in which the prisoners served their sentences. The prisoners put out announcements throwing light on the substandard and inhuman conditions prevailing in Serbia’s penitentiaries and prisons. During the riots, groups and individual prisoners made statements complaining that the prison conditions were far below the levels set by relevant international standards and domestic prison rules. The prisoners alleged serious violations of their physical and psychological integrity, humiliating and degrading treatment, unjust punishment and general arbitrary treatment by prison personnel. They complained of, among other things, torture by beating, lack of minimum personal hygiene facilities, absence of medical treatment and health care, and corruption among prison administrative staff. Some of the allegations and complaints were partly confirmed by competent officials of the Ministry of Justice. As a palliative for the utterly unsatisfactory prison conditions, federal and republican amnesty laws were duly introduced to be finally adopted respectively on 26 February 2001 and 13 February 2001. Nonetheless, although a number of convicts were fully amnestied and a percentage of sentences commuted, the conditions in which prisoners served their sentenced remained unchanged. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the inhuman conditions in Serbia’s prisons endured and multiplied also owing to the country’s isolation of many years, during which time no international organization other than the International Red Cross was granted access to its prisons. Domestic non-governmental organizations were also kept at arm’s length and only rarely allowed to see what went on inside. In view of the circumstances enumerated above, it was clearly necessary to introduce continuous monitoring of prisons by an independent, non-governmental institution in order to obtain a realistic picture of the prison conditions. The new government is aware that admission to the Council of Europe and to other international organizations depends in part on the conditions in which sentenced persons serve their prison sentences, as well as that the public must be informed about those conditions. So, after presenting the concept and objectives of the Prison Monitoring project, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia was granted permission in May 2001 to visit institutions for the enforcement of criminal sanctions. This meant that for the first time in the history of this state an NGO could apply for and be granted permission to visit places of detention, custody and imprisonment without any restrictions, to interview prisoners with no personnel being present, and to talk to personnel without the presence of administration officers. Between June 2001 and October 2003, the Helsinki Committee paid a total of twenty-one visits to institutions for the enforcement of sanctions entailing the deprivation of liberty. During the period covered by this report (April 2002 to October 2003) the Helsinki Committee visited twelve institutions (one maximum-security prison, two closed prisons, three open prisons, two district prisons, one psychiatric prison, one reformatory, and one juvenile prison). In launching the project, the Helsinki Committee was principally guided by Article 64 of the European Prison Rules which states: ‘Imprisonment is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself. The conditions of imprisonment and the prison regimes shall not, therefore, except as incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in this.’ The Helsinki Committee hopes that its efforts to complete the project and publish this book will make a small but valuable contribution towards achieving this goal.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №19: Between Principles and Practices - The Position of "Small" and "Major" Minorities in Serbia.

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №19: Između načela i prakse - položaj "malih" i "velikih" manjina u Srbiji.

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; principles; practices; ethnic minorities; language; education; rights and freedoms; law; assimilation; council of europe; religion; media;