Proxies and Necessary Existents
Proxies and Necessary Existents

Summary/Abstract: In this paper I argue that the metaphysical thesis regarding necessaryexistents (objects which necessarily exist), as supported by Bernard Linsky andEdward Zalta is not committed to proxies. In her paper “Proxy 'Actualism'”(2006), Karen Bennett argues that the view proposed by Zalta and Linsky iscommitted to such entities, and because of this, it cannot be considered actualist,as they propose. I consider her criticism regarding the correct labeling of thisthesis, but I argue that it is not committed to proxies. I will follow three mainthemes in this paper. The first one concerns Bennett's account on the similaritybetween Alvin Plantinga's theory of individual essences and Zalta and Linsky'saccount on actualism. The second is whether Zalta and Linsky's metaphysicalaccount is committed to proxies. Here, I will follow Zalta and Michael Nelson'sreply to Bennett's paper and argue that Zalta and Linky's metaphysicalinterpretation of the simplest Quantified Modal Logic is not committed toproxies. Finally, the last problem regards the actualist nature of their account.

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