Jak jest możliwa epistemologia. Epistemiczna teoria możliwości poznania Jana Srzednickiego
How is epistemology possible? The epistemic theory of Jan Srzednicki of the possibility of knowledge

Summary/Abstract: Srzednicki argues, that to achieve a positive answer to the Kantian question, how knowledge is possible, in non-circular manner, we have to debar any item that is itself a piece of cognition from being considered the archetypal item on which we base our explanation of the very possibility of knowledge. Therefore, the only way to get out of the Wittgensteinian and postmodern cul-de-sac is by showing, "what form knowledge must have, together with what conditions must be obtained for the epistemic system to be possible". To accomplish that we have to remember that the latter are not themselves part of the cognitive situation. The most important rational truisms we have to start with are: we are capable of thinking, we think about something, and we can ask how it is possible. Our first question is only about the very possibility of thinking, but in effect about the very possibility of thinking about something, but not anything more sophisticated than that. Though Srzednicki accepts Wittgenstein's critical conclusions, he maintains that Wittgenstein "failed to identify the reason for this difficulty, and consequently was unable to proceed further". Srzednicki uses some Kantian starting points but filtered through the results obtained by Wittgenstein. He indicates that to resolve the Wittgensteinian paradox we have to abandon the idea that there is only one linear single move to do so. He shows that to accomplish that task we need many steps - starting from paradigmatic sub-level of cognition and the object-level above complement each other though in non-linear manner. He argues that we can not built cognition and knowledge as puzzle-game adding one piece of knowledge to another but we have to step down to a 'supportive strata' and ask what type of requirements have to be considered as valid to move our reasoning to the next point.

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