Praksa Kantonalnog suda u Sarajevu u primjeni odredbe člana 312. stav 1. tačka k.) Zakona o krivičnom postupku Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine u žalbenim postupcima protiv prvostepenih presuda, s osvrtom na pravo stranke na obrazloženu sudsku odluku
The practice of the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo in the application of article 312, paragraph 1, point k) of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in appellate proceedings against first-instance judgments, with referen

Summary/Abstract: The obligation of the court, after conducting criminal proceedings, to render a reasoned judgment in which it provides clear and sufficient reasons regarding all decisive facts, i.e. to respond to all legally relevant issues as well as to the objections raised by the parties during the proceedings, is prescribed not only by the Criminal Procedure Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but is also considered, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, to be one of the elements of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Failure to comply with the aforementioned obligation constitutes a substantial violation of the provisions of the criminal procedure under Article 312, paragraph 1, point k) of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided, of course, that it is raised in an appeal, since the second-instance court does not examine substantial violations of the provisions of the criminal procedure of its own motion. The aim of this paper is to present, through the case law of the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo, some of the most common grounds for challenging and quashing first instance judgments that relate to the aforementioned substantial violation of the provisions of the criminal procedure, given that practice has shown that first-instance judgments are most frequently challenged precisely on this ground of appeal, and to draw attention to some of the most common omissions of the first-instance court, thereby potentially preventing the quashing of judgments in the future. In addition, the author considers that analysing concrete examples from judicial practice in this field could be of assistance not only to judges and professional associates, but also to other legal practitioners, regardless of whether they deal with cases at the first instance or second-instance level in this area, and could contribute at least to some extent to the development of judicial practice and possibly provide answers to certain dilemmas in the work of first instance courts.

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