Wokół wybranych wątków filozofii moralnej Josepha Raza. Część II
Around Selected Themes in the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Part II

Summary/Abstract: Part II of this essay is devoted to a critique of Joseph Raz's achievements in the field of political and moral philosophy. It begins by questioning the elaborate conception of personal autonomy that underlies his perfectionist liberal doctrine. Confronted with contemporary alarmist diagnoses by Siva Vaidhyanathan and Shoshana Zuboff, who proclaim the twilight of the ideal of autonomy – in the wake of the destructive impact of social media and the birth of so-called surveillance capitalism – J. Raz's sophisticated vision appears anachronistic. Secondly, the philosopher's use of the category of group rights and the unconvincing line of defence in his polemic on the same topic with Susan Moller Okin and Yael Tamir are rejected. Thirdly, J. Raz's contribution to the global debate on human rights in the form of the political conception of human rights that he formulated is criticised from many angles. Fourthly, and finally, a question mark is placed over his surprisingly positive assessment of Ronald Dworkin's monist ethical conception, developed by the latter in his philosophical credo Justice for Hedgehogs. As interpreted in both parts of this essay, Dworkin's vision runs completely counter to J. Raz's moral philosophy. It is therefore difficult to understand the reverence that the Oxford philosopher seems to have for the monistic project presented by the author of Justice for Hedgehogs. The essay concludes by pointing out that, whatever reservations and doubts one may have about J. Raz's political and moral philosophy, the importance of his contributions to both fields is beyond question.

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