Bez duše, ali s dostojanstvom – o relacijskom poimanju sebstva u klasičnoj konfucijanskoj tradiciji
Without a Soul, But with Dignity – About the Relational Concept of the Self in the Classical Confucian Tradition

Summary/Abstract: Whilst the concepts of human rights, equality, and democratic freedoms are frequently accepted as universal values, it is often forgotten that these principles are founded upon a particular conception of the human being as an autonomous, rational entity that is endowed with abstract moral duties. This conception of the human being and the associated values may be perceived as unfamiliar to certain cultural and political discourses and political communities. The classical Chinese Confucian tradition is based on a different understanding of individuality and, in connection with that, the fundamental ethical and political values of the community in which that individuality realizes its potential. This paper posits that this divergence can serve as a constructive theoretical foundation for elucidating contentious aspects in the conceptualisation of human beings as autonomous individuals. Consequently, it carries significant ramifications for the notion of “universal values”, including human rights and democratic freedoms. The paper will begin with an analysis of the concept of the autonomous self, followed by a critique of this concept through the lens of the Confucian conception of the relational self. It will conclude with an examination of whether the classical Chinese conception of the relational self can support the concept of human dignity.

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