БЕРЛИНОВО СХВАТАЊЕ ОДНОСА ИЗМЕЂУ ВРЕДНОСНОГ ПЛУРАЛИЗМА И МОРАЛНОГ И КУЛТУРНОГ РЕЛАТИВИЗМА
BERLIN’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUE PLURALISM AND MORAL AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM

Summary/Abstract: The subject of this paper is thorough analysis of value pluralism and moral and cultural relativism, as different meta-ethical theories. The focus of the analysis is Berlin’s understanding of value pluralism, distinction between value monism and pluralism, as well as the implications of this distinction. This topic is connected with other key issues, such as the concepts of freedom and human nature, therefore it is of great importance in the field of moral and political discussions. Drawing on the analysis of Berlin’s view on value pluralism, the authors examine the most relevant critiques of this view, which interpret Berlin’s understanding as radical pluralism, subjectivism, moral and cultural relativism and postmodernism. In that respect, the main purpose of this paper is to distinguish value pluralism from the above-mentioned standpoints. The authors will attempt to demonstrate that these critiques consist of wrongly derived implications of Berlin’s understanding. In the light of the mentioned considerations, the authors conclude that the recognition of the existence of the minimal core of universal human nature and morality is what distinguishes value pluralism from subjectivism and relativism.

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