Richard Brinkley on the Limits of the Sensitive Power: A First Look at His Epistemology
Richard Brinkley on the Limits of the Sensitive Power: A First Look at His Epistemology

Summary/Abstract: This paper examines the role of and limits to the sensitive power in the epistemology of Richard Brinkley, drawing on the recent discovery of his complete Lectura super Sententias. Preserved in Florence (BNCF, Conv. Soppr. G.III.367, ff. 47rA–137rA), the commentary substantially expands Brinkley’s available theological corpus and makes it possible to examine the intersection of theories of sense perception, epistemology, and theology in his work. Focusing on quaestio 1 of the Prologue, the article shows that Brinkley considers sense cognition to be unreliable as, in his view, even the proper sensibles and optimal conditions do not preclude error. Brinkley grounds assent to Christian doctrine in intellectual evidence, which is understood as propositional apparentia, and distinguishes natural reason, which is limited to a partial knowledge of appearances, from human reason as illuminated by the divine light. Thus, Brinkley’s model indicates a theologically motivated limitation of natural reason and a possible use of skeptical argumentation in service of a theory of illumination.

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