“Slowing Down Transition” Poland vs. East Germany, 1980–1990: First Findings
“Slowing Down Transition” Poland vs. East Germany, 1980–1990: First Findings

Summary/Abstract: This study investigates the trajectories of property rights transformation in Poland and East Germany (GDR) between 1980 and 1990 through the lens of the proposed concept of the slowing down transition (SDT). While the literature on transition economics extensively analyzes systemic change in Central and Eastern Europe, the notion of SDT—as an institutional and political attempt to inhibit or delay the shift “from plan to market”—remains unexplored. Drawing on an analysis of institutional changes, as well as comparative economic history, the study examines how SDT manifested in both countries at the stage preceding or accompanying the critical systemic transition. The study is based on an analysis of normative acts and institutional reforms introduced by communist governments, the opposition, and transitional authorities. In Poland, early signals of property transformation appeared as early as the 1970s, followed by more substantial reforms in the 1980s, including worker self-government laws and later “nomenklatura privatization.” The Messner government displayed the strongest symptoms of SDT, attempting to safeguard elite interests and centralize reforms. However, from 1988 to 1989, Poland shifted toward liberalization, marking the onset of full systemic transition. In contrast, the GDR maintained a more dogmatic economic model, with SDT becoming particularly visible in 1990 through the creation and operation of the first Treuhandanstalt (UrTHA), which aimed to preserve social property and prevent privatization. Only the de Maizière government’s reforms and the conditions of German reunification—grounded in the extension of West German constitutional and property rules—overcame SDT and enabled rapid marketization. The study’s originality lies in introducing SDT as an analytical category for economics and economic history that enriches the understanding of late communist economic reforms and divergent transition paths. The comparative perspective demonstrates how differences in political constraints, elite strategies, and external pressures shaped institutional transformation, including property rights, and the timing of systemic change.

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