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Before the aggression on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, Yugoslavs and Others lived together in Bijeljina. According to the 1991 census, there were 96,988 inhabitants in the municipality of Bijeljina. There were 30,229 Bosniaks (31.17%), 57,389 Serbs (59.17%), 492 Croats(0.51%), 4,426 Yugoslavs (4.56%) and 4,452 Others (4.59%). At the same time, the city of Bijeljina had a population of 36,414: 19,024 Bosniaks (52.24%), 10,450Serbs (28.70%), 366 Croats (1.00%), 3,452 Yugoslavs (9.48%) and 3,122 Others.(8.57%). The population of the Municipality lived in the city of Bijeljina and another 58 settlements. Bijeljina, as a strategically important city in the plans and goals of the aggressors, has been the target of attacks since 1991. Aggression and war crimes against Bosniaks were planned, prepared and organized against this Bosnian town. Camps for Bosniaks were organized in Bijeljina, civilians were killed, mass and systematic rapes and other forms of sexual violence were committed, the Bosniak elite was targeted killed and persecuted, civilians were expelled and deported en masse, cultural property and property were destroyed, and all Islamic religiousobjects.On April 1, 1992, Bijeljina was attacked by the so-called "Serbian forces". Thetargets of the attack were Bosniaks, Albanians, Roma and other non-Serbs, who wereunaware of what was happening in their town. They were killed in their houses,apartments, mosques. They were also massacred on Eid al-Fitr, April 4, 1992. Theso-called The Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG), a special unit of the Serbian StateSecurity Service, led by Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, which was under the directcommand of Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Serbia, and the "Mirko Chetniks" ledby Mirko Blagojevic. Under Arkan's command was placed the municipalgovernment, the police, the army, the judiciary, the Territorial Defense. Bijeljina wasoccupied. In April 1992 alone, at least 93 civilians were killed in Bijeljina (81Bosniaks, 8 Albanians, 3 Serbs and 1 Croat). From March 31 to April 6, 1992, atleast 55 civilians were killed. Pictures of crimes from the streets of Bijeljina quicklywent around the world, but the international community did not react to the picturesof horror. Bijeljina was a rehearsal for war, murder, war crimes and genocide thatsoon followed throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended with the signing of the DaytonAgreement on December 14, 1995 in Paris. According to many researchers, intellectuals of various profiles, the Agreement legalized the genocide of Bosniaks inBosnia and Herzegovina.According to the Dayton Agreement, there are two entities in the internalstructure of Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,which consists of 10 cantons, and the Republika Srpska. Apart from the two entities,there is also the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was created by theDecision of the International Arbitration Court. It was established on March 8, 2000.Between 1992 and 1995, approximately 2,2 million people in Bosnia andHerzegovina were forced to flee their homes. After the war, he began to return,among other things, to Bijeljina. The return process of the expelled Bosniaks wasslow and disorganized. The first wave of returns ran from 1996 to 2000. The exilesmostly returned to the local community of Janja. In 1998, the work of the Majlis ofthe Islamic Community in Bijeljina was renewed, and since then the process ofreturning property has begun. Everything went extremely slowly with a lot ofobstruction by the local authorities. However, in 2002, the foundations for all fivedemolished mosques in Bijeljina were "poured out". The mosques were renovatedthanks, among other things, to the funds of whites who lived abroad.An aggravating circumstance for returnees is the fact that the Bosnian languageis denied in the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Teaching in theBosnian language is prohibited, and the language called the non-existent Bosniaklanguage. This discriminates against students who want their language to be calledBosnian.In addition, high-ranking officials from the Republika Srpska in publicappearances deny the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniaks as a people,which affects the perspective of the people of this area.The situation with employment in public administration is not good. Returneesare mainly engaged in agriculture, but here there is a problem of placing surplusproducts.In 2013, a census was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the firstcensus after the war and aggression. The municipality of Bijeljina had 107,715inhabitants, which is 10,727 inhabitants more than in 1991. The population lived inthe city of Bijeljina and another 66 settlements, which is 8 settlements more than in1991. The ethnic structure of the population changed significantly under theinfluence of the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2013, there were 91,784Serbs, which is 34,395 more than in 1991, 13,090 Bosniaks, which is 17,139 fewer,515 Croats, which is 23 more, and the other 1,550, which is 2,902. persons less thanin 1991. In ethnic terms, there were 674 non-respondents in the municipality ofBijeljina and 102 without answering.The city of Bijeljina had a population of 42,278, which is 5,864 more than in1991. There were 35,798 Serbs, which is 25,348 people more than in 1991, 4,469 Bosniaks, which is 14,555 less, 315 Croats, which is 51 people less, and Others1,159, which is 1,963 people less than in 1991. year. Those who did not declarethemselves in the ethnic sense were 502 and 35 people did not answer.The municipality of Bijeljina had, in the total population, 85.21% Serbs, whichis 26.04% more than in 1991, and Bosniaks 12.15%, which is 19.02% less than in1991. There were 0.03% fewer Croats and 3.14% fewer Others than in 1991.In the city of Bijeljina, there has been a drastic change in the ethnic structure ofthe population compared to 1991. Namely, Bosniaks made up 52.24% of the city'spopulation in 1991, Serbs 28.70%, Yugoslavs 9.48%, Others8.57% and Croats1.00%. The number of Bosniaks decreased by 41.67% and amounted to 10.57% inthe total population of Bijeljina. At the same time, the percentage of Serbs increasedfrom 28.70% to 84.67%. The increase was therefore 55.97%. The percentage ofCroats decreased by 0.25%, and the number of Others by 5.83% compared to 1991.Bijeljina is a typical example of how war, murder, expulsion, rape, intimidation,deportation, forced mobilization, demolition and other means can drastically changethe ethnic structure of a city's population. Certainly, other causes of the reducednumber of Bosniaks in Bijeljina should not be neglected, such as the securitysituation, economic situation, education, road and other infrastructure, etc.
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Responding to the crisis in photojournalism, many photographers during the wars in former Yugoslavia developed alternative photographic approaches to capture the complexity of the wars more adequately than conventional photojournalism seemed capable of doing. In this article, we present a typology of these alternative photographies. We discuss forensic photography, aftermath photography, post-conflict and peace photography as well as participatory photography both in generic terms and in the specific Bosnian context. Following this typology, we introduce one specific photojournalistic project, Gilles Peresses and Fred Ritchin’s “Bosnia: Uncertain Paths to Peace”. This project integrated several aspects of the new photographies into a coherent and convincing approach. We then discuss it in terms of interactivity and narrative openness. Necessarily limited by the technological standards of the time, this project can be seen as an important precursor to current photojournalistic approaches in search of adequate representations of the ongoing messiness and institutionalized instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Four war crimes trials are under way in Serbia: two for war crimes against Bosniaks, one for war crimes against Albanian prisoners and one for war crimes against Albanian civilians. On December 12, 2005, the War Crimes Chamber of the Republic of Serbia handed down a verdict for war crimes against prisoners of war in the Ovčara case. On December 14, 2006, the Supreme Court of Serbia overturned the verdict of the War Crimes Chamber of the Belgrade District Court and remanded the case for retrial. In addition, the trial of two former reservists of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior for the murder of a Kosovo Albanian during the NATO bombing is underway before the District Court in Nis. Organized by the Humanitarian Law Center, the mentioned trials are monitored by the families of the victims and representatives of the victims' associations. Encouraging witnesses / victims to participate in war crimes trials is also a HLC priority in supporting domestic war crimes trials.
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This paper tackles the issue of Bjelovar and the Bjelovar–Bilogora County in the Homeland War 1990–1995. The Bjelovar area is inseparable from the western Slavonian region, with its specific demographic structure and a relatively large Serbian ethnic community. The majority of this community did not accept the new Croatian authority; when the time was right, they rose in rebellion. In 1990, Pakrac became the unlucky centre of the aggressive Serbian community, and the Bilogora and Papuk mountains offered very convenient conditions for organising and expanding Serbian mutiny. In the region, there was a considerable concentration of the Yugoslav National Army, especially in Bjelovar, Virovitica and Doljani garrisons. In the dramatic September of 1991, almost the whole of this potential was – with more or less resistance – transferred into Croatian hands, and they consequently played a major role in the War and the establishment of the Croatian Army. In the autumn of 1991, in a decisive defence action, Serbian forces were disabled in the attempt to sever Croatia on the Okučani–Virovitica stretch, which would have resulted in separating Slavonia from the mother country. This defence was of strategic importance, as well as were the liberation operations that followed since the end of October 1991; major areas were thereby restituted as parts of the legal system of the Republic of Croatia. In the period 1992–1995, the region had experienced the effects of the non-efficient mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Forces. The final solution was reached in 1995 on the battlefield, in the operations Bljesak (Flash) and Oluja (Storm); in both of which a part of the units of the Croatian Army and Police Forces from the Bjelovar–Bilogora County were strongly involved. The topic is presented based on the available documents and literature. Between the summer of 1990 and the end of 1992, no regional division was in force; however, Bjelovar was the centre of the Police Administration that had succeeded the earlier regional division of the communities of municipalities; since the autumn of 1991, it was also the Command of the Operational Zone Bjelovar. The author has taken into consideration this organisational aspect as well, as it is of significance for the understanding of the problem area on the whole.
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In the first part, this study offers a reconstruction of the cultural life of Bjelovar and its surroundings – the Bjelovar literary and cultural circle (Bjelovar, Čazma, Đurđevac, Daruvar, Garešnica, Grubišno Polje) – by presenting portraits of writers, painters, musicians and educators; as well as by exhibitions, concerts, the work of associations and institutions; and a review of the publishing activity (newspapers, magazines, journals, books, monographs, etc.). The war havoc and the transitional deconstruction of the symbolic city capital (heritage, space) caused by globalisation are the two key elements that have formed not only wartime writings, but also the context in (the connection with) which they were created. The second part of the study is a presentation of wartime (1991–1995) and postwar (1996–2000) poetic writings in the Bjelovar literary and cultural circle, incorporated in poems and lyrical writings by numerous authors (V. Bažant, Ž. Sabol, K. Kovrlija, B. Kreštan, S. Frajtić, M. Mađerić, V. Vargović, I. Pejić, B. Jelušić, B. Delić, A. Perše Deškin, M. Vidović, K. Blaha, A. S. Prević, K. Prević, Z. Satrapa, L. Erl Luketa, D. Horvat Zácskai, M. Borovac, etc.). It forms a tribute to a better comprehension of Croatian wartime writings. The emphasis has been put on poetry – the poem and its structure as a humanistic analysis of the indifferent world, the understanding of the meaning of suffering and victim, self-perception and the perception of the other party – the enemy, with strong belief in the good and the victory thereof, as well as on the analysis of heritage and its endurance when facing the forces of destruction (wounded city, wounded land, etc.). The need for the as authentic as possible witnessing of the “severe reality”, wartime events, and memory in general determined the frequency of the genre of autobiographical/memoir literature, and the stylistic specificity of wartime writing as a pronouncedly documentary, factual/descriptive (stating the date and venue of the text), and in tone and directness similar to folk story telling – equally in prose, dramatic, and lyrical texts.
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Moto za ovu knjigu preuzeo sam od »Duhovne republike Zicer«, osnovane u klubu Zicer u Novom Sadu još godine 1992. s ciljem da spriječi mobilizaciju za rat koji se vodio u Hrvatskoj. Jugoslavija je tada već bila raskomadana, bile su prekinute komunikacije između novih država, a sve informacije strogo kontrolirane i cenzurirane. Tako sam za tu »republiku«, koja je bila dio širokog antiratnog pokreta u Vojvodini, doznao tek u ljeto 2014. iz tjednika Novosti, koji je prenio dio teksta iz projeka »Living Together« (Živjeti zajedno), financiranog od Europske unije. Naravno, patetična optužba tog mota nije sasvim pravedna, točnije, ne odnosi se na sve ljude. Nasilje, zločini i laži proizveli su kolektivnu paranoju, a nacionalizam je jedan od njenih najstrašnijih oblika. Osim toga čini se kako je u prirodi čovjeka da kao normalna prihvaća pravila uspostavljena u sredini u kojoj živi, iako se ona ponekad mijenjaju nevjerojatnom brzinom. Dra-matičan primjer je njemačka zdravstvena služba koja je već na početku Hitlerove vladavine, /kao normalni dio brige o zdravlju nacije, prihvatila kastraciju svakog tko je bio proglašen psihičkim bolesnikom. Ponašanje mnogih ljudi kod nas, u proteklih četvrt stoljeća, slijedilo je isti obrazac. Ali za one koji se smatraju mislećim dijelom nacije i koji su imali prilike govoriti, gornji moto ima punu vrijednost. Nije zanemariv ni broj onih koji su toga bili svjesni, a nisu šutjeli, iako su bili izloženi raznim pritiscima i šikaniranjima. Istovremeno su vladari novih država počeli kontrolirati sve medije i javne tribine na kojima su postali dobrodošli samo zagovornici nacionalističke mržnje.
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Lideri Nato saveza objavili su da alijansa planira da ojača istočni front raspoređivanjem dodatnih trupa u Bugarskoj, Mađarskoj, Poljskoj i Slovačkoj – uključujući hiljade američkih vojnika – i slanjem „opreme koja će pomoći Ukrajini da se odbrani od hemijskih, bioloških, radioloških i nuklearnih pretnji“. I dok sama alijansa ne dostavlja Ukrajini naoružanje direktno, mnoge njene članice ovoj zemlji šalju oružje, uključujući projektile, rakete, mitraljeze i ostalo.
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L'etablissement des détachements de partisans »Romanija«, »Zvijezda« et du détachement de Kalinovik, effectué selon les recommandations et les décisions de l’Etat-major du Mouvement pour la Liberation Nationale prises a Stolice, a ete realise au cours du mois d’octobre 1941. Cela voulait dire qu'on avait renonce a l’idee de former un regiment dans la montagne Romanija et une brigade dans la region situee entre le mont Jahorina et ie village de Kalinovik. Le détachement, en tant qu'unite militaire, partout où il était forme s’est avéré reel et justifie et a contribue a un essor plus important de la revoile populaire, au toujours croissant nombre de partisans et aux grands succès obtenus en 1941. Bien que les trois détachements des partisans des environs de Sarajevo aient eu une activité presque indépendante, au moment où l'Etat-major de Sarajevo fut supprime, leurs activités, mises sous le commandement ue l’Etat-major du Mouvement, pour la Liberation Nationale de Bosme-tlerzcguvine, ont ete tres coordonnées, il était evident qu' il existait un plan d operations militaires bien defini, d'operations qui furent toujours compte Lement réalisées. C'était le pian on plutôt ia tache primordiale primitivement destinee a l’Etat-major ae ta region de Sarajevo, pian qui prévoyait le »nettoyage« des environs de Sarajevo, l'encerclement et la liberation definitive de ia ville. C'est pourquoi on a prêté une attention particulière a l'augmentation du nombre de combattants, tache qui fut le mieux realisee a Romanija. Les unites des partisans des environs de Sarajevo comptaient en tout, a cette epoque, environ 7.500 combattants. On entreprenait egalement des operations systématiques en vue de détruire toutes les voies de communications, des ponts, des lignes de chemin de 1er, des lignes téléphoniques et télégraphique^, ce dont n reste assez de documents bien conserves témoignant de arrêt total ou partiel de toute circulation sur les voies de communications menant vers Sarajevo. Cela entraînait un veritable désarroi dans l'organisation et le fonctionnement des autorités »oustaciii« (»oustachi« étaient des collaborateurs fascistes recrutes parmi les Croate et les musulmans du pays) du soi-disant »Etat Croate Indépendant«, ce qui était tres important d'autant plus que c’est une region abondant en richesses naturelles auxquelles l’occupant nazi s'intéressait particulièrement. Le remorcement des unites partisanes et les attaques effectuées sur les voies de communications, caractéristiques d’une guerre de partisans, de meme que les attaques inattendues et les diversions, la prise des bourgs moins importants, ont permis le changement du caractère des operations: on procédé aux operations plus importantes permettant un »nettoyage« plus efficace et la prise permanente du territoire, effectues par les trois détachements. , Les trois derniers mois de 1941 sont caractérisés par des luttes toujours plus acharnées, par une intese activité et initiative des forces libératrices dans cette region. Au cours de ces trois mois on a realise les fronts dits »de lutte« aux environs de Rogatica, Kalinovik, Visegrad, Olovo, Pale et de Varež. Maigre les frequentes contre-attaques des Aitemends et de leurs collaborateurs, malgré les mesures répressives les plus drastiques, qui traduisaient sa rage et son impuissance, l’ennemi essuyait de très grandes pertes et était extrêmement menace et force a se détendre. Vers ta fin octobre la ville de Rogatica a ete liberee, le village de Tmovo au commencement du novembre. A la même epoque la région ou opérait le détachement »Zvijezda« a été complètement »netoyee« dans la direction des villes de Vareš et d'Olovo; le territoire libère du détachement »Romanija« s'est répandu jusqu’aux villes de Visegrad et de Goraide - le même détachement a pris les positions stratégiques très importantes des Roches Rouges et des d’Aigle du mont Romanija. Au mois de decembre les partisans ont attaqué le village de Pale, un des bastions protégeant la ville de Sarajevo; ils ont libéré la ville d'Olovo, la vallée de la Krivaja; ils attaquèrent également la ville de Vares qui fut complètement cemee par des unités partisanes. Une telle situation a fait que le général plénipotentiaire de Zagreb demandât au Haut commandement de faire venir une division allemande du front oriental. , Car, vers la fin décembre 1941, toutes les positions ennemies ont été liquidées sauf quelques unes à proximité immédiate de la ville de Sarajevo. De cette façon-la ont été remplies toutes les conditions permettant la réalisation de la tâche et de la conception capitales: libération de la capitale de la Bosnie-Herzégovine.
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The subject of this paper is the attack of the Yugoslav National Army Knin corpus and Serbian Territorial defence on the municipality of Livno in April 1992. Those were in fact two attacks, the first on 13 April 1992 in direction Glamoč - Livno and the second on 23 April in direction Bosansko Grahovo - Livno. Both attacks were successfully repelled by the crucial help of smaller reinforcements from Croatia. This event was also of strategic importance, because it was one of three successful defences from April 1992 that enabled territorial and political survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite its significance, archive sources for these fights are very modest and fragmented, because of what there are many unknowns regarding the fights. Thus, this paper is written with the intention to shed light on the event crucial for the course of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and end of war in Croatia in 1994 and 1995.
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The Special Police Task Force of the Police Administration Bjelovar – Omega – was formed on 23rd February 1991 as the first regional unit of the Special Police Forces in Croatia. It covered the territory between western Slavonia and Podravina. Its commanders were Miralem Alečković and Hamdija Mašinović, and during the War, Omega numbered 302 active and 418 reserve members. The unit carried out its first operation on 2nd March 1991 in Pakrac, and became thereby the first Croatian army unit that was to operate actively in the Homeland War. After a series of interventions in Pakrac, the defence of Glina followed, and the tragic ambush in Sirač, where two members were killed and seven wounded. The next was the tragedy in Kusonje, where the unit attempted to rescue the Bjelovar guardsmen. Battles for Daruvar and Doljani followed, as well as the freeing of Pakrac by breaking out through Kukuljevac. In September, the unit played the crucial role in overtaking the barracks of the Yugoslav National Army in Doljani and Bjelovar. Omega had continued its warpath on the Pakrac–Lipik stretch, where it had carried out as many as nine interventions until the end of 1991. The unit was further one of the crucial success factors in Otkos 10, the Bilogora liberation operation. Omega further participated in the liberation operations Papuk-91 and Alfa. During the Homeland War, six members of the unit were killed, while 43 were wounded.
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Boris Begović, Zoran S. Mirković (ur.), Pravni poredak Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd 2017, 356.
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Review of: „Bosna i Hercegovina 1990.-2020.: Rat, država i demokracija“ by Mirjana Kasapović, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2020. Review by: Višeslav Raos
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U svom prilogu autor analizira djelovanje međunarodne diplomatije u vezi sa situacijom u Bosni i Hercegovini i tokom rata na tlu Bosne i Hercegovine i razlaže odnos te diplomatije prema njoj kao državi i njenim institucijama. Autor ukazuje na nejedinstvo međunarodne javnosti i politike u tom pogledu i na kompromise koje je ona iznudila da bi ostvarila nešto što jeste stanje mira, ali nije trajno stanje sigurnosti i normalnog života za ljude koji u Bosni i Hercegovini žive.
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Nakon smrti Josipa Broza 1980. na njemačkom govornom području sa velikom pažnjom praćena su zbivanja u SFR Jugoslaviji. Uglavnom su predstavljena u publicistici, sadržavajući najvećim dijelom futurističke predstave i scenario koji se deceniju kasnije ostvario.
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During the 1980s, socialist Yugoslavia was hit by various social problems, which disintegrated the fragile tissue of Tito's state-political legacy. In the early 1990s, when the unstoppable phase of dissolution of this country began, national-chauvinist pretensions resolved to realize their old great-power ambitions in a period of general disruption surfaced. Although in this whirlwind of social turmoil the method of military force was used as the dominant and indispensable factor, behind the scenes political arrangements were very often much more effective in realizing certain goals. Sometimes conducted in public, and sometimes secretly, such negotiations were most often a typical expression of grand national aspirations. In this context, one can certainly observe one of the most famous separate negotiations in the 1990s on the soil of the disintegrating Yugoslavia, conducted between Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tuđman. Although these talks have not been published to date, many close associates of the Serbian and Croatian presidents, as well as participants in various political sessions, clearly indicate the presence of a high degree of their mutual agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this paper, the author tried to shed light on the separate Serbo-Croatian efforts to divide the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the statements of Tuđman and Milosevic, and the speeches of their close associates and participants in numerous political talks.
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Tema o kojoj ću uvodno govoriti zaslužuje cijelu biblioteku iscrpnih rasprava, studija i monografija kojima će se, sasvim izvjesno, baviti bosanska, evropska i svjetska istorijska nauka u predstojećoj budućnosti. Ona to zaslužuje zbog toga što je u posljednjoj deceniji BiH bila čvorište i ratni poligon protivrječja u bosanskim, evropskim i svjetskim političkim odnosima. Ako se ja ipak opredjeljujem da danas govorim o toj temi, činim to stoga što nalazim da je u ovom desetljeću istorijska nauka svojim ostvarenjima bila izraz njegove realnosti.
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“Legende i ideološka iskrivljenja”, unutar raspada jugoslavenske države (SFRJ) i raspada jugoslavenske historiografije bile su kreacija profesionalnih historičara, a ne amatera (koji su ih po inerciji slijedili). Veliki broj srpskih historičara koji su u tome učestvovali imali su zlokobnu ulogu u kreiranju i servisiranju ideoloških i političkih ciljeva posljednjeg velikosrpskog pokušaja osvajanja Bosne i Hercegovine. Pretežni dio esnafa srpskih historičara učestvovao je i suučestvovao u poslu podržavanja agresije na Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Manji dio profesionalnih srpskih historičara koji se usprotivio zloupotrebi historijske nauke, bio je izoliran u svojevrsna “intelektualna geta” ili prinuđen da emigrira u inostranstvo. Slijed proteklih događaja pokazuje nepoznavanje i svjesno iskrivljavanje povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine od strane većine srpskih historičara (u ovom radu spomenuta je tek nekolicina takvih), uz odsustvo njihove želje i deficit intelektualnih mogućnosti da je, zaista, upoznaju. Oni su se opredijelili za manipulaciju kao metod i sredstvo za prikrivanje povijesne istine u cilju ostvarenja, kako se to obično imenuje, velikosrpskog državnog koncepta. Takav stav, sada već jasno formulirane, velikosrpske historiografije uvjetovao je konstantu potcjenjivanja drugih naroda Bosne i Hercegovine uz, istovremeno, svjesno raspirivanje i održavanje destruktivne energije srpske mitomanije i grandomanije. To je, u završnici raspada SFRJ, i agresiji na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, značajno doprinijelo genocidu nad Bošnjacima i Hrvatima, izvršenom u velikosrpskoj režiji. Ideološka eliminacija, zaogrnuta u togu pseudoznanstvenih parametara velikosrpske historiografije, sračunato je prethodila fizičkoj eliminaciji Bošnjaka i Hrvata u velikosrpskom genocidu. Kao da je sve znanje, koje su velikosrpski historičari usput sabrali, služilo isključivo za regrutiranje dovoljnog broja ubijeđenih pristalica za izvršenje zločina nad, unaprijed označenim, “neprijateljem”. Prema gledištu srpskih historičara, bespogovorno odanih velikosrpskoj ideji, dosadašnja faza “rešavanja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja” usmjerena je planiranom strateškom cilju - formiranju “države svih Srba”. Mada je srpsko društvo žrtva pseudomorfoze, uz evidentne znakove raspada i propadanja cijelih dijelova njegove strukture, velikosrpski historičari istrajavaju u pokušajima “dokazivanja” da se, navodno, radilo о nacionalnom preporodu njihovog naroda. Perpetuiranje energije za održanje takve vrste mišljenja fatalno doprinosi daljem srozavanju cjeline srpske historiografije, ali uvjetuje i održanje dovoljnog intenziteta destruktivnih ideologija unutar srpskog društva. Posljedice takvog stanja osjećat ćе se još dugo u cijeloj regiji jugoistočne Evrope. Svakako da će među historičarima locirani ideolozi i propagatori veli- kosrpskog barbarizma (već nazvanog velikosrbizam) morati pokušati od- govoriti na pitanje jednog Srbina iz Beograda: “...zašto je naša nova istorija samo zbir nesreća, smrti, gluposti, prostaštva i diletantizma?” Odgovor treba tražiti i u njihovom prihvatanju stava Dobrice Ćosića: “Laž je u istoriji očuvala srpski narod taman toliko koliko i junaštvo.”
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Three different international courts have determined that genocide took place in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992-1995: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Yet paradoxically, there has been virtually no punishment of this genocide, while the punishment of lesser war crimes of the Bosnian war has been very limited. The ICTY has convicted only one individual, a lowly deputy corps commander, of a genocide-related offence. The ICJ acquitted Serbia, the state that planned and launched the assault upon Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992, of genocide and related offences, finding it guilty only of failure to prevent and punish genocide. Although Serb forces were responsible for the overwhelming majority of war crimes, the ICTY prosecution has disproportionately targeted non-Serbs in its indictments and, among Serbs, has disproportionately targeted Bosnian Serbs, with no official of Serbia or Yugoslavia yet convicted of war crimes in Bosnia. This article argues that the meagre results of the international judicial processes vis-à-vis the crimes of the Bosnian war must be sought in the structural failings, poor decision making, and political influences that affected the international courts. It argues that the international courts have failed either to deliver justice to the victims of the war crimes or to promote reconciliation among the peoples of the former Yugoslavia and suggests measures that could be taken to rectify the situation.
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The war in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has lasted nearly three years and ranks as the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. The fighting has threatened not only the stability of the Balkans but also has undermined NATO and the UN and exposed the failure of the European Union's attempts to fashion a coherent and common security and foreign policy. The war has also significantly, and often adversely, involved the interests of the United States, Britain, France, the Russian Federation, and a number of lslamic countries. Finally, while many were expecting the spread of peace and prosperity to follow the end of the cold war, the world has witnessed instead the resurrection of an evil in Europe, which many assumed had been exorcised by the defeat of Nazi Germany. The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has involved the deliberate and systematic use of genocide, with its familiar death squads, sealed cattle cars, and concentration camps, against one of Europe's last remaining populations of indigenous Muslims. [...]
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