"ŁAD POSTLIZBOŃSKI" W EUROPIE

Author(s): Piotr Nowak / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 2/2017

The author of the article puts forward a thesis that the period in the international relations that came after the Cold War has already been completed and we are now in another one, to which he gives the name of the Post-Lisbon order. So far, in the discourse on the international relations it is called the post-Cold War order, without a clear distinction of its timeframe. The author, who presents a theoretical introduction of the definition of the international order which he perceives as a way of determining the relationship between international actors, who also presents the most important provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon and the New NATO Strategic Concept (adopted in Lisbon), called the new period a post-Lisbon order. By analyzing the presented problems the article constitutes an attempt to prove the thesis which was put forward at the beginning.

"To nie my przekroczyliśmy granicę, to ona przecięła nas." Biopolityka europejskiego reżimu migracyjnego

Author(s): Lukasz Moll / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 21/2016

This article reconceptualizes analytical tools suitable to theorizing the European migration regime by employing concepts developed by philosophers of biopolitics. By referring to border and migration studies, it diagnoses both the crisis of the traditional conceptualization of the border and the crisis of the post-Westphalian political order in Europe. Identifying the end of bordering practices as a result of the intertwining of sovereignty, territory, and population in the context of a neoliberal regime of capital accumulation, the article proposes to treat borders as productive apparatuses (dispositifs). While they support the desirable flows of people, they block the undesirable forms of circulation. In conclusion, the article argues that the co-existence of borderless spaces within the European Union with the arbitrary mechanisms of mobility control applied to non-EU migrants is impossible to maintain in the long run. Keeping the current status quo will result in the obliteration of the inside/outside division and a rupture in the strong link between borders and territory. In effect, the same apparatuses which aimed to make free mobility possible are becoming its main source of danger.

# V4 2015: neľahké hľadanie odpovedí na európske výzvy

Author(s): Tomáš Strážay / Language(s): Slovak / Publication Year: 0

Vyšehradská skupina, tak ako napokon celá Európska únia, čelila aj v roku 2015 výzvam prichádzajúcim z vonkajšieho prostredia a v menšom meradle tiež takým, ktoré súviseli s jeho vnútorným fungovaním. Napriek pokračujúcemu rusko ukrajinskému konfliktu sa dominantnou témou vo vyšehradskom i európskom (nielen zahraničnopolitickom diskurze) stala migračná a utečenecká kríza. Postoj k nej ovplyvňoval tak vnútornú dynamiku Vyšehradu, ako aj jeho vnímanie v rámci EÚ. Vyšehradské krajiny čelili zhoršenej reputácii v očiach niektorých členských krajín Únie, ktoré kritizovali ich nesolidárny postoj v otázke redistribučných kvót. Prirodzene, značná časť vyšehradskej agendy sa niesla v znamení kontinuity, čo sa týka slovenského aj českého predsedníctva. Významnými oblasťami spolupráce tak boli naďalej napríklad energetika či bezpečnosť a obrana. Spolupráca s krajinami východného susedstva a západného Balkánu tvorili piliere formátu V4 plus, ktorý sa rozšíril o ďalších partnerov. Jedným z významných zadaní pre obe predsedníctva bolo vyvažovať spoluprácu s nevyšehradskými krajinami s vnútornou súdržnosťou V4. Potvrdilo sa, že vyšehradská spolupráca zostáva imúnna voči vnútropolitickému vývoju v jednotlivých krajinách. Hoci májové prezidentské i októbrové parlamentné voľby v Poľsku znamenali diametrálnu zmenu v oblasti poľskej vnútornej politiky, na vzťahoch v rámci V4 sa to neprejavilo.

(003) POLAND’S SECOND RETURN TO EUROPE?

Author(s): Pawel Swieboda / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2007

Donald Tusk, the new Polish Prime Minister, wants to bring Poland back to the heart of Europe, rebuilding ties with Germany and France to create a ‘Weimar Triangle’, lessening tensions with Russia, and trying to make the country a genuine player in European foreign policy. The new Government will try to rebalance ist relationship with the United States, slowing down the move towards missile defence and withdrawing its troops from Iraq. Although there will be a change of style on contentious issues like Russia, the new government will still be an ‘assertive partner’ opting out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; unlikely to join the euro; and likely to put up a fi ght against reform of the EU budget.Co-habitation with President Lech Kaczyński will create tensions but the government has the constitutional powers and the moral clout to set the agenda.

(007) CAN THE EU WIN THE PEACE IN GEORGIA?

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Mark Leonard,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2008

The EU has established itself as the main diplomatic broker in the conflict between Russia and Georgia. It should use this position to help forge a positive peace from a war which threatens the foundations of the European security order. Russia has used its conflict with Georgia to display its military power, reclaim a sphere of influence and frighten its neighbours. Rather than looking for punitive measures, the EU should respond to Russia’s demonstration of force with much stronger engagement for democracy, prosperity and security in the broader region - keeping tough measures towards Moscow on the table if Russia resists.This war was caused in part by the dysfunctionality of the previous ‘peace-keeping’ process in Georgia. The EU must work hard towards ensuring that any new arrangements are not unilateral and do not merely legitimate Russia’s de facto control. The EU should promote an international peace-keeping mission and offer to deploy a civilian reconstruction mission dealing with development, building confidence and security between both sides, and tackling wider political issues. It should also encourage the United Nations to set up a commission of enquiry to help establish the truth on the causes and conduct of the war.Instead of focusing on short-term sanctions against Russia, the EU should move quickly to raise its profile in the Eastern Neighbourhood and to help stabilise other conflict regions - paying attention both to old ‘frozen’ conflicts and potential new flashpoints. The EU should also make a special commitment to Ukraine: It should recognise its right to EU membership in the future, agree to a more liberal visa regime, offer a solidarity clause backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and move to integrate Ukraine into the EU’s energy market.

(020) DEALING WITH YANUKOVYCH’S UKRAINE

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2010

Over the last few years, the European Union’s relationship with Ukraine has been undermined by a split on both sides. On the European side, some wanted a reform-minded, western-leaning Ukraine, either as a good thing in itself, or in order to eventually transform or at least contain Russia. Others, meanwhile, were quite happy to allow Ukraine to stagnate in order to keep the thorny question of enlargement off the table. On the Ukrainian side, some saw their future lying in Europe, while others wanted to move closer to Russia. This double split has left Ukraine adrift. However, the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010 creates a new situation. The political crisis of recent years may not be over – even after the replacement of his rival, Yuliya Tymoshenko, as prime minister, Yanukovych doesn’t yet fully control the government, let alone Ukraine’s powerful ‘oligarchs’ – but his return to power may represent a real opportunity for Europe.

(021) BEYOND WAIT-AND-SEE: THE WAY FORWARD FOR EU BALKAN POLICY

Author(s): Heather Grabbe,Gerald Knaus,Daniel Korski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2010

In the midst of a huge economic crisis, European Union leaders may be tempted to put off any further decisions on enlargement. However, now that some of the Western Balkan countries have tested the EU’s commitment by formally applying for membership, the wait-and-see approach is unsustainable. The EU has kept six of the countries of the Western Balkans – Albania, BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia – waiting for a decade. The EU has asked them to take on difficult and ambitious reforms to prepare them for membership.However, Balkan leaders are no longer even sure that the EU members really want them in the club. As a result, the EU’s credibility is fading in the region. If it continues to hesitate about the next step, its leverage could fade too. The EU should respond to these membership applications in a positive way while reinforcing ist accession conditionality. The most realistic way to do this is to employ the EU’s existing tools more fully and more effectively, and to better sequence the next steps towards accession. This would support reformers in the region without imposing any additional costs on the EU. The aim is to set out a clear, realistic and motivational programme to help the Balkan countries to get in shape for membership – which could take many years to achieve. This will strengthen governance and provide political momentum to help the region get through the current economic crisis and ist political fallout.

(025) THE SPECTRE OF A MULTIPOLAR EUROPE

Author(s): Ivan Krastev,Mark Leonard,Dimitar Bechev,Jana Kobzova,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2010

The EU’s ‘unipolar moment’ is over. In the 1990s, the EU’s grand hope was that American hard power would underpin the spread of European soft power and the integration of all Europe’s powers into a liberal order – embodied in NATO and the EU – in which the rule of law, pooled sovereignty and interdependence would gradually replace military conflict, the balance of power and spheres of influence. However, the prospects for this unipolar multilateral European order are fading. The dilemma facing the European Union in its own continent is somewhat similar to that faced by the US at a global level. The EU can do little to prevent Europe’s evolution from a unipolar to a multipolar order; but it can do a lot to shape the relations between its emerging poles. The new approach would take advantage of a political opening created by Moscow’s desire to modernise and Turkey’s search for a regional role, and recast the continent’s institutional order for a world in which Europe is increasingly peripheral and in which a weak neighbour can be as frightening as a strong one. It would be the first step towards creating a trilateral rather than a tripolar Europe: a new institutional order in the continent that (to paraphrase Lord Ismay) keeps the EU united, Russia post-imperial and Turkey European.

(026) BEYOND MAASTRICHT: A NEW DEAL FOR THE EUROZONE

Author(s): Thomas Klau,François Godement,José Ignacio Torreblanca / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2010

Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union has been an extraordinary achievement. But the events of 2010 have made it apparent that its political governance was designed for fair weather. Having reluctantly taken the first steps this year, European leaders must now make it storm-proof. The move to an agreement to establish a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to replace the EFSF in 2013 represents a fundamental and encouraging change in the approach of European leaders to the future of the eurozone. But the new model of eurozone governance currently envisaged by the EU, which is based once more on the Maastricht Treaty, will be vulnerable to failure for the same reasons as its predecessors. If Europe wants to remain a serious player and help shape the twenty-first century, it should instead go beyond Maastricht and finally build a monetary and economic system strong enough to last. There are at least three other solutions – Eurobonds, a euro-TARP and an expansion of the federal budget. Yet each of them is opposed above all by Germany, the eurozone’s dominant power, which feels its robust growth vindicates its own economic model even though its political model for a rule- and sanctions-based governance of the eurozone looks to have failed. Europe now faces a choice between a future of permanent tensions within the EU and a new grand bargain. Europe needs clearheaded, forward-looking German leadership that would anchor a European Germany in a more German Europe.

(027) THE EU AND BELARUS AFTER THE ELECTION

Author(s): Balázs Jarábik,Jana Kobzova,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

The crackdown that followed the presidential election in Belarus on 19 December 2010 reversed pre-election signals that had promised a relatively liberal atmosphere. After a rigged election result that gave President Alyaksandr Lukashenka an implausible 79 percent of the vote, more than 600 Belarusian citizens were arrested, including eight of Lukashenka’s nine opponents in the election. However, although he was able to survive the election, Lukashenka now faces economic pressures and a forthcoming struggle over the privatisation of state assets, which will be the most important test of his ability to keep both the elite and society under control. In that context, the post-election crackdown was a sign not of the regime’s strength but of its internal weakness. As the country’s internal struggles intensify, it would be a bad time for the European Union to isolate Belarus. At the same time, however, the EU must react in order to regain credibility in its neighbourhood. In the past, the EU and the United States tried both isolating and engaging the regime. Although neither policy was a complete failure, neither was particularly effective. In addition to expressing solidarity with those still in prison, the EU must now devise a proactive strategy that changes Lukashenka’s options. Lukashenka is a great survivor who has shown skill in balancing between Russia and the West, but his position has been weakened. While Russia is also increasingly frustrated with its ally, the interruption of EU dialogue with Minsk increases the chances that Moscow will gain control of its neighbour’s economy. The EU now has an opportunity to regain the initiative in its relationship with Belarus. It should raise the stakes for both the regime and Russia through a combination of targeted and ‘smart’ isolation, selective sanctions and engagement.

(030) THE NEW GERMAN QUESTION: HOW EUROPE CAN GET THE GERMANY IT NEEDS

Author(s): Ulrike Guerot,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

Since the beginning of the euro crisis last year, there has been a kind of “unipolar moment” within the eurozone: no solution to the crisis was possible without Germany or against Germany. Although Germany has now signalled it will do what it takes to save the euro, much of Europe is worried about the way this will be done and even resentful about where Germany seems to be heading. Germans, on the other hand, feel betrayed by the European project with which they once identified perhaps more than any other member state. In fact, whereas Germans once saw the EU as the embodiment of post-war German virtues such as fiscal rectitude, stability and consensus, they now see it as a threat to those same virtues.###This brief aims to move beyond this dialogue of the deaf and outline what a new deal between Germany and the rest of Europe might look like. It shows how an increasingly eurosceptic Germany is tempted to “go global alone”. Meanwhile other member states are responding to the new Germany with a mixture of “hugging Germany close” and forming coalitions that could one day be used to balance German power if Berlin fails to recreate a legitimate basis for its role in the EU. It argues that Germany needs to recast its approach to economic governance to avoid the creation of a two-speed Europe; work with other big states to reinvent the European security architecture; and put its economic might at the heart of a push to develop a global Europe.

(031) TURNING PRESENCE INTO POWER: LESSONS FROM THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

Since the launch of its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, the European Union has become the biggest trading partner of most of the states in the region, embarked on association and free-trade talks, deployed crisis management operations, and offered visa facilitation and visa-free dialogues. But the EU has not succeeded in turning this presence into power. In fact, as the EU has become more involved in the eastern neighbourhood, its ability to influence political developments in the region has stagnated at best. With the exception of Moldova, all of the EU’s eastern neighbours have gone in the wrong direction in the last few years. Behind the EU’s failure to turn presence into power in the eastern neighbourhood lie three structural trends: the increasingly authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in most of the neighbourhood states; the emergence of a multi-polar world that allows countries in the eastern neighbourhood to play “neo-Titoist” games of balancing between external actors; and the EU’s own limited commitment to the ENP. The EU should continue to increase its own visibility and outreach with the public, business interests and state institutions in the eastern neighbourhood. However, it should not rely on soft power alone. Instead, it should also aim to develop a more transactional relationship with its eastern neighbours – in other words, to decide what its interests are, be less diplomatic with interlocutors and set tough conditions on issues such as visa liberalisation.

(033) A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO

Author(s): Susi Dennison,Nicu Popescu,José Ignacio Torreblanca / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

While Morocco is usually seen as more stable, more advanced and more democratic than many other countries in North Africa, it too has potential for unrest. Although there is no immediate prospect of a revolution as in Egypt or Tunisia, Moroccans are increasingly frustrated with the country’s veneer of democracy. They are now demanding more limits on royal power and an end to corruption and clientelism. In short, they want a king who, as a slogan of the 20th February protest movement puts it, “reigns, but does not govern”. This situation presents the EU with a different kind of challenge than those it faces in Egypt or Tunisia. With its European outlook and its close economic and commercial ties with EU states, Morocco highly values its privileged status within the EU’s southern neighbourhood. This brief, based on a research visit by the authors to Rabat in April, argues that the EU should now use the considerable leverage it has to put greater pressure on Morocco to create real democracy. The EU should put its weight behind a more inclusive constitutional commission, engage with youth movements, including Islamists, and offer better trade terms. It is in the EU’s interest to push for political reform now rather than react to a Syrian-style crackdown and instability in a few months’ time.

(041) EUROPE AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS: A NEW VISION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Author(s): Susi Dennison,Anthony Dworkin / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

In the aftermath of this year’s revolutions, the EU has rightly recommitted itself to the support of de-mocracy and human rights in the Middle East and North Africa. However, although protesters across the southern Mediterranean share some of the EU’s values, they do not see Europe as a political model and democracy in the region is likely to produce some results with which Europeans are not comfortab-le. This brief argues that, in response, the EU should focus above all on the development of legitimate and accountable governments in post-revolutionary countries in the Arab world. Rather than backing specific political groups in countries that are in transition, the EU should work to create the building blocks and background conditions for fair and inclusive politics. The EU should also try to support human rights through transparent diplomacy and support for civil society. In countries such as Moroc-co that remain undemocratic, the EU should develop a more political approach that pushes harder for incremental reform in return for credible benefits, while continuing to engage on other EU interests. The use of violence against civilians in countries like Syria should be a red line for limiting cooperation, dra-wing condemnation and sanctions in severe cases. EU proposals on conditionality and a new European Endowment for Democracy will be most effective if they are focused on the support of accountable and legitimate government.

(043) FOUR SCENARIOS FOR THE REINVENTION OF EUROPE

Author(s): Mark Leonard / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

Europe’s leaders see the need for “more Europe” to deal with the euro crisis but do not know how to persuade their citizens, markets, parliaments or courts to accept it. This is the root of Europe’s political crisis: the necessity and impossibility of integration. European integration has been defined by two contradictory but mutually reinforcing forces that operate on both the European and national level: technocracy and populism. But the more technocratic the EU has become, the more it has provoked a populist backlash. European leaders are now unable to solve the euro crisis because they can only force inadequate solutions through loopholes in the Lisbon Treaty. Four routes towards solving Europe’s institutional crisis are now emerging: asymmetric integration by working around the existing treaties; a smaller, more integrated eurozone based on the existing treaties; political union through treaty chan-ge; and a deal among a new vanguard through a Schengen-style treaty. There are also calls to strengthen each of the three traditional channels for democratic participation in order to restore legi-timacy: European elections, referendums and national opt-outs. Whichever of these options Europe ultimately chooses, the challenge will be to solve the acute euro crisis without at the same time exacer-bating the chronic crisis of declining European power.

(AVRUPA) ORTAK GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA POLİTİKASI

Author(s): Sait Yilmaz / Language(s): Turkish / Issue: 27/2015

Lisbon Agreement on Dec 1st, 2009 has remarked the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of EU instead of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). European Union has suffered from vital incapabilities in her defense structure although took part in some military operations in World wide such as peace keeping in Africa and police missions in Afghanistan. Hard power gap between EU and USA has drastically widen in recent decades. EU countries provided modest contributions into NATO operation in Afghanistan. EU makes much more effort to develop her soft power and aims transformations in near geographies. However, it is fact that EU system is bulky as witnessed in Arab movements. NATO and EU have to reconsider their defense policies in common understanding.

(Sub)national leadership in the European Union – the case of Alex Salmond

Author(s): Tomasz Czapiewski / Language(s): English / Issue: 3/2012

The aim of this article is to describe one exemplification of the phenomena of subnational leadership in the conditions of widely developed European integration, that created multi level political stratus. Alex Salmond for many years stands as charismatic leader of regional political party and succeeded in electoral competition. His method of political activities are stemming controversies, though, the summary of his overall political activities must point out his influence on the structure of modern United Kingdom – there is great possibility that we are 1-2 years ago from independence referendum.

(С)поделена природа? Природно наследство и местно развитие в един регион от българо-сръбското пограничие

Author(s): Ivaylo Markov / Language(s): Bulgarian / Issue: 1/2017

The article is focused on a border region between Bulgaria and Serbia which is geographically dominated by Ruy Mountain (whose ridge is the boundary between Bulgaria and Serbia) and the valley of Erma river forming two huge defiles along its way in this mountainous region – the Lomnishko defile (in Bulgaria) and the Poganovsko defile (in Serbia). The micro region (from natural and geographical point of view) shared until 1919 several cultural, social and economic characteristics (from an anthropological point of view), thus forming a common historical and geographical entity. The demarcation of the boundary between Bulgaria and Serbia as a result of the Treaty of Neuilly split the region between the two countries. The border regime, which was rigid and impermeable through the whole second half of the 20th century, made the zones on the both sides of the border well guarded, but industrially underdeveloped periphery. With the opening of the border in the period after 1989 and especially with the intensification of the European integration processes the character of the Bulgarian-Serbian border is undergoing changes and is gradually turning into a bridge for diverse trans-border initiatives. A great deal of these initiatives are connected with the well preserved ecology of the region, which is evaluated at present as a treasure by the local authorities and communities who believe it to be an important resource and instrument for the overcoming of the peripheral position of the region.

,,Дијалектичка равнотежа’’ институционалног система ЕУ у области спољног представљања: фикција или реалност?

Author(s): Dejana M. Vukcevic / Language(s): Serbian / Issue: 4/2012

Dans cet article, l’auteur s’efforce d’analyser l’identité institutionnelle de l’UE en matière de la représentation extérieure. Malgré la tentative proclamée d’une plus grande cohérence et de l’efficacité dans le domaine extérieur de l’UE, le traité de Lisbonne crée une image institutionnelle complexe dans laquelle une représentation extérieure unique de l’UE est difficile. Cela est dû au fait qu’il y a un grand nombre d’acteurs et une confusion quant à la compétence dans le domaine de l’action extérieure de l’Union. Le nouveau traité demeure prisonnier d’un mélange hybride des logiques intergouvernementale et supranationale qui se caractérise par un manque de clarité des rôles des institutions prévus par le traité. L’article est divisé en deux parties. Dans la première partie, l’auteur analyse la nouvelle identité institutionnelle de l’UE dans le domaine de l’action extérieure. Dans la deuxième partie, l’auteur traite l’application des dispositions istituionnelles, marquée des tensions permanentes pour le contrôle des positions de pouvoir. Cela est dû à des dispositions vagues et imprécises du traité de Lisbonne laissаnt aux Etats membres et aux institutions une grande marge de manœuvre quant à l’interprétation de leurs compétences. L’auteur conclut que la pluralité d’acteurs dans ce domaine témoigne d’un compromis du traité de Lisbonne quant à l’allocation du leadeship politique dans le cadre de l’UE. Pour cette raison, il est difficle d’établir un équilibre entre les intérêts des Etats membres et des institutions dans la consolidation postLisbonne en matière de représentation extérieure ce qui n’est pas sans répercussions quant à la visibilité de l’UE sur la scène internationale.

+383 Prishtina Calling

Kosovo zehn Jahre nach der Unabhängigkeitserklärung

Author(s): Adelheid Wölfl / Language(s): German / Issue: 01/2018

Ten years after independence, most Kosovars are disappointed. They expected more prosperity and employment. The new government in Kosovo, which is in place since September 2017, has not been able to ratify the border agreement with Montenegro – a prerequisite for participation in the Schengen visa liberalization regime. In summer 2018, Kosovo might finally get a dialling code of its own: +383. The country remains bottom-placed regarding EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. In Serb inhabited Northern Kosovo the security situation has worsened after the murder of Oliver Ivanović in January 2018. Prior to a bilateral and legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia – which should be signed in 2019 – there has been speculation about a possible border change, which could result in Northern Kosovo falling to Serbia. However, the German government has clearly opposed this possibility. There are also rumours that Russia and the US could play a role in the agreement, but this is rejected by key players in the EU.