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The Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s stance on the revolution and war

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English

Volodymyr (secular name Viktor Sabodan), the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All-Ukraine, the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which recognises the honorary primacy of the Moscow Patriarchate, died on 5 July 2014 at the age of 79. He was replaced by Metropolitan Onufry (secular name Orest Berezovsky), aged 70. The fact that this representative of the moderate trend, far from politics, was elected signifies that the UOC’s previous policy will be continued in the coming years: strengthening the Church’s independence without questioning its canonical bonds with Moscow. Metropolitan Onufry’s task is to wait out the hard times, rather than to embark upon an active policy.

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Southern Gas Corridor managed by Azerbaijan and Turkey

Author(s): Aleksandra Jarosiewicz / Language(s): English

The Southern Gas Corridor is a European Commission initiative with the aim of facilitating the diversification of the routes and sources of gas imported into Europe in the hope of reducing the EU’s dependence on Russia. Although the Southern Gas Corridor – alongside the EU’s flagship Nabucco project, which constitutes a part of the Corridor – was originally conceived as a means of furthering the interests of the West (officially the EU but in practice also the US), the implementation of the project has become possible almost exclusively thanks to measures taken by Azerbaijan and Turkey.Consequently, a project which the EU had hoped would protect its political interests has indirectly given Azerbaijan and Turkey considerable influence over the EU, since it is those two countries that have effectively begun to define the shape of the Southern Corridor. This became particularly clear when the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) agreement was signed on 26 June 2012. If the EU wishes to ensure that the implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor project retains at least some of its original design, Brussels has little choice but to take into account the preferences of Azerbaijan and Turkey at the expense of its own original plans.

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The Ulyukaev case – tension inside the Russian elite

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś,Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): English

Alexey Ulyukaev, the Minister for Economic Development, was detained on 14 November 2016. Subsequently the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation launched an investigation against him on the charge of accepting a bribe (US$2 million). The bribe was reportedly offered in appreciation of the ministry’s positive opinion that enabled the state-owned oil company Rosneft to take over a 50.08% stake in Bashneft (the transaction was finalised on 12 October 2016). Much seems to indicate that the Ulyukaev case is an element of the rivalry of opposing groups of interest inside the Russian ruling elite. The operation was initiated by the CEO of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, and its goal was to deal a blow against the government’s economic bloc criticising Rosneft’s expansion in the Russian energy sector. In turn, the Ulyukaev trial itself has been used by Sechin’s numerous opponents to undermine his position. However, the developments seen over the past year show that Igor Sechin remains the key player in the Russian energy sector. He owes his position to his close links with Vladimir Putin and the important function which Rosneft plays in the country’s domestic and foreign policy. The conflict between interest groups is an integral element of the Russian political system, and allows the Russian president to play the role of arbiter in the government elite. The rules of operation of this system are unlikely to change significantly in the coming years.

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The Kremlin’s regional policy – a year of dismissing governors

Author(s): Maria Domańska / Language(s): English

2017 has seen a wave of dismissals of the heads of Russia’s regions – the largest in the past five years. This is linked primarily to the Kremlin’s preparations for the presidential election. Personnel changes are among the few instruments the government has at its disposal to improve public support, given the dysfunctional governance model, growing dissatisfaction among the Russian public and the government team’s unwillingness to launch reforms.Even though it would appear that there is no single consistent algorithm for reshuffles on the level of governors (each decision to dismiss and nominate a governor has been considered separately), still the criteria that were taken into account in the first place included the socio-economic situation in the region, the degree of tension inside the regional elite, and public support for the incumbent governor. The Kremlin’s inability to formulate an appealing and credible election manifesto has been masked by a partial rejuvenation of the regional government staff and a temporary neutralisation of tension in some of the regions. Thus the staff ‘face-lift’ ahead of the election is aimed predominantly at building a positive image; the main goal is to give hope to the public, at least temporarily, of positive changes.The position of governors in the Russian government system has been gradually diminishing. Their competences and status have been consistently reduced as part of the process of increasing the centralisation of power in Russia. The logic of the personnel changes carried out in 2017 proves that the status of the governor’s office has been finally downgraded and depoliticised: the newly appointed governors are in fact middle managers and representatives of the nomenklatura delegated from the centre and at the full disposal of the central government.

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Putin for the fourth time. No vision, no hope

Author(s): Maria Domańska / Language(s): English

On 6 December Vladimir Putin announced that he will run in the presidential election to be held on 18 March 2018. The absence of any change in the office of Russia’s president is rooted in the logic of a personalised system of governance that has emerged in Russia. It is also a demonstration of the government’s will to maintain the present course in domestic and foreign policy, one that is static and devoid of any scope for development. This is regardless of the fact that the government is struggling with increasingly serious economic and socio- -political challenges. These mainly include economic stagnation, continuously decreasing real incomes, and tense relations with the West, all combined with the lack of a coherent, positive ideology to legitimise Putin’s model. Against this backdrop, the election-related actions the government has taken to date are of a provisional and tactical nature: they focus on efforts to achieve a stabilisation of the socio-political situation and to eliminate possible threats to the ruling elite in the pre- and post-election period. At the same time, attempts are being made to make the electoral ritual more attractive, so as to boost turnout and thereby demonstrate a high approval rating for both the president and the model of governance he endorses.

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The beginning of the celebrations of the centenary of Ukraine’s independence

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): English

January 2018 saw the first celebrations commemorating the centenary of Ukraine’s fight for independence (1917–1921). The first two of these events, commemorating the declaration of independence (22 January 1918) and the battle of Kruty (29 January 1918), were surprisingly small-scale, especially with regard to the participation of Ukraine’s leadership in them. This may mean that the ruling elite has no concept of how to use the centenary to solidify its political position, also in the context of the presidential and parliamentary elections planned for 2019. At the same time, a profound shift in the narrative regarding the fight from a century ago has been evident in the media reports and educational materials published by the Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance (UINP). The emphasis is no longer placed on the armed struggle and the continuation of the leftist tradition of the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic; instead, priority is given to the efforts to build a state and create its institutions, including professional armed forces. The anarchist-revolutionary traditions are criticised, and the importance of order and discipline is highlighted.

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Mołdawski teatr polityczny. Układ sił w roku wyborczym

Author(s): Kamil Całus / Language(s): Polish

Since the end of 2015 Vlad Plahotniuc, an oligarch and the richest man in Moldova, leader of the ruling, nominally pro-European Democratic Party, has been de facto the only person who counts in Moldovan politics and business. He is an extremely unpopular politician who has been accused of transforming Moldova into a classic ‘captured state’. However, he has been forced to work with Igor Dodon, the country’s nominally opposition and pro-Russian President, who enjoys the most public trust, as well as with the Socialist party (PSRM) which stands behind him. Both politicians have created a particular system of government which is something like a political cartel. The parties which make it up are conducting a largely superficial ideological-political struggle which stirs up huge emotions and polarises society. The dominant role in the tandem is played by Plahotniuc, who is much more powerful, as he controls the government and the parliamentary majority, and is also the main beneficiary of the current system.

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Sankcyjny poker Waszyngtonu. Rosja w oczekiwaniu na amerykańskie decyzje

Author(s): Iwona Wiśniewska / Language(s): Polish

On 29 January, the administration of President Donald Trump sent Congress a batch of documents which provide the basis for a possible further expansion of sanctions against Russia: a report on the Russian business and political elite, and a report on the consequences of selected financial sanctions. At the same time, the authorisation for the possible introduction of extraterritorial sanctions against entities from the Russian security sector and arms industry came into effect. This was in line with the requirements of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, No. 3364 from 2 August 2017. This Act covers US sanctions against Iran, Russia and North Korea. As of now, President Trump’s administration has not decided to implement any new sanctions against Russia, although it has the ability to do so at any time.

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Obwód dniepropetrowski: nowe czasy, stare zasady

Author(s): Tomasz Piechal / Language(s): Polish

The war in Donbass and the loss of control over part of the country’s strongly industrialised areas resulted in the significance of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast increasing for Ukraine in both economic and political terms. This region already accounts for 20% of domestic industrial production. The fact that the military operation is taking place in neighbouring areas has turned Dnipropetrovsk Oblast into a direct supply base for the Ukrainian army and a migration target for many people from the conflict area. Furthermore, the situation in the oblast may serve as a good case study illustrating Ukraine’s problems on the regional level four years on from the Revolution of Dignity. Despite the unprecedented intensification of patriotic and pro-Ukrainian sentiments in the region, it has been impossible to initiate an overhaul of the elite. The old links between politics and business remain intact, politicians linked to the former Party of Regions still predominate in local governments, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast itself remains under the strong influence of local oligarchs. The election of Borys Filatov, a candidate of the post-Maidan forces, for the mayor of Dnipro gave rise to strong hopes that the dominance of these circles would be challenged. However, two years since his election, no major reform of the government system has been conducted in this city, corruption is still present on a broad scale, and the mayor himself has forged alliances with local representatives of the ancien régime. As a result, Filatov turned out to be not a pro-European reformer but a representative of the old regime who has skilfully adapted himself to the new post-revolution reality by employing pro-European rhetoric. Similar tendencies can be observed across the country but, considering its significance for Ukraine, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is the most interesting region for describing this phenomenon.

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Koniec kryzysu? Sytuacja gospodarcza Białorusi po dwóch latach recesji

Author(s): Kamil Kłysiński / Language(s): Polish

In 2017, Belarus’s GDP went up 2.4%, the first positive result since 2014. This meant an exit from a two-year recession, further proof of which includes an upward trend in industrial production, low inflation and a relatively high level of currency reserves. It appears that Belarus has returned to the path of economic growth, above all as an effect of the improvement of the situation on the global fuel markets, resulting in increasing income from the sale of petroleum products, one of its main exports. The fact that the Belarusian-Russian dispute over the terms of oil and gas supplies from Russia, which had continued for more than a year, was resolved in April 2017 has also had a positive effect. Another important factor was the improvement of the economic situation in Russia, which is the key market for a significant section of Belarusian exports. In turn, the Belarusian government’s policy has only contributed to improving the country’s economic situation to a marginal extent, although the record-low inflation level last year is doubtless a merit of the central bank. Apart from this, moves aimed at preserving the ineffective economic system have prevailed. Heavy industry, most of which is ineffective, is still supported mainly due to President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s fear of the social destabilisation that might be provoked by massive dismissals of personnel from decommissioned plants. The government is continuing its policy of administratively regulating pay rises for the same reason. The reforms launched, for example introduce facilitations for doing business (including the unprecedentedly liberal decree regulating the operation of the IT sector which has been rapidly developing over the past few years); but they will not lead to a comprehensive reconstruction of the inefficient economic model, nor lay the foundations for stable economic growth.

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High on the party, low on the state. A quantum leap in the process of China’s reconstruction

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Michał Bogusz / Language(s): English

At its annual session in March 2018, the National People’s Congress (NPC) approved a series of changes to the structure and organisation of the Central People’s Government (also known as the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, further in the text referred to as the central government) and an amendment to China’s constitution. It also announced nominations to several important state offices. This represents a crowning achievement and formal confirmation of the process of changes to the Chinese system of power that has been ongoing since 2012. The purpose of these changes is to secure continued governance by the Communist Party of China (CPC), to maintain domestic stability and to break the impasse in economic and social reforms. The general thrust of these changes involves a shift in decision-making power and a transfer of control in terms of how the state apparatus works to organs of the CPC, at the cost of central government institutions and local governments. This is being done by concentrating power in the hands of the party’s General Secretary, Xi Jinping, who in recent years has used the CPC structures to boost discipline within the party and state institutions, to increase coordination in domestic and foreign policy and to revive the process of economic and social reforms. The changes to the structure of the administrative apparatus follow the centralist ambitions of Xi Jinping. This refers both to how the central government operates and to Beijing’s influence on local governments. These changes will considerably impact the functioning of the state and China’s international relations.

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On the way to creating the ‘Donbas people’. Identity policy in the self-proclaimed Republics in East Ukraine

Author(s): Yulia Abibok / Language(s): English

Four years since the unrecognized ‘republics’ in the east of Ukraine were declared, their future remains unclear. On the one hand, Ukraine, its western partners and the leadership of the Russian Federation continue to insist that these territories be returned to Kyiv’s control on the terms of the Minsk Agreements. On the other side, the self-proclaimed leaders of these ‘republics’, while also declaring their commitment to the Minsk Agreements, have publicly rejected any possibility of reunification with the rest of Ukraine1. As a result, the east of Ukraine remains in a condition of smouldering war.Four years since the unrecognized ‘republics’ in the east of Ukraine were declared, their future remains unclear. On the one hand, Ukraine, its western partners and the leadership of the Russian Federation continue to insist that these territories be returned to Kyiv’s control on the terms of the Minsk Agreements. On the other side, the self-proclaimed leaders of these ‘republics’, while also declaring their commitment to the Minsk Agreements, have publicly rejected any possibility of reunification with the rest of Ukraine1. As a result, the east of Ukraine remains in a condition of smouldering war.In this situation of uncertainty, the Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ are continuing to make efforts to legitimize and strengthen their ‘statehood’, most notably by means of a new historical policy. Both para-states are trying to revise the assessments of historical events which have been established during the years of Ukraine’s independence. Serious efforts are being made in the area of the ‘patriotic education’ of children, both in school and during extra-curricular activities; there are new ‘state’ holidays, cults, and a large-scale campaign honouring and perpetuating the memories of the new ‘rebel’ heroes and of civilians who have died at the hands of the Kyiv ’murderers’ is being conducted.Moreover the events of the war of 1941–5 are being reinterpreted, compared to the current military actions ‘against the fascists’. The new ‘state’ cult is being built on just such a parallel, which not only imparts significance to the current events, but also helps to contrast the ‘republics’ to today’s Ukraine. The intended effect of the DPR and LPR’s historical policies is the creation of a new Donbas community which is hostile towards ‘nationalist’ Ukraine.

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Thaw in Uzbekistan. Reforms by President Mirziyoyev

Author(s): Mariusz Marszewski / Language(s): English

It has been almost two years since the death of the long-serving leader of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, and since Shavkat Mirziyoyev took up power (September 2016). The change has had spectacular results, including signs of liberalisation of the previous, extremely authoritarian system of rule, and economic reform, for instance with regard to stimulating growth of small-scale business, and in fact activation of Uzbekistan on the international stage and normalisation of relations with neighbours. Meanwhile, certainly the most important process under way in Uzbekistan is that of consolidation of power by the new president, and a key element of this is dismantling the might enjoyed to date by the National Security Service. The curbing of the position of the National Security Service, which has been successful so far, entails internal restructuring of the state apparatus. The limited liberalisation and opening up to the world are mainly a result of this process.Mirziyoyev has created a new dynamic both internally and in the region. The effects will only become clear in the long term. The outcome of this new situation is uncertain; consolidation of the new president’s power and the ensuing reforms are accompanied by constantly recurring crises which were frozen during Karimov’s rule. There are also external threats – a possibility of return to custodianship of Russia, a country which is fortifying its position, China’s increasing economic dominance, and growing strength of radicals among the Uzbek minority in northern Afghanistan. The emerging processes are therefore proceeding fast, and thus it is hard to determine whether the new Uzbekistan under President Mirziyoyev will prove to be a stable country in which the liberal reforms will continue.

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A Basin under Special Supervision. The Russian–Ukrainian tensions in the Sea of Azov

Author(s): Krzysztof Nieczypor / Language(s): English

The construction and opening in May 2018 of the Crimean Bridge, which connects the territory of the Russian Federation with the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula, has contributed to a worsening of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the Sea of Azov. Since April 2018, Russians have halted merchant ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch, which is greatly limiting the operation of Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. Russia’s actions are affecting Ukraine’s economy in that they make the export of goods that account for a major portion of Ukraine’s state budget revenue increasingly difficult. According to estimates by the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure, total financial losses due to shipping limitations stand at US$ 20–40 million annually.Russia’s activity in the Sea of Azov and in the Strait of Kerch seems to confirm Moscow’s ambitions to make this basin a fully Russian-controlled internal area. Increased concentration of the Russian armed forces near the Crimean Bridge proves that this piece of infrastructure is of strategic importance for the Russian Federation. Access to the Sea of Azov and control of the ships sailing through the Strait of Kerch enables Russia to exert economic blackmail on Ukraine. The measures Russia has launched are of a permanent nature and are also intended to exacerbate Ukraine’s difficult economic situation. In this way, the Russian leadership is trying to influence the public mood in the southern part of the Donbas (which is controlled by Kyiv) to persuade the local residents that any further confrontation with Russia would be senseless.

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Serbia-Kosovo negotiations – playing for time under pressure from the West

Author(s): Marta Szpala / Language(s): English

The negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement to normalise relations between the two states are to enter a new phase in September. Although the negotiations, which have been going on since 2011 under the oversight of the European Union, may have prompted the incorporation of the Serbian minority and the territories it inhabits into Kosovo’s institutional system, they have been at a standstill for three years. The authorities in Prishtina are unwilling to agree to further concessions to the Serbs until Belgrade recognises Kosovo’s independence, at least on a de facto basis. Any compromise will come at a high political cost for the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo, due to hostility on the part of the public and the opposition in both states. Meanwhile, the EU and the US are putting pressure on Belgrade and Prishtina to reach an agreement by no later than mid-2019. The Serbian and Kosovar elites cannot ignore this pressure as they largely owe their political positions to support from the West, and for this reason the authorities in both states wish to play for time and prolong the talks. They are doing this by periodically escalating tensions and putting forward solutions that are unacceptable to the other party or the international community. One example of this was the proposals made in July by the presidents of Serbia and Kosovo, Aleksandar Vučic and Hashim Thaçi, to exchange territory and change borders, which caused a great deal of controversy inside and outside the countries. Moreover, divisions between countries in the West, which do not have a united strategy regarding the negotiations, may hamper moves to reach a compromise. The United States is pushing for a quick resolution of the dispute, even if this means reviewing the borders. . However, Germany is opposed to that solution as it fears that this would strengthen separatist movements throughout the entire Balkans. Both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians will try to exploit these divisions, while the success of the process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations will in fact depend upon effective pressure from the West.

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China’s offer to the EU: tough negotiations or a coalition against Trump?

Author(s): Jakub Jakóbowski,Konrad Popławski / Language(s): English

Donald Trump’s aggressive policy towards Beijing and the spectre of a trade war have served as a catalyst for the resumption of dialogue between China and the EU. Within a period of less than two weeks, the Chinese prime minister held three meetings with EU leaders: within the 16+1 framework, a German-Chinese intergovernmental consultation, and a China-EU summit. Beijing’s diplomatic offensive was intended to show openness to the EU’s demands to liberalise access to the Chinese market, and to neutralise allegations that China has been exploiting divisions between EU member states. Beijing hopes that improving the climate of the talks, together with making some small concessions to Brussels, and especially to Berlin, will allow it to bring the EU onto its side in its conflict with the United States at relatively little cost. This puts the EU in a dilemma. On the one hand, supporting the pressure Washington is currently putting on Beijing could lead to a real opening-up of the Chinese market, and also reduce the growing imbalance in international trade whose roots lie in China. However, this risks a collapse of economic growth in China, which would mean losses for many European companies. On the other hand, if the EU cooperated with Beijing on this matter, it could strengthen the multilateral trading system based on the WTO, and also help to defend the Iran agreement and the Paris agreement on climate change. However, if Brussels openly joins the Chinese coalition against Washington, that could cause serious divisions within the EU and in trans-Atlantic relations, and also limit Beijing’s determination to undertake domestic reforms.

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A stinking business. Environmental issues, protests and big money in the waste business in Russia

Author(s): Jadwiga Rogoża / Language(s): English

In recent months, Moscow oblast has seen a series of social protests against environmental problems caused by municipal waste landfills. The waste disposal sites are overloaded, lack adequate safeguards, emit toxic gases and contaminate the groundwater with harmful effluent. The situation is most severe in Moscow oblast because the capital city generates the largest volumes of waste; however, the problem itself extends beyond environmental concerns into the economic and social spheres. Waste management in Russia is marked by notorious overloading of legal waste disposal sites and the emergence of illegal waste dumps, inadequate waste disposal practices leading to air pollution and groundwater contamination which affect local residents, and bad practices by businesses with links to President Vladimir Putin which have monopolised the waste collection sector.

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„Niepodległe państwo potrzebuje niepodległego Kościoła”. Walka o samodzielność kanoniczną ukraińskiego prawosławia

Author(s): Tadeusz A. Olszański / Language(s): Polish

19 kwietnia Rada Najwyższa Ukrainy na wniosek prezydenta Petra Poroszenki, a 22 kwietnia sam prezydent poparli prośbę Ukraińskiego Kościoła Prawosławnego Patriarchatu Kijowskiego (UPC-KP) i Ukraińskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego (UAPC) do patriarchy ekumenicznego (tj. patriarchy Konstantynopola, najwyższego zwierzchnika Kościołów prawosławnych) o przyznanie ukraińskiemu prawosławiu autokefalii. Wiele wskazuje na to, że decyzja o spełnieniu tej prośby już zapadła, a ogłoszenie odpowiedniego tomosu (dekretu patriarchy) nastąpi jeszcze w tym roku. Proklamowanie Ukraińskiego Autokefalicznego Partykularnego Kościoła Prawosławnego (Ukrajinśka Pomisna Awtokefalna Prawosławna Cerkwa, UPAPC) oznaczać będzie początek nowej fali konfliktów konfesyjnych na całej Ukrainie, w tym prawdopodobnie rozłam w Ukraińskim Kościele Prawosławnym uznającym zwierzchność patriarchy Moskwy (UPC). Nie ma bowiem wątpliwości, że pewna, trudna dziś do określenia część wiernych i kapłanów pozostanie lojalna wobec Moskwy, Patriarchat Moskiewski będzie wszelkimi sposobami wspierał ukraińskie struktury Rosyjskiego Kościoła Prawosławnego (RPC), władze Ukrainy będą zaś przeciwdziałać ich rozwojowi.

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Nord Stream 2 dzieli Zachód

Author(s): Agata Loskot-Strachota,Rafał Bajczuk,Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): Polish

W ostatnich tygodniach nasiliła się amerykańska ofensywa przeciw projektowi Nord Stream 2. Waszyngton naciska na Berlin, by wycofał poparcie dla projektu i grozi użyciem coraz mocniejszych instrumentów – w tym objęciem sankcjami europejskich firm zaangażowanych w realizację gazociągu. Narastający spór pomiędzy USA i Niemcami dotyczący Nord Stream 2 wpisuje się w kontrowersje w Unii Europejskiej dotyczące projektu i pogłębia podziały pomiędzy państwami członkowskimi. Uwypukla różnice w podejściu do współpracy gazowej z Rosją i rozwoju strategicznych rosyjskich projektów gazociągowych. Podczas gdy w optyce Niemiec, ale też Austrii, Holandii i kilku innych państw dominuje podejście komercyjne, Polska, państwa bałtyckie, Dania oraz USA łączą projekt także z kwestiami bezpieczeństwa, nie tylko energetycznego. Konflikt o Nord Stream 2 wpisuje się też w rozgrywkę o przyszły kształt rynku gazu w Europie, rolę poszczególnych dostawców zewnętrznych (głównie Rosji, ale w coraz większej mierze także USA) oraz koncernów, w tym Gazpromu i jego europejskich partnerów. Sprawa Nord Stream 2 stała się poważnym wyzwaniem dla spójności UE oraz jej stosunków z USA i Rosją.

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Ekspansja na koszt państwa: Novatek motorem rosyjskiego sektora LNG

Author(s): Szymon Kardaś / Language(s): Polish

24 maja podczas Międzynarodowego Forum Gospodarczego w Petersburgu zostało podpisane porozumienie o zakupie przez francuski koncern energetyczny Total 10% udziałów w projekcie Arktyczny LNG 2 za 2,55 mld USD. Przedsięwzięcie to, przewidujące budowę zakładu skraplania gazu na Półwyspie Gydańskim, jest realizowane przez rosyjską spółkę Novatek – największego prywatnego producenta gazu w Rosji. W grudniu 2017 roku firma uruchomiła pierwszą linię produkcyjną terminalu LNG na Półwyspie Jamalskim – projekt Jamał LNG. Ponadto zamiar realizacji własnych projektów LNG podtrzymują wciąż Gazprom i Rosnieft’.

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