Recenzija: Organizacija federacije u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji 1943—1979
The review of: Ljubiša Korać, Organizacija federacije u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji 1943—1979, Arhiv Jugoslavije/Globus, Zagreb 1981, 488 str.
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The review of: Ljubiša Korać, Organizacija federacije u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji 1943—1979, Arhiv Jugoslavije/Globus, Zagreb 1981, 488 str.
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The review of: Metod Mikuž, Svet po vojni (1945—1957). Oris časa, v katerem živimo. Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 1983, 392 str. ilustr.
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The review of: Andreas Hillgruber: Europa in der Weltpolitik der Nachkriegszeit 1945—1963. (Oldenbourg Grundriss der Geschichte, zv.. 18), 2. dopolnjena izdaja, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munchen—Wien 1981, 188 str.
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The review of: Dokumention zur österreichischen Zeitgeschichte 1945—1955. (pripravil Josef Kocensky), Wien-Munchen 1970; strani 531.
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The trips of the presidents between 1923 and 2017 to Kastamonu as a whole were scrutinized in this study. The trips to Kastamonu were conducted by the presidents Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, Celal Bayar, Cevdet Sunay, Kenan Evren, Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan respectively. The presidents visited the province, towns and the villages, met with the authorities and the public. The presidents were accompanied by the statesmen, senior military officers, ministry experts, and family members. Therefore, it was aimed to investigate the issues in the area and to reach the right decisions for these issues. For which reasons the presidents travelled to Kastamonu and which activities they carried out in Kastamonu were questioned in this article. It was obtained in this study that the Kastamonu trips were quite important because of the fact that the issues about the city were reported directly to the first person of the state and potential investments in education, health, social, economic and cultural areas were planned. Research papers, archive documents and Kastamonu press were utilized as main references.
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The USA strategy development towards non-aligned countries represents the union of continuity and changes. The continuity is shown in efforts to strengthen its own positions and interests as much as possible in the non-aligned movement due to further consolidation of political, militaristic, economic and technological leadership of the USA in the world. The changes are manifested in the valuation system of the non-aligned politics and its role in the modern world. The attitude of the USA to the non-alignment went from the period of denying the international orientation of non-aligned countries at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, followed by the period of disregard, up to the beginning of the 1970s, as well as by the confrontation with non-aligned countries, „the third block” that had carried out the „tyranny of the majority”, to the tacit acknowledgment of the non-alignment, but with the further confrontation with non-aligned countries (up to the Carter’s government). Eventually, it entered the phase of public acknowledgment and advocacy for the cooperation with nonaligned countries at the end of the 1970s. In the 1980s, the USA began to flow towards the gradual exclusion of the non-aligned movement from the international scene, by its neutralization and submissiveness, which certainly represented the picture of the complete crash of the non-aligned politics and the marginalization of the non-aligned movement role in the modern world.
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The first part of the text presents a complex picture of the current situation in contemporary Serb historiography. The author points to the specific character of the period of Slobodan Milosevic’s rule and of its effect, combined with the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, on Serb historiography. The latter’s place in the public eye is determined, and an assessment made of the major problems hampering its work. The author shows how the pressure of direct Party control has been replaced by other problems, such as the need to confront amateur publications, the role of historiography in the national reawakening from the illusions of the past, financial difficulties, and insufficient professional progress. A certain lack of interest among the readers is pointed out, which comes after decades of hardships and a period of active interest of contents thought to reflect current politics. In the second part of the work the author casts a critical glance on a specific sociological trend in contemporary Serb historiography, especially when it makes actual events less clear. The results of new research should find their place in history textbooks and in them the past should not be reduced to something ugly and irrelevant from which nothing can be learnt. A historian must use his acquired knowledge of the past to build a critical perception that will establish a new identity for this science. The author underlines the view that the science dealing with the study of the past must never again be perceived as a means of totalitarian propaganda in the service of a specific ideological pattern.
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Review of: Marko Vrhunec: ŠEST GODINA SA TITOM (1967-1973),Beograd 2001, str. 359. Review by: Miroljub Vasić
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From 1988 to 1991 the most respectable Yugoslav daily newspaper „Politika” regularly published numerous letters from its readers in the column entitled „Impressions and Reactions”. Letters from all types of people were published, to the satisfaction of „Politika” editors, who prided themselves with the idea that the column had become a „popular platform”. The column was wholly political in content and its appearance coincided with a particularly dramatic period of transformation in Serb society. It was a time when the new social and political elite was becoming established, and was busily creating the foundations of renewed national identity and awareness. In the process, whose accelerated rhythm trampled over all who tried to remain rational and cautious, Serbia’s new administration called for „national mobilization” and unity among „Serbs worldwide”. The collective belief and the collective rights of the nation, which the government in Serbia loudly proclaimed, stifled isolated sounds of doubt or opposition. The column „Impressions and Reactions” reflects the deep and dramatic transformation of the political climate among the Serbs. By analyzing the texts and thematic wholes of this column, the author has offered a modest contribution, which might serve as a basis for a future anatomy of Serb society at the close of the 20th century.
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The year 1956 represented without doubt the most turbulent period after the break in Yugoslav-Soviet relations in 1948. As Sir Roberts pointed out in his annual report, the history of diplomacy knows of few cases in which relations between two countries have gone from one extreme to the other in such a short time. While observing the course of these events, despite pressure caused by the deterioration of their country’s relations with Yugoslavia, British diplomats, especially the ambassador Sir Roberts, succeeded in offering a sound interpretation of the character of the relations and the motives influencing the decisions made by the Yugoslav and Soviet leaders. Often their assessments of the true state of affairs in Yugoslav-Soviet relations and their opinions regarding the future of these relations disagreed with the views of their superiors in London. Actual events regularly confirmed, however, the opinions of the diplomats in Belgrade. A study of the reports of British diplomats arriving from Belgrade in the course of 1956 indicates scarce coverage of the events involving Hungary in the first half of November. Sir Roberts’ absence from Belgrade during this period certainly played an important part in this. Consequently, in the first, deciding days of the Hungarian crisis there was no one to send the brilliant political analyses, based on close contacts with Yugoslav leaders, which this exceptional diplomat otherwise regularly dispatched from Belgrade. It is the author’s guess that in this period communication between the British diplomats in London and Belgrade was limited to purely informative reports, which unfortunately are still unavailable for research. Nevertheless, as shown in this article, the quality primarily of Sir Roberts’ analyses made before and after this short period, present in an exceptionally comprehensive form the Western interpretation of Yugoslav-Soviet relations in 1956 and at the time of the Hungarian crisis.
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Rezolucija Kominforma, koja je za posledicu imala prekid veza Jugoslavije sa SSSR-om i sovjetskim satelitima, u potpunosti se odrazila na međunarodni aspekt delovanja Narodne omladine Jugoslavije (NOJ). Dotadašnja tesna saradnja sa omladinskim organizacijama socijaiističkih zemalja naglo je pogoršana. Iznenadna izolacija u kojoj se Narodna omladina Jugoslavije našla nametnula je potrebu za povezivanjem sa omladinom izvan socijalističkog lagera, posebno iz Zapadne Evrope i SAD. U tom cilju NOJ je nastojala da organizuje posete Jugoslaviji omladinaca i studenata iz raznih evropskih i vanevropskih zemalja, U prvo vreme radilo se o posetama inostrane omladine u okviru radnih grupa i brigada. U periodu od 1949. do 1951. godine na radnim akcijama u Jugoslaviji učestvovalo je 3.740 omladinaca iz inostranstva. Jugoslaviju je u tom periodu posetilo i više delegacija omladinskih i studentskih organizacija iz Francuske, Velike Britanije, skandinavskih zemalja. Većinu tih poseta organizovala je Narodna omladina Jugoslavije.
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In the word analysis and acts of its fathers Marxism is represented as a bundle of promises on the change of relations in society, flammable slogans, unrealistic conceptions of a human and society and brutal reckoning with the wrong classes, religious people and organized Churches or in short with all the dissidents. Central preoccupation of all communist leaders is revolution, hate and revenge with false promise to offer changed and improved living conditions. Thereby communism produces death and trouble, since it is turned to evil. It is also a system designed for extreme control of the human spirit and prescribing the way of thinking.If we take into consideration its basic philosophical assumptions outcomes of the applied communism are expected. Radical atheism and considering world as a relation of material realities as well as considering society as a predatory relation of bourgeoisie and proletariat which can be and has to be overcome only by revolution and massive destruction of opponents, inevitably produce a lot of violence or evil. Absence of God and lack of need for distinguishing good and evil gives the self-confidence to a couple of people regarding their absolute authority. In practice communism always isolated a tight group of those who decided what the best was for those who were not a part of that selected group (Party) and who endeavored to eliminate potential political opponents. As far as Catholic dogma is concerned, communism represents a wrong understanding of a man, wrong concept of the human society, wrong analysis of human relations and wrong understanding of the history. Since communism is a comprehensive system, world view, the Church officially pointed out that it could not accept it any part, it must reject it completely. Having come into power in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, communists repeated everything their role models, from Lenin to Stalin, had done before in Russia. Communism was confirmed one more time as a system with inherent predispositions for suppressing freedom and free ideas and as a suppressor of all in advance denounced segments of the society. Therefore it is understandable that Catholic Church pays special attention to the victims of that godless, antihuman and anti-civilizational system and that it wants to point out their sacrifice as witnessing for God, religion, personal ideals, communion of holy persons and as a pledge for a really better future of the world. Helping to shed light on the circumstances of their martyrdom, members of that Church in Croatian people only fulfill their debt towards those victims.
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The text provides a survey of Yugoslav military actions on the border with Italy, between September and December 1953, the time when the crisis arising around the Free Territory of Trieste had reached its peak. The Yugoslav Army’s extensive maneuver, which incidentally took place during the first phase of the Yugoslav-Italian dispute, put the Yugoslav forces stationed in the west of the country to a great test. Particular emphasis is placed on the deployment of Yugoslav forces into combat positions beginning with 8 October 1953, and the specific role and numerous operations accomplished by the Yugoslav Air Force and Navy. A detailed description is also given of the various problems facing the Yugoslav Army in these dramatic events. The Trieste crisis in the autumn of 1953 presented the most serious trial the Yugoslav People’s Army had experienced after 1948 and before the recent war in the 1990’s.
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In 1945 the imitation of Soviet models in Yugoslavia spread to the cultural and political sphere. The works of the best known Soviet ideologists and the theory of social realism became dominant. Translations of Soviet literature prevailed, Russian became a mandatory foreign language in schools, while Russian and modem Soviet artistic forms gained supremacy in the Yugoslav theater and movie production. The change in the cultural and political course came in 1949, and its consequences were soon felt in the programs of cultural institutions. Yugoslav cultural circles began turning their attention to Western trends. The changes in the cultural domain were formally confirmed at the plenary session of the Yugoslav Communist Party held towards the end of 1949, when Milovan Djilas explained the general turnabout. As a result, professional expertise gained greater importance in the political appraisal of artists and scientists. Individuals whose thoughts veered from official party ideology were thus given the chance to publish their ideas, and although this in no way threatened the acquired privileges of the Marxists it did make room for the expression of different views among the Communist theorists. Djilas was in favor of greater freedom of culture from the influence of politics, while Boris Ziherl was foremost among those who insisted on the need to maintain the inviolability of the Marxist dogma. Within a few years, however, the Communist elite, fearing that social liberalization might go too far and prove a threat to their monopoly, put a stop to the process of cultural reform. In the sphere of culture the ideas of the hitherto leading theorist Milovan Djilas were substituted by the dogmatic views supported by Boris Ziherl. The Communist Party thus showed that the time had not come yet for free cultural creativity, guided solely by the imagination and the aims of artists and scientists.
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The journal "History of the 20th Century" has been published since 1983, containing the works of many Yugoslav and foreign historians, authors and thinkers from other fields of science. The journal presents original works of science, but also other forms of professional writings. The central subject matter the journal deals with is Yugoslav history from 1918 to the 90-ties. A few of the essays published have referred to general history and international relations. The works published from 1983 to 1992 primarily deal with the period from 1918 to 1953. In the first years of publication the journal mostly referred to themes regarding the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its operation between the two world wars. Later this topic gave way to works dealing with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Works concerning World War Two are presented in every edition, particularly those dealing with the various aspects of the War of National Liberation and the revolution. Where topics concerning the period immediately following World War Two are concerned, most essays deal with the socialist period of Yugoslavia, especially the first ten years. The majority of the essays deal with political, diplomatic, and military history. A number of important historical subjects were never treated in the "History of the 20th Century", while others were first mentioned only seven or eight years after the beginning of the journal's publication. Ever since its first edition was published the "History of the 20th Century" has attracted the attention of the professional public, provoking interest, reactions, and discussion.
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The visit of the delegation headed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchov, to Belgrade in May 1955, exceeded the bilateral relations between these two socialist countries and marked a turning-point in Yugoslav foreign policy. The meetings of the Yugoslav leaders with Khrushchov were a political test of their ability to defend the country’s independence before the mighty eastern partner and, at the same time, of imposing their own principles on future relations. Much has been written about the nature of this meeting and its result in respect to these Yugoslav aims, however, the question of how the Belgrade talks affected Yugoslav relations with the West has not until now been satisfactorily answered. The available documents show that the Belgrade talks coincided with an important political commotion in the West and the dilemma regarding future policy toward Yugoslavia. Two dominant views emerged in the West in this respect. The first was in favor of ceasing all further aid to Yugoslavia and of adopting the same political course applied to other socialist countries. This idea was based on the notion that Yugoslavia was gradually returning to the communist camp and that helping Yugoslavia meant aiding the growth of communism in the world. Supporters of the other theory thought that co-operation with Yugoslavia should be continued in view of this country’s success in maintaining its independence in relation to the USSR and of the possibility that other socialist countries might follow its example. The result of this rebellious diplomatic act on the part of the Yugoslav government was that views in favor of co-operation with Yugoslavia prevailed in the West and US aid to Yugoslavia was continued with occasional fluctuations which reflected the changing intensity in the relations between the US and Yugoslavia.
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The turbulent events which took place in Hungary in the autumn of 1956 brought Imre Nagy into the forefront of political life. He was the prime minister of the Hungarian reformist government from 1953 to 1955 and was deposed and excluded from the Communist party for his conflict with the Stalinist Hungarian leader, M. Rakosi. After the upheavals in Hungary in October 1956 and the first Soviet intervention, I. Nagy was appointed prime minister and when, while occupying that position, he accepted the demands of the revolutionary forces, he became the leader and they symbol of the Hungarian revolution. The main aims of this revolution, the introduction of a multiparty system and independence for Hungaria, were irreconcilably against the interests and the dogma of the USSR and the Soviet leaders decided to quench the Hungarian revolution and to overthrow the government of Imre Nagy by force. Tito ard the Yugoslav administration supported the government of Imre Nagy until it proclaimed the abolition of the single-party system, a cornerstone of the Communist regime, thus threatening Communist political monopoly in the country. From that moment, Yugoslav official politics turned against Nagy to side with the Cremlin. At the meeting with Khrushchev on Brioni island, Tito agreed to Soviet military intervention and to the replacement of Nagy and his government with Janosz Kadar. It was decided on this occasion that the Yugoslavs would attempt to draw Nagy away from the center of political attention by offering him and his closest associates political asylum, a possibility which I. Nagy, faced with imminent Soviet intervention, had already inquired into. However, enormous problems were stirred up when Nagy and his group took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy on 4 November, fleeing before Soviet tanks. While the Yugoslav government struggled to keep their promise to gel Nagy out of the country, both the Soviet and Kadar’s governments demanded his extradition to the new Hungarian government. Negotiations over this problem went on until 21 November, when Kadar’s government accepted the solution proposed by the Yugoslavs to guarantee Nagy and his group a safe return to their homes. When this agreement was being put into effect, Nagy was abducted by the Soviets and immediately deported to Romania. The ensuing protests of the Yugoslav government were ignored and only served to create a serious breach in its relations with the Hungarian and Soviet governments. Nagy was kept in Romania until 1958 when he was returned to Budapest where a secret trial was organized in which he was condemned to death and executed. The Yugoslav government protested once again primarily because it was named in the accusation as an accomplice in Nagy’s »counterrevolutionary activity« but in the end the Yugoslavs were forced to accept this outcome as a fait accompli.
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Manifest PKWN oraz jego realizacja przez powstającą PRL stanowi wprowadzenie w życie programu o jaki polska lewica walczyła od wielu dziesięcioleci: reforma rolna poprzez parcelację majątków ziemskich i likwidację feudalnej struktury społecznej, masowy do-stęp do edukacji, ubezpieczenia społeczne, budowa mieszkań dla ludu, budowa Polski ze stabilnymi granicami i dobrymi stosunkami z sąsiednimi państwami. PKWN zapoczątkował także politykę emancypacji kobiet oraz dzieci i końca rodziny patriarchalnej. O ile bezsprzecznie skazą PKWN był fakt, że został ustanowiony przez władze ZSRR w momencie wkroczenia Armii Radzieckiej na tereny Polski, jego powstanie było zgodne z postanowieniami zachodnich aliantów. Właśnie kompromis ZSRR z zachodnimi mocarstwami przyniósł Polsce jej obecne, „idealne” dla interesu państwa granice, granice których dzisiejsza prawica wcale nie kwestionuje. Dla Polaków 1989 roku, także dla opozycji solidarnościowej, program PKWN był ważnym etapem modernizacji Polski. Celem było dopełnienie tej modernizacji poprzez demokratyzację państwa. Ustanowienie w 1945 roku Tymczasowego Rządu RP i wprowadzenie w życie programu PKWN powoduje szyb-kie zmiany w społeczeństwie polskim: reforma rolna likwiduje polityczną zależność chłopów od obszarników, setki tysięcy ludzi ze wsi korzysta z ogromnej mobilności i awansu społecznego w budowie nowego państwa – odbudowie z ruin, zagospodarowaniu ziem poniemieckich, dostępu do edukacji i pracy w nowo tworzonym przemyśle. Powstaje nowoczesna Polska taka jaką znamy. Równocześnie aparat przymusu PRL represjonuje opozycję, a politycy PZPR popełniają szereg strategicznych błędów, które w późniejszym czasie odbiorą władzy jej społeczną legitymizację. PZPR pozostaje u władzy przez cztery dziesięciolecia, gdyż jest to zgodne z interesami Zachodu, zgodne z kompromisem jakie mocarstwa Zachodu zawarły z ZSRR w latach 1943-46. Gdy w 1989 roku Zachód wycofuje się z kompromisu, a ZSRR wycofuje się z dominacji nad Europą Wschodnią, Polska po-pada w zależność wobec Zachodu, w której znajdujemy się do dzisiaj. Polakom nie udało się zdobyć na wizje niezależności i zamieniają jedno lenno na drugie. W bilansie PRL jako osiągnięcia należy zapisać powszechną oświatę i dostęp do kultury, rozdział Kościoła i Państwa, a w latach sześćdziesiątych rozwinięcie aktywnej i oryginalnej polityki zagranicznej (współpracy kulturowej, naukowej i technicznej z Francją, wsparcia pokojowej polityki ONZ, polityki kooperacji z krajami Afryki i krajami Arabskimi). Za błędy PRL należy uznać spłacanie przedwojennego długu II RP i ponowne zadłużenie prowadzące do kryzysu długu 1980 roku. Także niewykorzenienie antysemityzmu, nacjonalizmu oraz rasizmu należy uznać za ciemną stronę PRL. Wraz z brakiem legitymizacji demokratycznej oraz zadłużeniem wobec Zachodu upadek systemu był przesądzony w momencie wycofania się jego wschodniego protektora.
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Yugoslavia almost exclusively relied on economic and military aid of the Western powers during 1953 and 1954. This aid was particularly significant to Yugoslavia as a means of overcoming the economic isolation in which the country found itself after the conflict with East European countries and as a means of strengthening its economic and defensive resources. At the same time, the aid correlated with Western strategic interests deriving from the confrontation with the USSR during the cold, war. The support given Yugoslavia was meant to be an incentive to other communist countries to free themselves of Soviet dominance. However, notwithstanding the definite interest of both sides in co-operation, the differences in their socio-political systems and their views on current world events were so vast that they seriously hampered their communication. In an effort to reduce these differences as much as possible, Yugoslavia was compelled to make certain concessions to the West in the sphere of both internal and foreign politics. As part of the general liberalization of the political and economic system the former habitual practice of requisitioning the farmers’ crops was finally abandoned and a more tolerant attitude was taken towards political opponents (release of political prisoners). The Yugoslav leadership also had to demonstrate an appropriate willingness to co-operate over the issues; of Trieste and the global defense program of the NATO. This was one of the ways of dispelling the West’s doubts regarding Yugoslavia’s possible return to the 'Soviet orbit. The effect of radical changes made in Yugoslav foreign politics during the first half of the fifties is still a matter of debate and different interpretation in domestic and foreign literature. However, a fact which cannot be denied is that in this way Yugoslavia fortified its position in the international community and avoided the general economic ruin which had otherwise threatened her.
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The article presents the development of the Yugoslav Military Doctrine and the Yugoslav Armed Forces from 1945 to the 1980s. The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia developed the concept of General People’s Resistance and Social Self-Protection which was defending the freedom, national independence, sovereignity, and the self-managing socio-political system. The new doctrine also formed two defence components, the Yugoslav People’s Army as the operational army, and the Territorial Defence as the highest organisational form of defence and armed combat under the authority of republics and regions. Despite the well-conceived concept of the General People’s Defence and Social Self- Protection, the latter failed to find answers on how to defy the “internal enemy” and how to solve internal political, economic, and national problems, which amassed in Yugoslavia of the 1970s and the 1980s. Slovenian Territorial Defence was something positive, which derived from the Doctrine of Total People’s Defence. Since its establishment in 1968, the Slovenian Territorial Defence developed differently from the other federal republics and was increasingly considered as the Slovenian armed forces.
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