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The analysis in the paper is focused on the concept “Europeanvalues”. Some possible risks coming from the identification of European andgeneral human values are critically considered. The author develops somearguments against the radical interpretation of tolerance as a value without limits.There are contradictions leading to formation of two parallel systems of values inthe EU members countries.
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Almost all theses produced in the name of religion in modern thought and later in the West were realized in the form of a reckoning with the thought of the Middle Ages. The deism and atheism of the Enlightenment, which saw all kinds of reference sources other than natural theology, which is directly related to the scientific revolution, rational theology, which is the extension of the rationalist philosophy of modern thought, and reason, were produced because of the reckoning with the understanding of medieval religion. For this reason, the positive or negative discourses produced about religion in the mentioned periods should be understood by considering the tension between these two periods. It is obvious that religious philosophies, produced in a period when the understanding of the geometric universe and philosophies centered on the mind were widely accepted, could not remain indifferent to these developments. For example, deism is, on the one hand, the result of the search for an alternative to the elimination of the medieval church institution, on the other hand, it is the theoretical extension of rationalist discourses that eliminates all sources of reference other than reason. The same interactive situation is valid for the discourses produced about religion in the contemporary Western thought. However, this time, although the tradition of criticism regarding the understanding of religion of the Middle Ages continues to a certain extent, rational religious philosophies produced within the framework of the claims of modern thought and the Enlightenment that prioritizes reason were also criticized. For example, Nietzsche's (d. 1900) "God is dead" statement and Heidegger's (d. 1976) concept of "onto-theology" are criticisms of the absolute acceptance of the metaphysics of being constructed within the epistemic boundaries of man. Apart from this, Marx's (d. 1883) determination that "religion is opium" is directly related to the social processes of Western thought. As a matter of fact this interactive situation, which we have expressed in the examples, is quite normal when the Western thought's own adventure is taken into account. However, when the mentioned problem and the solutions produced for these problems are generalized to include other societies and thoughts, a reduction problem is experienced. Nietzsche's statement "God is dead", Heidegger's critique of "onto-theology" and Marx's statement that "religion is the opium" does not seem to be meaningless reactions when their historical context is taken into account. Furthermore, deism is not very strange belief for the society lived in the Middle Ages. However, if these discourses about religion are abstracted from their own climate of thought and accepted as a common problem or solution for all cultures and religions other than the West, confusion of meaning will be inevitable. The allegations in question should be understood within the framework of the theoretical, historical and social background that is the source of the problem, and should not be considered general determination that deny all religions and God. The same is true for the terms deism and atheism, which have a meaning and integrity in the tradition of Western thought and are directly related to the West's own religious and philosophical past. Treating these two terms as if they are the common problem of Islam or any other religion without considering the historical ties will not go beyond being a reduction that does not consider the particular existence conditions of other religions. In addition to the examples we gave, the concept that we want to focus on and which we see as a more chronic example of the insertion of a concept that was formed depending on certain historical or social conditions into the meaning world of another religion is theism. The reason why we define theism as a more chronic problem is that it is accepted as a concept compatible with Islamic belief, unlike the concepts of deism and atheism. In this study, the drawbacks of direct use of the concepts of deism, atheism and especially theism, produced in the tradition of Western thought, as a specific form of the problematic, which is defined as the transfer of a concept that emerged in certain cultural atmosphere to another cultural atmosphere, will be discussed. First, by reviewing the philosophy of religion studies conducted in Turkey, the fact that three concepts mentioned are directly transferred to the philosophy of religion studies carried out in the Islamic world will be presented as a problem and this situation will be defined as the reduction of Islamic belief to some other concepts. The aim to be achieved by emphasizing such a problem is to remind the importance of understanding the principles of Islamic belief in its own meaning, without reducing it to other meanings. This is because every concept produced within the tradition of Western thought is directly related to its own intellectual and practical history. For this reason, when a solution or criticism that is formed in a different sense or dependent on a certain practical past is brought to Islamic thought, the philosophical and practical past of those concepts will also be transferred. However, every belief should be evaluated by considering its own meaning and history. Evaluating this problem through concepts that Islam directly rejects, such as deism and atheism, is more understandable than the concept of theism. However, when it comes to the concept of theism, problem becomes quite complex. Because in almost all sources, Islam is defined as a theistic religion and this is considered as a necessary pre- suppossion for the Islamic belief. However, theism is the understanding of God in modern Western thought, in which Descartes’s rationalism and Newtonian mechanics are accepted as the dominant element. Such an understanding of God, built within the epistemic boundaries of the thinking agent, is incompatible with the Islamic conception of God.
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The problem of evil and theodicy is one of the most important subjects in the field of Philosophy of Religion. The problem of evil is basically stated as the problem of incompatibility of the existence of God with evil. While the problem of evil is used to justify atheistic claims, theodicy has been developed to strengthen theistic claims against the problem of evil. Mawlānā, D̲jalāl al ̲ - Dīn Rūmī (1207-1273), who is the important sufi thinker of Turkish-Islamic culture, is generally known for his mystical and literary works. Although Mawlânâ's philosophical views have not been studied sufficiently, it is seen that he presents his important ideas in the philosophical field, especially in the philosophy of religion, in a non-systematic and hidden way in his works. In this study, the problem of evil has been studied in the case of Mawlânâ, within the scope of the evil’s types and the problem of evil’s types in the literature. In addition, it has been examined whether Mawlânâ discussed the evil as a philosophical problem and contributed to the solution of the problem of evil. There are three types of evil in the literature of Philosophy of Religion: Natural Evil, Metaphysical Evil and Moral Evil. Although Mawlānā does not clearly define these types of evil, his perception of evil is similar to the three types of evil in the literature. However, Mawlānā rejects natural evil and in some measure accepts metaphysical evil. What Mawlānā understands from evil is exactly moral evil. According to Mawlānā the moral evil results from alienation from God, giving a lot of importance to material things and neglecting spirituality. Thus, he adds a spiritual and divine dimension to the concept of moral evil which takes part in the literature. As it is seen, Mawlānā does not systematically discuss the types and definitions of evil. By the same token, he does not discuss the problem of evil and does not offer solutions to the problem of evil. Themes related to the problem of evil are found in the examples and the subtext of his couplets. Three basic problems of evil are mentioned in modern debates: The Logical Problem of Evil, The Evidential Problem of Evil and The Existential Problem of Evil. When the problem of evil is evaluated in terms of Mawlānā's views, the contradiction between God and evil in the logical version of evil is cancelled and the God-evil dilemma (There is either God or evil) becomes a false dilemma by demonstrating a third possibility which both God and evil exist. On the other hand, Mawlānā's views which emphasize the goodness and the order of the world have the potential to respond to the evidential problem of evil. Mawlānā has taken a quite different approach to the themes of death and freedom whose contradiction with God and his power is used to justify the existential problem of evil. According to Mawlānā, the human freedom does not confine the power of God and death which is a new birth and the beginning of a new life, is not evil rather it is good. All in all, there is not the problem of evil, but there is theodicy in the views of Mawlānā. In this study, the theodicy used by Mawlânâ, which is related to contrasts, has been called the theodicy of contrasts and has been explained and systematized. There are seven arguments in the theodicy of contrasts: Argument 1: The evil is the part of the natural equilibrium, Argument 2: Since good and evil exist together, the point of view comes into the prominence, Argument 3: The evil is necessary for the understanding of good, Argument 4: There is the evil for the greater good, Argument 5: There are situations which good is in the evil and evil is in the good, Argument 6: The evil is actually good and Argument 7: It is possible for the good-bad duo to merge in the good: Unity. Mawlânâ's understanding of God has been labeled as theist, pantheist and panentheist from time to time. It is known that Mawlânâ defends God as an omnipotent, omniscient and all good within the framework of the understanding of tawhid. At the same time, it is seen that Mawlânâ claims that good and evil merge at the final point. In previous studies on Mawlânâ, it was often emphasized that his conception of God is both immanent and transcendent. There is a theistic tendency in Mawlânâ's attempt to preserve the attributes of God, and a pantheistic tendency in the idea of merging the good-bad duo in the good. It could be argued that Mawlânâ is more likely to be a theist or panentheist than a pantheist due to his emphasis on both a transcendent and an immanent creator. In addition, these two probabilities make it possible to discuss the problem of evil in Mawlânâ. It is known that theodicy related to theme of contrast was developed before Mawlânâ. As a result, although it cannot be said that Mevlânâ made an original contribution to the problem of evil with his theodicy of contrasts in terms of content, it can be claimed that his treatment of the problem is original considering his style and his appeal to metaphors.
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One of the most controversial issues in the history of philosophy is the theory of ideas. Mulla Sadrā states that he is the person who truly understands the ideas in the process from Plato to himself, and even, that he is alone in this regard. Sadrā says that he achieved this success thanks to his discovery and inspiration, as well as his being-centered philosophical system. He attributes the difficulty in knowing the ideas to the inability of the mind to comprehend pure and luminous beings. Just as strong lights dazzle the human eye or distant objects do not appear clearly, the human mind perceives ideas as vague and universal concepts. Ideas are universal, but not in the logical sense. For ideas are abstract luminous beings, not things that come out of a mental abstraction and generalization process. For this reason, divine help and intuition are needed in order to understand them. Based on the principle that the like can be known through the like, people who have melted their entire existence in the pure mind and perceive the ideas as the talisman of every species, the strong sustainer and ruler of the species. Although the ideas are not universals that are the product of the mind, they give power and light to the mind in creating logical universals. In that case, it is obvious that in the absence of ideas, it is not possible to talk about real knowledge. In other words, knowing something mentally means that it is at the ideal level of being. Otherwise, neither the fixed existence nor the knowledge of the thing can be mentioned. According to him, the issue of existence must be resolved in order to understand the ideas. It does not seem possible to grasp the solution of the problem of ideas without understanding the unity, organization and nobility of existence. Accordingly, while the idea of unity of existence solves the problem of getting a share, the idea of tashkīk makes it possible to distinguish between ideas and their individuals. The nobility of existence allows the multi-structure of the ideal realm to be performed in unity. Sadrā finds Avicenna's attitude on the subject of ideas strange because he did not take into account Esûlûjyā and the proofs developed accordingly. Also, he does not have the knowledge of the discovery of ideas. Sadrā sees Suhrawardī as the philosopher who comes closest to the truth on the subject. While proving the ideas, Sadrā does not hesitate to use the proofs developed by the defenders of the idea like Suhrawardī, but he states that only he has reached the truth of them. According to Sadrā, it is certain that the natural world is a product of the mind, so the existing ones must have prototypes in the abstract world. This situation is based on the ontological principle of priority and posteriority. That is, what is simple and abstract must come first. For the composite and material is the thing that comes into existence later. This is another expression of the rule of imkān al-ashraf. When the mind examines something existing in the realm of possibility, it judges that its higher possibilities must have existed before. Another proof is the principle of “The Supreme does not exist for the lower one.” In that case, Ideas do not exist for the corporeal species and their individuals below them. For this situation requires that the things that are taken as ideas and models to be more honorable and superior than the ideas. On the contrary, the forms of corporeal species are the mold and shadow of these intellectual and luminous forms. When the ideas are identified with both the knowledge of God and the divine names, they do not have their own existence, or any aspect that can cause multiplicity. In the creation of the universe, while the ideas correspond to the minds and are passive towards God, they are active compared to the beings below them. At this point, it should be said that ideas are often confused with qualities obtained by mental abstraction. In Sadrā's philosophy, quiddities are nothing but forms of existence. It can be said that within the framework of Sadrā's understanding of emanation, existence is divided into two as common/exclusive and ideas, and these two combine to create beings. In this respect, it is seen that Sadrā places the ideas in the position of form and the common being in the position of matter.
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The issue of reaching moral perfection in Islamic thought is handled together with the theory of knowledge. The subject of soul (nafs) and powers, which includes the physical and metaphysical aspects of human being, forms the basis of the theory of knowledge and morality based on it. The aim of this article is to examine the views of Shams al-Din al- al-Shahrazūrī (d. 687/1288), one of the most important names of the Ishrāqī school(Illuminationist thought), about the soul and its powers at the center of the idea of moral evolution. In the author's system about powers, the animal soul realizes perception and movement based on the senses. This realization, which takes place at a minor level, enables humans and animals to maintain their daily lives. In order for an action to have moral value, such partial knowledge must reach the level of universal knowledge by the nātiq soul. The theory of imagination and memory, which is examined within the inner cognitive powers of the animal power, is also at the focus of the criticism of the Ishrāqī thought to the Peripatetic understanding of knowledge. In our study, on the one hand, alShahrazūrī’s theory of powers and the idea of moral evolution are examined; on the other hand, criticisms of the Peripatetic school are also discussed on these issues. Thus, another aim of our study is to examine, al-Shahrazūrī’s understanding of morality in the context of his contributions to Ishrāqī thought, similarities and differences with Peripatetic philosophy. Al-Shahrazūrī follows his teacher al-Suhrawardī in his theory of knowledge and thought of perfection, which he explains in connection with the powers of the soul. However, he made his teacher's thoughts more systematic on the subject of powers and enriched them with different examples. The interlocutor of both authors in terms of powers is Avicenna who is the founder of the system in this field in Islamic thought. The most detailed explanation about the division of the inner powers of perception by five in the form of common sense, imagination, delusion, imagination and memory belongs to Avicenna. Al-Fārābī’s division for these powers is similar to that of al-Shahrazūrī. Although al-Shahrazūrī clearly mentions the Peripatetic school in his explanations and criticisms, it is determined that his addressee is Avicenna. As was the case in al-Suhrawardī, al-Shahrazūrī who first discussed and explained the five-point classification according to the Avicennan system, then criticizes this system and bases on three basic powers as common sense, imagination and zākira (memory). He places these powers at the base of his moral philosophy in harmony with his own ontology and epistemology. The most basic criticism of Avicenna about powers is on the function of imagination and memory to store images and meanings. AlShahrazūrī does not accept the function of both powers in the sense of storing power, but combines the functions of these senses in imagination. Al-Shahrazūrī's criticisms of Avicenna's classification on powers are mainly directed towards his theory of knowledge and form the basis for explaining his own Ishrāqī theory of knowledge. The reason why he reduces the inner senses to three basic powers and shows different actions as functions of a single force is basically denying the existence of powers that store images or judgments within the powers of the soul. This attitude, which we see in al-Suhrawardī, allows to explain the Ishrâqî theory of knowledge. According to Avicenna, since cognition is the formation of the forms of sensible objects in the mind, these forms must be preserved in the mind when they disappear. However, for al-Suhrawardī, cognition takes place in luminous realms depending on the relation between the subject and the truths of sensory objects. The truths of these objects took place in the ‘âlam al-mithal (imaginal world). In this case, there is no need for a bodily force to reserve this kind of knowledge. Such a theory of knowledge also deeply influences the idea of moral evolution. What is essential for human beings in perfection is to lead a life oriented towards luminous realms where knowledge will be realized. This attitude places the idea of isolation, which is based on asceticism and contemplation, at the center of moral evolution. In the process of knowledge required for competence, the inferential experience is important, but in the last stage, the main thing should be the experience of pleasure. Al-Shahrazūrī describes a person who has achieved moral competence at the highest level as " ārif (sage)". Ārif is a person who attains the knowledge of the realm of light by fulfilling asceticism and contemplation in the most perfect manner, and is at the peak of moral competence. In al-Shahrazūrī's thought, the sage should use the methods of reasoning, however, in the last stage, he should deepen in the methods of asceticism and observation and emphasize intuitive knowledge. In these thoughts, al-Shahrazūrī is based on the Ishrāqī method by synthesizing the Peripatetic method, which emphasizes the mental experience, and the Sufi method, which emphasizes the experience of pleasure. Al-Shahrazūrī, who followed Suhrawardī in this regard, made his teacher's thoughts more systematic on the subject of powers and strengthened them with different examples. With this attitude, he deepened the mystical character of Ishrāqī philosophy within the framework of the idea of moral evolution.
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Our International Society for Comparative Philosophy toward World Philosophy (“CPWP” for short: www.cpwponline.org), emphasizes (but is not limited to) the constructive engagement of distinct approaches and resources from different philosophical traditions (whether distinguished culturally or by style/orientation) or from (ancient) philosophical tradition and contemporary scholarship (philosophy or other intellectual pursuits): inquire into how they can talk to and learn from each other and make joint contributions to the contemporary development of philosophy through treating a range of (perennial, existing or newly identified) issues of philosophical value and significance that can be jointly concerned and approached via appropriate philosophical interpretation and from a higher and/or broader philosophical vantage point toward world philosophy and for the sake of contemporary development of philosophy and society. Problems of cross-tradition philosophy with its methods and approaches, namely the comparative approach with advantages and shortcomings of these comparative perspectives taking into account that they belong to the Euro-American methodological tradition as a product of the European intellectual history and the corresponding socialization processes vs. non-Western discources, which belong to a different referential framework and eo ipso they are resulting in different methodological procedures, our philosophers-comparativists are placing into a broader cross-cultural context. Also, the very process of comparing different philosophies as such is necessarily linked to numerous methodological problems especially when dealing with transcultural philosophical comparisons connected to intercultural philosophical vocabularies, and this issue is above all connected with predominantly Western-centric methodology and its axiological presumptions. Actually, dealing with the perspective(s) of different referential frameworks in the framework which prevailed in the course of European intellectual history, this paper is quest for upgrading and changing the existing methodological procedures on the basis of available literature. This ‘constructive-engagement strategy’ or ‘constructive-engagement account’ has been pointedly focused on in a recent international virtual conference (19–23 April 2022) co-organized by our journal and the CPWP and co-sponsored and hosted by the SJSU Center for Comparative Philosophy.
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The main purpose of this paper is to examine and discuss the importance of the method that Ibn Khaldun introduces in Muqaddima. The dimensions of the consequences of its application are particularly reflected through a completely new role of history as a science. For Ibn Khaldun, the new method with clearly established scientific principles should provide a crucial role in understanding the social laws and forces that determine the course of history. In considering Ibn Khaldun’s thought, special attention is paid to the fact that he is an Arab-Islamic thinker from the 14th century, which simply does not allow the study of his doctrine apart from the context of the time that he witnessed.
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Islamic philosophers showed a great interest in the metaphysical heritage, and especially in the understanding of being and its poles. This includes, for example, analogical being, simple being, graded being, synonymous being, reflected or manifested being, necessary and possible being, impossible being, discontinuous being... Furthermore, they devoted themselves deeply to the distinction between essence and existence, potentiality and reality, general and individual. The analysis of the different treatment of these questions in Islamic philosophy shows that roots of the modern understanding of being and existence do not only reach back to scholastic philosophy in its middle phase (Thomas Aquinas or later to Francisco Suarez and Christian Wolff), as many researchers tend to claim, but to a much earlier period. However, we will focus here on some indications of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra Shirazi about the univocal and equivocal meaning of the concept of existence precisely in order to confirm the aforementioned thesis.
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Given the lack of a comprehensive description of Mullā Sadrā’s tafsīr works in modern scholarship, the article offers a detailed account of the con- tent, organization, and scope of each of his writings on the Qur’ān. The material presented here does not only expand the understanding of the importance of Sadrā’s works on the Qur’ān, but it also enables a more refined approach to the theoretical dimensions of his sacred textual hermeneutics. In the list below, Sadrā’s writings on the Qur’ān are divided into four general categories: commentaries on individual sūras, commentaries on individual āyats, theoretical works on the Qur’an, and works on the Qur’an of questionable authenticity. The list is accompanied by an appendix that presents the approximate order of those works belonging to the first three categories. These titles are considered in relation to themselves and in relation to Sadrā’s other datable writings that do not deal with the Qur’ān.
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The paper discusses Mullā Sadra’s translated works, providing brief notes on them. Works on Mullā Sadra’s life and work are also analyzed. Only the translations and works about him written in Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian language are included and they are arranged chronologically. Although we cannot claim that all the translated works of Mullā Sadra in these languages are mentioned, along with all the works about him that have been written and translated, we have certainly managed to include most of the works in one place. It is sometimes surprising to notice in some works a lack of reference to this great Islamic thinker.
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Mankind has tried to answer the questions about the nature of the soul since history. One of the Islamic scholars who dealt with the nature of the soul, which is an important issue in Islamic philosophy, is Ibn Sînâ. His full name is Abû Ali al-Husayin b. Abdullah b. Ali b. Ibn Sînâ and was also known in the Islamic world by the title of as-shayḫu'r-re'îs and in the western world by the name of Avicenna. He has been one of the most prominent scholars in the history of Islamic science in the field of philosophy and medicine. He followed and enriched al-Farabî's school, which was based on the philosophical system of Aristotle and Plato. In addition to his works on various fields, he wrote many works on the soul. Among these works, the most famous work in the world of science is his eulogy al-Qaṣîda al-‘Ayniyya al-rûhiyya fî al-nafs, which is also an essential work in Arabic literature. It is possible that Ibn Sînâ was inspired, in regard to symbols and descriptions of the soul in his eulogy, by the views of ancient philosophers on the soul.
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The purpose of this study is to investigate the course of philosophical criticism after al-Ghazālī by using Shihāb al-Dīn ʿUmar al-Suhrawardī's (d. 632/1234) work Rashf al-nesāʾihi al-īmāniyya wa kashf al-fezāʾihi al-Yūnāniyya. Often confused with Suhrawardī al-Maktūl (d. 587/1191), Shihāb al-Dīn ʿUmar al-Suhrawardī is known for his Sufī identity and was the founder of the Suhrawardī order. Al-Suhrawardī organized his work into fifteen chapters and addressed topics like those discussed by al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) but differed from him in many ways regarding method and style. In his criticism of philosophy, al-Suhrawardī followed al-Ghazālī and focused on the issues he discussed. Al-Suhrawardī criticized philosophers' views on God's ignorance of the particular (juzʿi), their supporting the theory of emanation and the spiritual nature of the resurrection. This study suggests understanding al-Suhrawardī to trace the course of the criticism of philosophy after al-Ghazālī. Moreover, to appreciate the criticisms of philosophy after al-Ghazālī, al-Ghazālī's Tahāfut al-falāsifa and Shahristānī's Musāraʿat al-falāsifa (d. 548/1153) were compared with al-Suhrawardī's work in terms of their methods and contents. In this way, the present study pinpoints the similarities and differences between the three works. With this aim in mind, it first presents al-Suhrawardī's method in the criticism of philosophy and addresses his criticisms of philosophers. It also compares the works of these three names in terms of method, and content, along with the social and political reasons that led them to write their works. The present study suggests that al-Suhrawardī was mainly similar to al-Ghazālī in terms of their focus, while al-Suhrawardī, unlike al-Ghazālī relied more on the evidence in his method. Al-Shahristānī, on the other hand, mostly remained within philosophy compared to the other two scholars and offered his criticisms. Al-Ghazālī influenced both scholars who lived after him in identifying the subjects to be criticized. However, while al-Ghazālī and al-Suhrawardī agreed on the takfīr of philosophers, al-Shahristānī differed from them in this respect. The present study also concluded that, although there was no intense philosophical activity in al-Ghazālī and al-Suhrawardī's period that could prompt them to write these works, the two authors might have written their works due to certain political directives and social needs as they had close relations with the political figures of the period. Al-Shahristānī's work, on the other hand, appears to be the output of a philosophical debate.
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In Sufism, the subject of love or divine love is considered as one of the most valuable concepts and the most important foundations on which the Sufis build their way of knowing Allah. For this reason, it has aroused the interest of many people, especially mystical and literary circles, from different religions, languages, races and cultures since ancient times. If there were no conversation or love, many of the literary texts would not exist today. This phenomenon, which has been handled from different perspectives from past to present, has been subjected to different evaluations, sometimes in a literary text, and sometimes by writing separate treatises and books about it. One of the personalities who dealt with this subject in detail is Ibn Debbâg al-Qayravani, one of the Sufis of the 7th century Hijri. Ibn Debbâğ, like his predecessors Fârâbî, Tevhîdî and Ghazali, is one of the Sufis who consider love together with the theory of beauty and perfection. But what makes it different is that besides the theory of beauty and perfection, the states of lovers, the ways to reach genuine love, the parts of love, the truth of perfection and beauty, spiritual love, the pleasures of fellow devotees... In addition, his recording of mystical states and maqams with shar'i measures, his systematic handling of zahir-bâtın, latîf-kesîf, lofty-suflî concepts and associating them with love form a collection of his ideas. In fact, Ibn Debbâg sheds light on the understanding of Sufism of the period in which he lived, with the way he handled and handled the subject. While all these reveal the importance of our study, they are also the issues that determine its method. On the other hand, the absence of any academic study related to Ibn Debbâg and his understanding of love in our country is one of the main reasons why we prefer this subject.
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This article presents a quite neglected interpretative tradition within the Islamic philosophy – the Ottoman perception of the debate between Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī and the philosophers. It first discusses the negligence of the Ottoman intellectual contributions in general, i.e. its historical background, and then it moves to the discussion about the above-mentioned tradition which was initiated by sultan Mehmed II. Then it analyzes the long chain of commentators who wrote critical insights into earlier discussions about philosophical achievements. Then the article offers a more specific review of the commentaries of Hojazadeh and ‘Ala’uddin at-Tusi, and their critical views of al-Ghazālī. It also points out the complete absence of the mention of Ibn Rushd in these discussions. The Ottoman authors did not base their views on mere acceptance of al-Ghazālī’s arguments, but rather they pointed out his insufficiently substantiated views and criticized contradictions in his arguments when found. Their primary goal was not to establish the new philosophic systems, but rather to have a more thorough approach towards understanding and expanding the existing ideas.
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In this work, we endeavored to point out the broader framework of the Islamic intellectual tradition, which is essentially calmed in the content of Islamic philosophy and Sufism as a form of intellectual or thinking Islam. The essential object of our focus in the narrower content framework was our focus on intellectual knowledge (’ilm ’aqlī, ma’rifa) on whose universal value the intellectual tradition of Islam is based, as opposed to the traditional knowledge (‹ilm naqlī) that establishes the juridical, ethical-moral and dogmatic aspect of applied or practicing Islam. The primordial human nature (fitra), exposed to the influence of the light of these two types of knowledge in the thinking tradition of Islam, appears at the same time as an ontological and epistemological theater (al-majlā) within which the Word of God, under the macrocosmic and sacred-historical view, is constantly transforming it (the human nature) and through its continuous spiritual and moral-ethical transformation, it puts on a luxurious interpretative and hermeneutic garb.
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A conclusion is “the royal road to philosophy”. It does not exist, but is insisted upon. It is meant to be a compilation of what has been accumulated in the text. All the images and experiences of a journey are to be expressed by the goal. The search for a conclusion is the confirmation of a world reduced to a syllogism. A soul travelling towards the Universal would benefit more from a reminiscence of the journey and its highlights than from a conclusion. This text is focused on emphasising the importance of translation as a journey of one’s own, renouncing hearsay views and, in particular, expressing the significance of comparing the human God with the almost inoperable to be contained in every individuality. Chittick surmises and records. He translates and establishes. While translating, he enables those less informed of the original texts to discern their own paths. His thought is essentially interpretative. Without any pretension to statements uncorroborated by translated texts, Chittick is a testimony to the beauty of an inspired interpretation suggesting new possible roads.
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This paper discusses translations of William C. Chittick’s works into Bosnian language, giving certain remarks about them and providing a short biography of the author. The paper shows that numerous books and articles of this renowned American researcher of the classical Islamic philosophy and Sufism have recently been translated into Bosnian language. In 2019, the translations of three of his books were published, so it may not be farfetched to say that a kind of translation movement has been taking place. We assume that the reason for this phenomenon lies in the simplicity of Chittick’s language which he deploys to explain the deepest truths of Islam in a fluent, erudite and academic way. At the same time, his works do not lose comprehensiveness and diligence. Hence one can speak about a considerable influence of his works on Bosnian readers.
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In this paper I discuss a dispute between Jewish medieval philosophers about the status of divine attributes. The paper consists of three parts. In the first part, I outline Philo’s and Saadia’s reasons as to why God must be thought as perfect and simple. Using the aristotelian distinction „substance/accidence“, I explain why it is problematic to ascribe to God, as seen within Judaic tradition, properties such as omniscience, power, goodness, and others. In the second part, I examine Maimonides’ negative theology. Maimonides holds that one must not predicate anything to God. Because God and human beings are incommensurable, any such ascription would be equivocal. Under the influence of Saadia, Maimonides maintains that one cannot say anything about God except that He exists. To prove his thesis, Maimonides was prepared to interpret the content of Jewish Holy writs as being highly metaphorical and it’s most profound meaning as beyond the grasp of the majority of those practicing the principles of Judaism. Even though Maimonides’ influence was felt on many subsequent Jewish thinkers, many of them didn’t always agree with him. In the third part of the paper, I sketch Gersonides’, Crescas’ and Albo’s alternative solutions to the problem of ascribing attributes to God. Aside from discussing a question of the status of Divine attributes, in this paper I also try to put forward a thesis that goes beyond the framework of the mentioned dispute. Namely, Jewish philosophers, Maimonides being the paradigmatic example, didn’t simply adopt the official interpretations of religious dogma, nor did they compromise with it when it comes to proving their theses. In that regard, they came very close to early modern philosophers, who discussed philosophical and theological problems in light of principles of rational examination, rather than accepting the claims of ecclesiastical authority.
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This article tries to make up a lack of the recognition of the theologian of the Ḥanafī tradition from Samarqand in Transoxiana Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī’s philosophical contribution to the Muslim theology in regard to the theory of divine properties. Viewing al-Māturīdī as an early trope theorist, the author has dug into al-Māturīdī’s ontology, which argues to the effect that the substances are not just bundles of qualities but of particular property instances, or tropes. This al-Māturīdī’s theory comes in the context of his dialectical exchange about divine speech with an unnamed interlocutor. Thus, it is the author’s suggestion that those who teach more systematic courses that involve tropes should consider enriching and diversifying the historical context of their syllabus by including al-Māturīdī as an early example of a trope theorist. In addition to that al-Māturīdī’s has important ethical ideas that could be explored in comparison to other religious thinkers and philosophers.
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The article presents an overview of approaches to the ontological dimension of the universal as a category of humanitarian knowledge. An extensive analysis allowed to conclude that the study of universals within humanitarian studies has been mainly considered by philosophers in Indian and Arab-Muslim and Western European philosophies as 1) nominalistic; 2) realistic and 3) conceptual understanding. Philosophers of culture perceived universals as the symbolic core of culture or archetypes. In linguistics, the universal modes of human thought were developed by the modists, the "Universal Grammar of Port-Royal", the "Memorandum on Linguistic Universals": classical universalism; cognitive psychologism or conceptualisation of reality: cognitive (generative) grammar, cognitive semantics, theory of semantic primitives, theory of conceptual integration, etc.
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