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The paper presents a theoretical consideration of the basics of philosophy of law of Carl Schmitt, a famous German lawyer and thinker who is the author of a quite controversial law theory, which to this day will not cease to intrigue the professional researchers. The work approaches Schmitt’s thought in an impartial way, and conducts a constructive dialogue with his theory of law and the state, i.e. his philosophy of law, acknowledging Schmitt’s analytical results in defining the relationship between politics and law, but also criticizing his theory where it shows certain exaggerations. The paper presents a simultaneous research of Schmitt’s theory and Schmitt’s biography, trying to show the existential and political reasons why he tried to conform his theory of state and law to the totalitarian political circumstances in which he lived. The paper finally evaluates the value of Schmitt’s theory, which in a clear, descriptive and logical way distinguished two levels of legal thought, distinguishing the very level of constitution of the political-legal order where law is not, in real historical conditions, separate from politics - and the level of the system of positive legal norms itself. In addition to discussing the basic figures of Schmitt’s philosophy of law, the paper also pays attention to Schmitt’s treatment of particular legal-theoretical issues, such as the issue of the state of emergency and sovereignty.
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In this paper, the author examines the logical and ontological aspects of pandemic. Relatedly, the the definition of a pandemic is scrutinized. The very word pandemic (πάνδημος) comes from the Classical Greek language and refers to something pertains to all (πάν) people (δῆμος). However, this cannot be of great use for the definition of pandemic, because with each one known so far, it was about a wide distribution in the people, and not about the entire people. We will try to show that a precise definition (or precise description) of the pandemic does not exist, which means that the very notion is not clear, and therefore the declaration of a pandemic is a matter of preference of those who declare it. “Wide distribution” is a wide notion that could be a part of acceptable scientific definition. Such a lack is, however, compensated by the frequent use of emotional determinants that only obscure the problem, instead of illuminating it. Expressions such as: “invisible enemy”, “social distancing”, “new normal”, “responsibility”, “solidarity”, “state of war”, “virus attack” and others, have an emotional function, the goal of which is to replace the scientific, rational understanding of things.
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The text will suggest that our emotional life is one continuous stream of active and passive fear. The argumentation is based on different insights about fear presented by Angelo Mosso and Carl Georg Lange in particular. Specifically, Mosso shows that increased circulation occurs after fear ceases, while Lange links anger and joy to increased circulation, showing that these two emotions are physiologically close. At the same time, Lange argues that sadness is physiologically close to fear because it is characterized by weakened circulation. On the other hand, there is an evolutionary connection between fear and anger. The text presents the idea that fear is the only basic emotion, and that other emotions are modifications of fear, hence the title „The Stream of Fear” inspired by William James’s description of our mental life as one continuous „stream of consciousness”.
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The main purpose of this article is to analyze David Papineau’s influential perceptual model of phenomenal concepts in order to respond to the explanatory gap problem. Those are special kind of concepts which we use to refere to phenomenal properties of our own experience. Such concepts are formed when the subjects initially perceive relevant entities, they get stored into memory, and become re-activated at each coming encounter. Their distinctive feature is the non-existence of a priori connection with other concepts we possess. When we think in non-phenomenal concepts we do not have the same feeling as when we think in phenomenal concepts. This is the cause of our assumption that feelings are somehow different than physical properties. This situation of two different modes of presentation of the same entity which develop the illusion of two different entities Papineau calls the the antipathetic fallacy: It is the source of the dualist intuitions which encourage the impression of an explanatory gap and lead us to persistently reject the identity of mental and physical. Once we grasp the structure of phenomenal concepts we will understand the origin of those intuitions as well as the fact that they do not give us enough reasons for doubt in physicalism.
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From a canonical writing of the analytic philosophy to an existentialist diversion inside the scientific worldview – not many major works of the contemporary philosophy have become a subject of so divergent interpretations as Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This paper attempts to elucidate the meaning of the Tractatus from the perspective of the insight that the modern conflict in the ways of seeing the world between scientific Enlightenment and aesthetic Counter-Enlightement has informed the historical context of the book’s emergence, as well as its interpretative history. It is argued that Wittgenstein resorts to modernist irony so as to show by the example of the Tractatus itself the irrationality of the Enlightenment’s core belief that both sides in the aforesaid historical, ideological and exegetical dispute share, which is that scientific method exhaustes human rationality.
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Bernard Williams’s papers collected in the volume In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument had a great influence on contemporary normative political theory. Williams not only revived the topic of realism in political theory, but also defended the approach of political realism that he contrasts to the approach of political moralism. This paper will focus on the distinction between political realism and political moralism. Moreover, the question of legitimacy will be considered in the light of this distinction. After examination of the distinction between political realism and political moralism, we will be in a position to address the main question that this paper aims to answer: does political realism set any limits on political philosophy?
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Alvin Plantinga wants to answer the following question: Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable? We will present the answer John Locke gives, based on his evidentialism, to the aforementioned question, as well as Plantinga’s critique of Locke’s evidentialist approach. Plantinga thinks that the question „Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable?” is best understood as meaning „Is Christian belief warranted?”. We will analyze Plantinga’s argument for the claim that Christian belief probably has warrant if it is true, which implies that we first have to show that Christian belief (probably) is false in order to show that it (probably) has no warrant. But than that means that we have to show that Christian belief is false in order to show that it is unacceptable, making it very hard, if not impossible, to show that Christian belief is unacceptable. We will then present one objection to Plantinga’s argument, „the Great Pumpkin Objection”. Relying on Linda Zagzebski’s analysis, we will claim that the Great Pupmpkin objection shows that Plantinga’s notion of „warrant” does not adequately capture the meaning of the relevant notion of „intellectual or rational acceptability” of beliefs, and that, hence, his conclusion about warrant of Christian belief are not necessary relevant for the claims about intellectual or rational acceptability of Christian belief. We will also analyze a solution given by Kyle Scott. He thinks that if we have, in addition to Plantinga’s argument showing that Christian belief is warranted if true, favouring evidence in support of Christian belief, which he thinks we obviously have, than Christian belief is acceptable. We will point out that Scott does not elaborate what makes adequate favouring evidence in support of some belief, and we will calim that adequate understanding of favouring evidence will, in some respects, be very similar to Locke’s evidentialism. If so, than Scott proposal will reintroduce some elements of Locke’s evidentialism, and the question of whether there is favouring evidence in support of Christian belief will not have an obvious and easy answer.
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Psychologists have experimentally studied deductive reasoning since the beginning of the 20th century. However, as we will argue, there has not been much improvement in the field until relatively recently, due to how the experiments were designed. We deem the design of the majority of conducted experiments inadequate for two reasons. The first one is that psychologists have, for the most part, ignored the development of mathematical logic and based their research on syllogistic inferences. The second reason is the influence of the view, which is dogmatically still prevalent in semantics and logic in general, that the categorical notions, such as the notion of truth, are more important than the hypothetical notions, such as the notion of deduction. The influence of this dogma has been twofold. In studies concerning logical connectives in adults and children, much more emphasis has been put on the semantical aspects of the connectives – the truth functions, than on the deductive inferences. And secondly, even in the studies that investigated deductive inferences by using formal systems, the dogma still influenced the choice of the formal system. Researchers, in general, preferred the axiomatic formal systems over the systems of natural deduction, even though the systems of the second kind are much more suitable for studying deduction.
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The aim of this paper will be to investigate Rawls’ theory of justice concerning the position of the disabled people. First of all, I will expose his two principles of justice. Secondly, I will expose criticism of Eva Kittay and Martha Nussbaum, who claim that our acceptance of Rawlsian theory prevents us from achieving the just position of the people with disabilities. After that I will examine one of the most successful upgrades of Rawls’ original theory that was established by Harry Brighouse. However, Brighouse’s upgrade improves the position of only those individuals who had become disabled due to natural reasons and not due to their own mistakes. This is why I will, finally, tend to point out that the exclusion of those individuals whose disability is a consequence of their own mistake is not justified, since it incorporates a deontological assumption that is not necessary for Rawls’ theory of justice.
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According to one of the most influential and popular theories in the contemporary theory of action, an agent S is motivated to perform a certain act A if and only if she endorses some set of reasons R on the basis of which it follows that she should perform A, and given that she does not suffer from some sort of practical irrationality (e.g. depression, weakness of will, psychopathy, mental or physical exhaustion etc.). At least at first glance, this theory – which is known as the rationalist motivational internalism – appears to be uncontroversial and unproblematic. Yet, over the past ten years, this popular position has faced numerous very serious objections. In the course of this work, I intend to present some of these objections, in order to justify the claim that the concept of practical irrationality – i.e. the concept that plays the central role in this particular version of internalism – should be left out from the philosophical explanation of motivation. I will then attempt to defend the conclusion that the rationalist motivational internalism represents a completely inadequate theory of motivation.
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I begin with the thesis that the most appropriate classification of ethical theories pertains to their structural characteristics and give the advantage to the particularism/ generalism dichotomy over the deontological/teleological and act-centered/agent-centered classifications. Subsequently I use the example of Ross’s ethics of prima facie duties to illustrate how this distinction can be properly applied to a seemingly problematic case. In the first part of the paper I aim to show that Ross’s view is, in spite of its use of deontological terminology, essentially particularist. I then examine the specificities of Ross’s pluralism and explore the connection between prima facie duties and normative moral reasons. In the second part of the paper I criticize Audi’s interpretation of Ross’s ethics and show that Ross’s view doesn’t have the normative implications that Audi ascribes to it.
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In his book Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art, American aesthetician Richard Shusterman examines numerous objections to various forms of popular art. The paper deals with the extent to which Shusterman’s defense of popular art is concerned with whether the work of this kind can be experienced aesthetically. Since the aesthetic experience of popular art is not the main theoretical motive underlying the objections analyzed by Shusterman in this book, the paper presents the reasons why such an interpretation of his aesthetics of popular art would contribute to the understanding of his defense of this kind of art. After considering various objections to popular art, to which Shusterman responds by analyzing the production and reception of popular music, the paper concludes that most of Shusterman’s defense of popular art is directly or indirectly based on the view that popular music can be experienced aesthetically, since popular music compositions fulfill all the conditions required for the experience of this kind.
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The article opens the question of the perception of the relationship between art and capitalism in the contemporary era. This complex problem is treated from two angles of observation, which seem to be in a contrasting relationship. The first interpretative emphasis is placed on Adorne’s aesthetic theory of the mediation of art and society, while the other is summed up in Mikelsen’s theory of the effects of non-philosophical contemporary art which, in fact, conquers the position of power in the context of neoliberal capitalism with its empiricism. The article examines both these approaches, given their basic intentions, ranges and possible outcomes.
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According to one of the models of explanation of the development of verbal and linguistic competence, inductive reasoning provides a more adequate description of this development compared to various theories of innateness. The basic function of induction consists in concept formation and acquisition, i.e. in categorizing the world of our surroundings. Research has shown that pre-school children become aware of various ways in which categories are interrelated, and they are also using different principles for grounding their inductive reasoning. The main form of inductive reasoning from the standpoint of language learning is called category based induction. Category based inductive reasoning is the subject of many analyses which aim to pinpoint its origin and explain its further development. Some authors have maintained that the bias towards this type of reasoning is conceptually primitive, i.e. that it is not the result of language learning. In effect, it is the precondition of language learning as it enables the categorical mastery. Others have presupposed that children are biased when considering words as something that refers to kinds. When categorical information is passed through words the children are spontaneously making categorically grounded conclusions. The question of the origin of category based induction is still largely open. Is it an innate ability or the product of development? If it is the product of development, are there some components on which such reasoning is based, that are innate in a certain way? What is the exact relationship between categorization and induction? Is categorization prior to induction or is it the product of it? This is just to name a few of philosophically interesting questions with which the proponents of this model are faced. The model itself sheds new light on some classic problems of the philosophy of language in general, and on some key aspects of Quine’s position in this discipline, in particular.
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In this article I will analyze the transfer of fitness during the major transitions in evolution and its place in the multilevel selection models. The aim of the analysis is to show how social evolution can explain the evolutionary transitions in individuality.
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This paper illustrates the difference between falsificationistic and verificationistic principles of demarcation. Popper claimed that the falsificationistic criterion of demarcation is better than the verificationistic one. Therefore, he believed that his criterion should be more relevant when distinguishing scientific from nonscientific theories. Popper gave Freudian psychoanalysis as an example of a doctrine that would satisfy verificationistic, but not the falsificationistic criterion of demarcation. The aim of this paper is to thoroughly examine in which way both of demarcation criteria would treat psychoanalysis and to check if Popper’s criterion of demarcation is truly better than the verificationistic one.
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In the paper, I deal with the comparison of the use of negative indefinite pronouns in languages with double negation with their usage in languages without double negation. In languages with double negation referential usage prevails, while in languages without double negation quantificational usage is prevalent. Double negation is often considered to be inconsistent with the understanding of quantification in standard logic. I show that languages in which negative indefinite pronouns are used are not logically weaker than languages in which this is not the case. Moreover, I show that the languages with double negation clearly distinguish between the referential and quantificational usage of negative indefinite pronouns, so that the grammar of these languages prevents referring to nonentities.
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David Lewis’ interpretation of objective probability has two essential parts: Humean supervenience and Best system of laws. According to his interpretation, probabilities, along with the other nomic phenomena, supervene on the actual facts. Lewis also famously formulated the Principal Principle, which should show the connection between objective and subjective probabilities. However, years later, Hall, Thau and Lewis himself came to conclusion that the principle and Lewis’ interpretation of probability are not compatible. The main reason for that is the problem of so called undermining futures: Lewis named the problem „Big Bad Bug“. A popular way to solve the problem was to change the principal principle. In this article, I will argue that the origin of the problem is not compatibility of the principle and Lewis’s interpretation of probability, but that the problem is in the interpretation itself. Changing the principle, I argue, will not conclusively solve the problem.
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The emergence of contextualism in epistemology has set off a philosophical debate over the semantic nature of the concept of knowledge, that is to say over whether the meaning of that concept is invariant or context-sensitive. While some proponents of contextualist view defend the notion that the meaning of knowledge is indexical in its nature, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore argue that there exist only a few expressions which possess this semantic trait, and that knowledge expressions are not among them. Evidence in support of their position, according to the authors, is provided by linguistic tests. In this article we examine whether linguistic tests provide a reliable indicator of the semantic nature of the concept of knowledge.
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