PROBLEM EKSPLANATORNOG JAZA I PAPINOOVA STRATEGIJA POZIVANJA NA POJMOVE O FENOMENALNIM ASPEKTIMA MENTALNIH STANJA
THE EXPLANATORY GAP PROBLEM AND PAPINEAU’S PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS STRATEGY

Summary/Abstract: The main purpose of this article is to analyze David Papineau’s influential perceptual model of phenomenal concepts in order to respond to the explanatory gap problem. Those are special kind of concepts which we use to refere to phenomenal properties of our own experience. Such concepts are formed when the subjects initially perceive relevant entities, they get stored into memory, and become re-activated at each coming encounter. Their distinctive feature is the non-existence of a priori connection with other concepts we possess. When we think in non-phenomenal concepts we do not have the same feeling as when we think in phenomenal concepts. This is the cause of our assumption that feelings are somehow different than physical properties. This situation of two different modes of presentation of the same entity which develop the illusion of two different entities Papineau calls the the antipathetic fallacy: It is the source of the dualist intuitions which encourage the impression of an explanatory gap and lead us to persistently reject the identity of mental and physical. Once we grasp the structure of phenomenal concepts we will understand the origin of those intuitions as well as the fact that they do not give us enough reasons for doubt in physicalism.

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