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This essay raises the question of the character and status of imagination in ancient Greek philosophy. It is often said that neither Plato nor Aristotle conceived of imagination in genuinely productive terms. The point, however, is not approaching ancient thought while thinking with Kant, as if we were looking for proto-Kantian insights in antiquity. Ancient thought is not a series of ‘tentative steps’ destined to reach a full-blown articulation in modernity, let alone an anticipation of the first critique. On the contrary, it is essential to acknowledge the discontinuities that make the ancient discourse remote and, in many respects, opaque, hidden from us. On the ground of such assumptions, the essay addresses the understanding of imagination (eikasia, phantasia) in the Greek context, focusing in particular on Plato’s Timaeus. First, we consider how imagination, precisely in its creative aspect, operates at the very heart of philosophical argumentation. Plato’s emphatic awareness of this disallows the rhetoric of philosophy as the discipline of truth (of apodictic necessity, objectivity, and neutrality). In fact, it calls for a profound re-thinking of the relation between creativity and the philosophical turn to the ‘things themselves’. Timaeus imagines the cosmos as a theatrical device: the place of seeing and being seen, of contemplation and the originary emergence of images. This evokes an understanding of imagination outside the order of subjectivity and its faculties, i.e., a meditation on the impersonal character of production and the force of images (of symbols) arising without being constituted by ‘me’.
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La tradition philosophique a sans cesse cherché à définir ce que devait être l’amitié – idée, concept, type de comportement, vertu. Dès le début, chez Platon, toutes ces tentatives ont forcé l’amitié à entrer dans une comparaison avec la sympathie, l’amour ou le bien suprême. Mais toutes ont négligé ses rapports véritables à la temporalité. // The philosophical tradition has always tried to define what “friendship” actually should be: an idea, a concept, a kind of behaviour or a virtue. Since the beginning in Plato all these attempts constrained friendship in a comparison with sympathy, love or the primordial good. But all neglected its very relations with time.
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In Aristotle, substance, being specified in Z17 as cause and principle, is to be understood according to the analogical theory of principles and causes, namely form, matter and privation. These three causes involve potentiality and actuality, since form, privation, and the compound substance are in actuality, while matter is in potentiality. «What a substance is» depends on the connection between these three principles. In order to grasp the meaning of this connection, one has to put the analogical theory of principles back in its context, where previous theories on contraries (Plato’s theory included) are amended. The amendment of previous theories of principles relies on positing a third term, matter, between both opposites, i.e. form and privation. The implied distinction between matter and privation allows an understanding of generation which makes it compatible with substance. While generation removes privation, substance as form gives shape to matter, final matter and shape being identical to one another. Predication of matter by form supplies a relevant pattern for considering the relationship between matter, form and privation. At the same time, predication of matter by form provides both a renovated theory of opposites and a new theory of form as a cause, i.e. a theory of form as actuality.
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Aristote est l’inventeur de la notion de matière et de cause matérielle. Mais les passages où il parle d’une matière absolument première sont rares dans le corpus aristotélicien. Le problème, posé depuis longtemps par les interprètes modernes, est le suivant : Aristote croyait‑il à l’existence d’une matière imperceptible, sans forme et sans qualités, en tant que niveau autonome de la réalité, ou envisageait‑il plutôt la matière première comme un objet logique, un pur concept abstrait ? On se propose ici d’analyser le dossier des passages aristotéliciens les plus sensibles sur la question de la matière première et, après un rapide status quaestionis des interprétations antiques et modernes, on avancera une proposition interprétative selon la ligne «traditionnelle», à contre‑courant par rapport à la tendance actuelle.
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The Stoics try to demonstrate, in a theoretical context, more than any other philosophy, the link unifying the parts with the whole, in all areas of existence; namely, from man to divine reason, from god to nature – a tautological link in some cases – from matter to logos or creative pneuma. This unifying bond – hexis or continuity – guarantees the attachment between bodies which are in a state of sympathy (or interaction) which also constitutes their existence. It remains to seek the meaning of this notion; draw on its etymology: according to Bailly’s dictionary, the term hexis in Greek means among other meanings: action of possessing, possession. And according to the dictionary of L.‑S.‑J., hexis (proper noun) derives from the future of the verb ἕξω, from the verb ἔχω, (to have, to possess); in its intransitive form refers to a permanent condition, namely to an act, which results from practice. In order to make an attempt to define this concept or to orient its function, it seems appropriate for us to do some research – we could say historical –, consulting texts prior to Stoicism, examining its place and the nuances it takes in different contexts and finally, follow its interpretation where, according to philosophical approaches, it sometimes means disposition, habit, or situation. Nevertheless, the Stoics give this term an original meaning, different from the one that was granted to it until then. It is the hectic pneuma or the tension (tonos) prevalent in the universe. In this perspective, we will try to define its function and compare it with the notion of hexis in Aristotle, where it acquires the meaning of metaxy, in his Metaphysics, Δ, 1022b12.
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Porphyry’s Expositio per interrogationem et responsionem can help us to understand some obscure passages of chapter seven of Aristotle’s Categories, focused on the relative (πρός τι). The Porphyrian analysis of πρός τι presents indeed developments which are both useful for the understanding of the Aristotelian text and very innovative too. First, we can mention the general Porphyrian thesis according to which categories are predicates. This theory fits very well with πρός τι, which are predicates corresponding to properties that subjects only possess because of an observed reciprocal relationship. This brings us to the second novelty of Porphyry’s analysis, really important for modern developments of the notion of relation, namely the difference between σχέσις and πρός τι, which depends on it. Finally, we will mention the important Porphyry’s contribution to the understanding of a particularly obscure issue concerning the relationship between the two definitions of πρός τι that Aristotle provides. Porphyry points out the Platonic origin of the first definition, without dismissing it though: instead, he will just consider it too vast and encompassing the true πρός τι, object of the second definition.
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This article examines Averroes’ interpretation, found in his Long Commentary on the De Anima, of a famous passage in Aristotle’s De An. III 5 (430a14‑15) which presents the intellect “producing all things, as a kind of positive state (hexis), like light”. Averroes, clearly heir to Alexander of Aphrodisias for whom hexis refers not to the intellect “agent” itself but to its product, defends nevertheless, via the comparison with light, the conception of the agent intellect (a substance purely in act by itself ) as an hexis, which leads us to the inevitable consequence that the agent intellect is the prime object of the material intellect, acting as a condition for all subsequent thoughts.
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In the Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ, Numenius refines his definition of οὐσία step by step. He uses the word at first as a synonym of τὸ ὄν (15 F) and as another designation of being. Then, he associates it to the ἕξις when he refers to the specific οὐσία which possesses science (22 F): in all likelihood, this οὐσία is the intellect as the essence common to God and Man in the possession of science. Finally, Numenius gives οὐσία two aspects or sides which, in our opinion, represent two manners of conceiving the intelligible it constitutes: on the one hand, οὐσία comes from Being itself (the Good) and seems to represent the eidetic predicates or what we could name the “fundamental intelligibility”, a state in which the form is not determined yet, but which gives it the status of a real being ; on the other hand, οὐσία is the product of the second god and intellect and the determined aspect of the previous one, which makes it possible to distinguish the forms one from the other. In this last case, Numenius seems to name οὐσία more specifically ἰδέα, even if both words are elsewhere synonymous and used to refer to the two aspects previously mentioned according to the context in which they are employed. The paper presents the analysis of fragments 22 F, 24 F and 28 F from which we arrive at this interpretation. The distinction between two manners of conceiving οὐσία makes it possible then to discover two levels in the Being at the origin of each of them: Being itself (αὐτοόν which is the Good itself, αὐτοάγαθον) and the «second» or «just» Being, constituted by the good demiurge which is probably the “One who is good par excellence”.
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This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of life and being in treatises VI, 2 [43] On the genera of being and III, 7 [45] On eternity and time. Life and being play a key role in Plotinus’ ontology since they characterise incorporeal realities as such (life and being cannot be drawn from the analysis of bodies). Therefore, focusing on these items makes it possible to attain an account of intelligible reality according to the principles appropriate to it. Three issues are considered: (1) the cognitive process through which the soul grasps being and life when it turns its cognitive activity away from the bodies and reverts to itself (VI, 2, 4‑6); (2) the status of being and life as genera of the intelligible reality (life is equivalent to intelligible motion: VI, 2, 7); (3) Plotinus’ account of life as the way of being typical of intelligible realities (III, 7); (4) his gradualist account of the hierarchy of life (III, 8 [30], 8; VI, 3 [44], 7; I, 4 [46], 3).
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Review of: Gweltaz Guyomarc’h - David Lefebvre, Dynamis. Sens et genèse de la notion aristotélicienne de puissance, Paris, Vrin («Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie»), 2018
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Review of: Izabela Jurasz - Vito Limone, Origene e la filosofia greca. Scienze, testi, lessico, coll. Letteratura Cristiana Antica. Nuova Serie 30, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2018
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This essay raises the question of the character and status of imagination in ancient Greek philosophy. It is often said that neither Plato nor Aristotle conceived of imagination in genuinely productive terms. The point, however, is not approaching ancient thought while thinking with Kant, as if we were looking for proto-Kantian insights in antiquity. Ancient thought is not a series of ‘tentative steps’ destined to reach a full-blown articulation in modernity, let alone an anticipation of the first critique. On the contrary, it is essential to acknowledge the discontinuities that make the ancient discourse remote and, in many respects, opaque, hidden from us. On the ground of such assumptions, the essay addresses the understanding of imagination (eikasia, phantasia) in the Greek context, focusing in particular on Plato’s Timaeus. First, we consider how imagination, precisely in its creative aspect, operates at the very heart of philosophical argumentation. Plato’s emphatic awareness of this disallows the rhetoric of philosophy as the discipline of truth (of apodictic necessity, objectivity, and neutrality). In fact, it calls for a profound re-thinking of the relation between creativity and the philosophical turn to the ‘things themselves.’ Timaeus imagines the cosmos as a theatrical device: the place of seeing and being seen, of contemplation and the originary emergence of images. This evokes an understanding of imagination outside the order of subjectivity and its faculties, i.e., a meditation on the impersonal character of production and the force of images (of symbols) arising without being constituted by ‘me.’
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If there is widespread disagreement in an intellectual community, are its members in some sense failing epistemically? In this paper, I will offer a reconstruction of the first sustained attempt to answer this question. The attempt is made in the Alcibiades, a dialogue attributed to Plato. There, Socrates argues that the disagreeing parties lack knowledge. I will offer a reconstruction of this argument. Socrates relies on a controversial premiss according to which systematic and persistent disagreement within a group is an indication that its individual members lack knowledge. This claim rests on an optimistic assumption, explicit in the Alcibiades, that a person who possesses knowledge in a domain is able to persuade the audience and bring it to an agreement with the speaker. Knowledge, if present, spreads within the community unobstructed.
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The sociological approach to the concept of creativity lacks some accuracy, since it is addressed from an a priori perspective and admitted without reflecting on what it means socially and culturally. In this connection, the present article tries to provide a specific description of the term from its genealogy and on the basis of the socio-cultural-historical context where it arises. More precisely, it deals with the idea conveyed by western myths, the narrative about the identification of the instituting generatrix forces or the procreative divinities that lie behind the birth of the cosmos, of the world, of society, of the earth, of gods, of humans, of animals, and of plants. Thus, from an interpretative examination of the myths about Mother Goddess, those about Biblical Genesis, as well as of Greek creation myths, an attempt will be made to draw a conceptual map that delimits the most defining features of creativity (1). The ultimate goal is to check whether such characters have survived to the present day (2).
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As metaphysics of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā are directly inspired by Aristotle’s Metaphysics, especially by book Γ 1003a in which the Philosopher stresses that the subject of this science in being as such, but also by Α, 1, 981b; Α, 2, 982b where he clearly says that the science is about fisrt causes, it is not surprising that we can see some evident similarities between the teachings of these two great Muslim philosophers. Still, if we analyse their works we can notice various modifications by Ibn Sīnā, which are causing certain discrepancies between him and al-Fārābī (as in Kitāb al-Mabda’ wa’l-Ma’ād, already researched by Yahya Michot (2004/2005)). Differences and modifications are numerous. However, in this article I intend to highlight the main focus of their metaphysical teachings. The focus is mainly directed towards their understanding of existence, relation between necessity and contingency, as well as towards their understanding of metaphysics as science of being qua being in general. I this article I intend to show how Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical system represents an important step forward in comparison to al-Fārābī’s view.
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The paper discusses certain aspects of Buddha’s and Confucius’ philosophy that could be relevant for the general philosophical discussion on the problem of freedom, free action and related philosophical themes. Although their philosophical thinking was shaped in a rather different linguistic, cultural and philosophical milieu and background, both thinkers are in agreement at least twofold. Firstly, the possibility of freedom and free action is not opposed to the natural order of things, quite contrary, it is enabled by this order. Secondly, this possibility is being realised through never-ending self-cultivation and attunement to the world as it is. In the context of contemporary discussions on the problem of the relationship between free will and determinism, it could hence be said that both thinkers are on the position of “compatibilism”, nay, on the position that free action is possible only in the context of (soft) determinism that sees nature (or the world) as ever-changing and conditioning circumstances and “patterns”, and not bound to strict (mechanical) and linear deterministic causality.
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The story of „The Ship of Theseus” lay at the foundation of one of the most intriguing paradox of any perspective of ego, self and identity. In this article, the story is told and retold in many different ways. Broadly, the story has three narrators: Plutarch (who fueled at least six variations and another three competitors of the main theme), Thomas Hobbes (whose readings of the story ignited the search for solutions to this paradox – solutions that are mainly logical) and I, Gabriel R. Suciu: my version shifts the question from „How to present the paradox?” and „How to solve the paradox?”, to „How to build a paradox?”. It’s worth mentioning that a fourth version is also told, at the beginning of the article – the story told by the ship itself.
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The aim of the article is to outline the main characteristics of the connection between Martin Heidegger’s thought and Aristotle’s philosophy. Heidegger finds in Aristotle’s texts the example of presence as the thinking of unconcealment. The structure of the argument between Aristotle and Antifon becomes the paradigm for the argumentative relation between the conceptions of Heidegger and René Descartes. Both the destiny of Being which has now been revealed via Cartesian philosophy and the possibility of the new thinking of Being is derived from the philosophy of Aristotle, to wit – from the twofold possibility of reading its structure. The new thinking of Being is linked precisely to the thinking of presence as unconcealment, which coincides with the eigentlich Being. The relation of Heideggerian-Aristotelian philosophy to the Cartesian paradigm is understood via the structure of the Greek distinction between alētheia and pseudos.
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This paper offers an overview of the way the literary genres of dialogue and debate see the history of Western philosophy through. It starts out from Plato’s astonishing use of the dialogue form to recall the teachings of his master, Socrates, without ever relating it to his own way of thinking. Plato’s debate with poets, rhetors and sophists is the other pillar of the narrative, showing that, from its starting moment, Western philosophy relied on this more agonistic form of human communication as well. It relates the two genres to the form of political discussion in the Athenian agora, claiming that the nature of philosophical thought is just as controversial structurally as the Athenian innovation of democracy. Further examples will be scholastic philosophy in the medieval university and humanistic rhetoric in the Renaissance Italian city-states. The final section of the paper recalls the reflexive nature of philosophy as one of the reasons for the dialogic relationship between its authors, and the need to distinguish between agonistic debate and culture war.
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