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After the Battle of Ankara, the Anatolian lands of the Ottoman Empire were shared among many principalities. Timur not only divided the Ottoman lands among Yıldırım's sons, but also allowed the Turkmen principalities to continue their reign by returning the lands they had taken from the Ottomans. In other words, Timur, instead of a strong political structure in the Ottoman geography, set up a disintegrated but subordinate principality to rule, and after staying in Anatolia for eleven months, he returned to his homeland, Turkistan. Thus, while Timur formed a political structure suitable for his own benefit, he also secured the eastern borders of his Khanate.In this study, rather than focusing on the political environment that took place after the Ankara War, it is aimed to examine the relations between the political forces of the period from a different perspective by considering the coins minted in Anatolia in this process. Although the coins minted by the states and principalities in Anatolia, which is a sign of loyalty to Timur after the Ankara War, are briefly emphasized, it will not constitute the basis of this research. After the Ankara War, in the process that Çelebi Mehmet re-established the Ottoman Empire, the policy of dominating the principalities in Anatolia did not emerge suddenly, although it was mostly the result of military actions. In the first quarter of the 15th century, in this period when the Timurid winds had not yet subsided, these principalities were first subject to the Ottoman Empire with vassaagel ties as of 1410, and after 1428 they were directly subordinated to the central administration. These political facts were intended to be documented with minted coins.
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In August 1509, the town of Turku (Swe. Åbo) in southwestern Finland, then a part of the Swedish realm, was attacked by a Danish fleet. The sources tell of great material devastation and loss of life. However, although the sack of 1509 has been mentioned in numerous works treating the history of medieval Turku or medieval Finland in gen- eral, historians have not so far analysed how the recuperation process actually looked and which individuals and institutions involved in it were the crucial actors. Con- temporary sources, especially the correspondence between higher authorities, cast light on Turku’s urban recovery. Such sources may exaggerate the role of ecclesiastical authorities as leaders of the process, we get only sporadic glimpses of the actions of the town council. But it seems there were no plans to send material relief – at least not foodstuff – to Turku. Instead, the authorities were more interested in prevent- ing further attacks and maintaining societal peace. The higher clergy focused on the restoration of the cathedral and retrieving stolen cult items. It is also possible that the translation of a local saint in the summer of 1514 was utilised as a unifying and healing event for spectators and participants.
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The present article contains information about the events which resulted in the introduction of the Mauser system to the equipment of the Polish Army in the years 1919–1921. It includes details about technical aspects of the weaponry that were taken into consideration in the selection or rejection of particular weapon models. The article also analyses the political background of the decisions made by military officials, which had a great influence on the final choice of the type of weapon. Moreover, the information on financial issues that have a significant impact on the decisions made can be found in the above-mentioned text. The final choice of the small arms had a profound effect on the future activities of the Polish Army and its equipping with other types of weapons.
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The article discusses the process of developing heavy artillery in Polish infantry divisions at the end of the 1930s. At the time, the intention was to strengthen the firepower of infantry tactical units, whose combat capabilities began to decline compared to similar divisions in other European armies. As part of this process, the formation of heavy artillery battalions for infantry divisions began in 1937. However, due to financial and equipment difficulties, until 1939 such battalions were created for only seven out of thirty infantry divisions. In addition, these battalions had not three, but two batteries with three guns each. Thus, the heavy artillery battalion had only six guns in total, and not twelve, like the regular artillery battalions. In infantry divisions where heavy artillery divisions were formed, positions of Divisional Artillery Commanders were also created as the nucleus of artillery headquarters at the tactical level. However, the formation of the aforementioned squadrons was based on the existing heavy artillery regiments, which reduced their staffing status and mobilization possibilities. Thus, while the creation of heavy artillery battalions for infantry divisions did undoubtedly strengthen the combat capabilities of the divisions themselves, on the scale of the entire artillery it did not significantly strengthen the Polish army as a whole.
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An important element in strengthening the military potential of the Home Army during the Second World War was armaments delivered by air. Airdrops had not only a physical form – rifles, pistols, grenades, explosive materials and money, but as also a great psychological meaning. It was the confirmation of the Home Army participation in the Allies military activity and it enhanced hope for defeating the Third Reich. This psychological impact was maintained also after the war, especially when a new armed conflict was in perspective. Many Polish citizens hoped that World War III would provide political and structural changes in the Polish People’s Republic. This presented the authorities, especially the security apparatus with a severe operational challenge. The officials tried to inspect whether the so-called enemy forces would be able to draw on solutions from the previous war and empower the anti-communist underground in Poland by weapons airdrops in the perspective of a new armed conflict. Therefore, operational action was undertaken to detect airdrop locations used during World War II and to find the people who organized their reception. These tasks were carried out between 1949 and 1955 under the code-name “Monopoly”.
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Disinformation as a tool of war can be seen in various dimensions, such as military, social, economic, political and psychological. In addition to disinformation, a number of mechanisms are used in war to gain an advantage by misleading the opponents, putting pressure on them, forcing the opposite of their intended action. This concerns psychological warfare and psychological operations, operational camouflage (maskirovka), military deception. The article presents selected examples of the use of disinformation in the history of wars.
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Tactics is a classic field of study in military history, which has been radically transformed by research in recent decades. Our paper aims to investigate how, since the 1970s, historical studies of tactics have developed new concepts, introduced new themes, and highlighted new aspects of this field of research. We have only considered the studies regarding the period 1850- 1880, when there was an intense debate within the ranks of the European armies over the tactics that had to be developed as a result of the adoption of new infantry armament. The recent research carried out on the Western armies from the second half of the 19th century offers an interesting starting point for reappraising the history of the Romanian army.
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The works carried out by the 4th Engineering Company during the siege of the Pleven fortress were described by Lieutenant Grigore Crăiniceanu in a letter addressed to his professor, Henri-Alexis Brialmont, with the aim of informing him about the contribution of the Romanian military engineers to the blockade of Pleven in early September 1877. Brialmont was preparing the work “La fortification du champ de bataille”, which was found to be based only on Russian sources, which omitted the quantity and quality of these works on Grivitsa 1 and 2 redoubts, although even Grand Duke Nicholas himself had praised them. The translation of the letter into Romanian was published in the “România liberă” newspaper.
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In the battle for Dobrogea, the Dobrogea Army saved Romania from disaster, contributing essentially to the final victory. This article, based on documents from the state military archive of the Russian Federation, traces the different aspects of the battle for this region of Romania. Despite the mistakes made, The Dobrogea Army managed to keep Dobrogea in the hands of the allies, preventing the Central Powers from accomplishing the strategic plan to conquer the region in order to emerge behind the Romanian army fighting in Transylvania and later in the Romanian Plain.
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Debating World War II is always a challenge given the massive amount of historiography on various subjects associated with this topic. Even so, since it was one of the most important events in our contemporary history, there are still blank spots and aspects insufficiently explored. To a certain extent, World War II was significantly different from previous conflicts, especially from the perspective of using extensively landing tactics as a way to project the power in various theatres of operation. Of course, the major amphibious operation was conducted in June 1944 on the beaches of Normandy. Nevertheless, one should not forget the previous undertakings involving smaller contingents like in Norway (1940), Greece (1941), France (1942, Dieppe), Sicily and Italy (1943), Philippines (1944) together with British reinforcing operations in which various contingents from Australia, India, New Zeeland a.s.o were brought in North Africa or Europe. All of these were instrumental for increasing the allied ability to deploy and sustain forces in hostile environment. As a matter a fact, World War II contributed to the extensive development of tactics and equipment for amphibious operations, which also increased the speed1 of disembarking of heavy materials as well as substantial number of troops.
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Apart from million fold death and suffering, the battle of Stalingrad is also a testament to the failure of the military elite who did not oppose the criminal Nazi regime even when its unscrupulous actions were directed against subordinate soldiers and their own person. This happened upon the Volga not for the first and by far not the last time. On the contrary, Stalingrad was to become the writing on the wall for a German warfare that increasingly lacked military sensibility and ideological alternatives. In this respect, it is not completely without justification that today the historical place is generally regarded as a code for the turn of World War II in the European theatre The efficacy of the Battle of Stalingrad in the German culture of remembrance has various causes. The course of military events was just one of them. In particular, because the German military planning and conduct of operations needs to be viewed with scepticism, the staging of the collapse of the 6th Army became all the more important. From the very beginning, “Stalingrad” was more of a “felt” turn of the war than an actual one. This was another reason why the perishing of an entire German army put the Nazi regime under pressure for an explanation which they wanted to solve primarily with pathos. The heroisation of “fighting to the last” worked surprisingly well until 1945 and was reflected in the Germans persevering until the end of the war despite the increasingly obvious defeat.
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The study of the Italian campaign in Russia finds many gaps in the Italian historiography due mainly to the subsequent political elaboration of the events. The work of the Historical Bureau of the General Staff of the Army, reflected in the Official Reports, partially fills in these shortcomings, providing a narrative based exclusively on the original documentation produced by Commands and departments during the war. Among the strictly military aspects neglected by historiography, the logistic field is the least studied. Regarding the Battle of Stalingrad, for example, little is known about the direct support provided to the German 6th Army by the ARMIR (Armata italiana in Russia/Italian Army in Russia) detachments.
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This study analyses the Romanian viewpoint on the Battle of Stalingrad, focusing on some relevant issues, such as: the decision taken by Ion Antonescu to participate with large numbers in the Wehrmacht campaign of 1942; the reactions to reject this decision by some of the high-level political and military leaders; the movement of the expeditionary troops to the front; the organization of the deployment, equipment and training of the two armies deployed in the great bend of the Don and the Kalmyk Steppe; the defence operation carried out by the Romanian forces, etc. It is clearly mentioned that the plan for the “Uranus” operation was established by the Soviet General Staff before the deployment of the 3rd and 4th Armies, which invalidates the widely circulated thesis in historiography according to which the enemy’s main strikes had as start point the disposition of the Romanian troops on the flanks of the 6th German Army, the main group operating in town. At the same time, the study concludes that the main responsibility for the serious failure in this confrontation fell on the German High Command, under whose authority the big Romanian units acted under. It did not fulfil its commitment made in the winter of 1942 – that of equipping the Romanian troops on the front –, it drastically limited the freedom of movement of the Romanian commands, and did not take into account the multiple information indicating the preparation for a counter-offensive from the enemy’s side.
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Against the backdrop of Ion Antonescu’s decision to participate with large expeditionary troops in the campaign of the summer of 1942, the mobilisation of the Romanian air force was also required. To this end, on September 6, 1942, the Air Staff established the Air Combat Group (referred to as GAL), commanded by aviator general Ermil Gheorghiu. It was a structure similar to that of the 1941 campaign. At the same time, a logistic structure was also established after German model – the Forward Air Region. On October 1, 1942, the means of the Romanian Air Force in the region of military operations at Stalingrad and at the great bend of the Don included 26 aviation squadrons (out of which 6 fighters, 2 fighter-bombers, 7 bombers, 6 surveillance, 2 reconnaissance, 2 transport, 1 medical). The Soviet counter-offensive (on November 19-25, 1942) represented, for many reasons, a difficult test for the Romanian Air Force, also taking place in unfavourable weather conditions for flying. However, GAL flew 64 aircrafts (3 reconnaissance ones, 24 fighters, and 37 bombers) on missions that operated in the Bolshoi-Kletskaya area, attacking (with the bombers) troops, vehicles and tanks, while fighter aircrafts ensured freedom of action of the bombing formations. 2 AA batteries of the enemy were destroyed, along with 10 tanks and 15 cars. According to the documents found in the military archives, between September 16 and December 20, 1942, on the Stalingrad front, the Romanian combat aviation carried out 2,728 aircraft missions (1,430 – fighter aircrafts, 1,299 – bomber aircrafts), with a total of 4,324 hours of flight (1,763 – fighter aircrafts, 2,561 – bomber aircrafts). Bomber and fighter-bomber aircrafts launched 1,479,279 tons of bombs of various calibres on the enemy, mainly in the Stalingrad area. During this period, in the air battles and through the action of the AA artillery, 76 enemy planes were shot down, out of which 58 were clear victories (30 in air battles). The loss in personnel (dead, missing, wounded) suffered by the Romanian Air Force on the Stalingrad and Don-bend front was of 653 military men, out of which 57 were officers, 55 non-commissioned officers, 11 warrant officers, 530 troops.
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The Second World War was a global confrontation of unparalleled complexity. Understandably, the plans, strategies and courses of action of the commanders involved in the war were put under intense scrutiny. Every single event generatef a lot of lessons on how to achieve success in battle. But one, embodied by the Fall-Gelb Plan, was about to prove itself as one of the best offensive plans in the whole history. The paper presents in a brief manner how some decisions could easily lead to success despite difficult circumstances.
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The issue of determining the location of the main events of the Battle of Zhovti Vody in 1648 is considered. The Battle of Zhovti Vody, which changed the course of history not only in Ukraine and Poland but also in other European countries, is still poorly studied. There is no definitive answer to some key questions, such as the location of the « Urochishche Zhovti Vody», the place where the registered Cossacks joined Bohdan Khmelnitsky. Based on the analysis of sources and cartographic information, as well as a personal study of the area, the author draws conclusions about the location of the besieged Polish camp, the location of Kamenny Zaton. The author draws attention for the first time to special marks on one of the versions of the General Map of Ukraine by Guillaume Levasseur de Beauplan published by Willem Hondius in 1648, related to the Battle of Zhovti Vody. The study used a comparative analysis of historical maps and critical analysis of sources, regardless of the influence and authority of the authors. Identification and analysis of contradictions in the available empirical material led to the search for effective ways to eliminate them. As a result of the research, it became possible for the first time to locate the places of the main events of the beginning of the national liberation struggles of the Ukrainian people in the middle of the 17th century.
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