Perspectiva românească a bătăliei de la Stalingrad
The Romanian Perspective on the Battle of Stalingrad

Summary/Abstract: This study analyses the Romanian viewpoint on the Battle of Stalingrad, focusing on some relevant issues, such as: the decision taken by Ion Antonescu to participate with large numbers in the Wehrmacht campaign of 1942; the reactions to reject this decision by some of the high-level political and military leaders; the movement of the expeditionary troops to the front; the organization of the deployment, equipment and training of the two armies deployed in the great bend of the Don and the Kalmyk Steppe; the defence operation carried out by the Romanian forces, etc. It is clearly mentioned that the plan for the “Uranus” operation was established by the Soviet General Staff before the deployment of the 3rd and 4th Armies, which invalidates the widely circulated thesis in historiography according to which the enemy’s main strikes had as start point the disposition of the Romanian troops on the flanks of the 6th German Army, the main group operating in town. At the same time, the study concludes that the main responsibility for the serious failure in this confrontation fell on the German High Command, under whose authority the big Romanian units acted under. It did not fulfil its commitment made in the winter of 1942 – that of equipping the Romanian troops on the front –, it drastically limited the freedom of movement of the Romanian commands, and did not take into account the multiple information indicating the preparation for a counter-offensive from the enemy’s side.

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