DPC BOSNIA DAILY: What Chancellor Merkel Should Tell Bosnia's Politicians and People (II)
Bosnia Daily: July 9, 2015 – What Chancellor Merkel Should Tell Bosnia's Politicians and People (II)
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Bosnia Daily: July 9, 2015 – What Chancellor Merkel Should Tell Bosnia's Politicians and People (II)
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Here we present the general aims and characteristics of budget support in the EaP region, the volume of support and a breakdown by country. Budget support is the predominant EU tool in the Eastern Partnership countries, as around 60% of bilateral financial resources are scheduled to be spent through such means. This comprises financial assistance supporting government reforms and paid directly to the state budget of a specified country. Therefore, it requires close cooperation between the national administration and the EU delegation, ensured by frequent communication as well as the participation of common monitoring committees. Two types of budget support have been in use in the EaP region: general budget support and sector budget support. Under the former, funding is provided for a broad range of reforms planned by the government for a given period of time, for instance, implementation of the association agenda or action plans. The latter, sector budget support, goes for reforms only in a given sector, e.g., energy or health. Sector budget support has been the dominant form of support in all of the EaP countries except Armenia, where general budget support was employed.
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This section presents how budget support has been used in Moldova. In this country, several budget support programmes were launched in the years 2007–2013. Currently, there is one implemented operation in social assistance, five operations ongoing in the health, water, rural development, energy and justice sectors, and two new ones planned for launch on visa liberalisation and vocational education. The total amount of money planned for these eight operations (including the two newest ones still under preparation) is €332.2 million, of which some 52% has already been disbursed. Sector budget support has been the main EU assistance tool in Moldova, making up about 74% of the overall financial envelope proposed by the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for 2007–2010 (€209.7 million) and approximately half of the budget in the NIP for 2011–2013 (€273.14 million). Such a contribution looks particularly impressive if compared to the state budget of Moldova, of which it represents about 4–5% (the highest contribution among the EaP countries). Moldova has obtained additional resources under the “more for more” principle (€28 million).
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This section presents how budget support has been spent in Georgia. Budget support expenditures amounted to €258 million in 2007–2013 and made up 60% of Georgia’s national budget. This sum consisted of €216 million planned for budget support, including €49 million allocated under the “more for more” rule to some operations and the rest for technical assistance and other grants. In this period of time, 12 programmes were planned, out of which two projects were finalised, six are still under implementation, and four are in the planning process. The majority of the financial resources have been disbursed, as the level of EU conditions met for each tranche hovered around 90%. The EU de-committed only €2.5 million as Georgia had not fulfilled some EU conditions due to changes in the government’s political priorities.
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This section presents how budget support has been used in Ukraine. Sector Budget Support (SBS) is the predominant EU assistance tool in Ukraine, with around 60% of all EU aid to the country planned to be spent in this way in the years 2007–2013. Six agreements were signed in the sectors of energy, energy efficiency, trade facilitation, environment, transport, and border management, and another is awaited in energy for an overall sum of €389 million. However, in total Ukraine received payments of no more than one third of this amount (€111.14 million) because since 2011 the EC has limited transfers for all operations. The main reason for this was non-fulfilment of a precondition on PFM, as since 2011 the country’s public procurement law and budgetary transparency have significantly deteriorated. This crucial condition ensures that funds are not fraudulently used. After two years of futile discussion on the implementation of this condition, the Ukrainian government finally adopted a PFM strategy in September 2013 (not made public) as this issue was made an EU condition to sign an AA.
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This section presents how budget support has been used in Armenia. In 2007–2013, several budget support operations were implemented in Armenia for an overall sum of €134.9 million. The programmes have seen 85% of targets achieved on average. Some delays in paying the tranches took place when specific conditions were not achieved. Such cases are not publicized by the EU delegation, probably in order not to strain cooperation with the government. In terms of management, the Armenian Ministry of Economy is the major coordinator, while on the EU side the delegation manages the process, both in its operational and financial aspects, with a staff consisting of 7–8 people. The programming usually takes 1–2 years, while implementation of budget support operations usually lasts 3-4 years. The programmes are helped by a set of all of the usual TA tools.
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This section presents how budget support has been used in Azerbaijan. The EU has planned relatively modest financial resources for Azerbaijan in the scope of budget support. This is not only due to the fact that it is the wealthiest country in the EaP region and can finance its own ongoing reforms but also because of its limited absorption capacity and the execution of the “more for more” rule. Azerbaijan has oil and gas reserves that provide significant revenue to the budget and it has a relatively stable economy. This, unlike other EaP countries, implies no great interest on the government’s behalf for financial assistance from the EU. Moreover, contractual relations with the EU are not as dense as, for instance, with Georgia or Moldova. Azerbaijan does not aim to integrate economically with the EU, therefore the scope of potential legal approximation is limited. In the years 2007–2013, four operations took place of the overall planned amount of €60 million (which is almost half of all EU assistance planned in Azerbaijan in this period), while only one operation in energy was finalised.
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The EU approach in the Eastern Partnership countries is to financially support concrete reforms: sector budget support operations are most commonly in use. Theoretically, such a tool, given teeth by precise conditions and indicators, should allow the smooth completion of the sector integration planned in the scope of the EaP. In practice, an analysis of the first years of use (2007–2013) shows that this instrument has potential in countries willing to integrate with the EU, while in the others its use has limited impact on guiding comprehensive reforms. The pace of fulfilment of budget support conditions differed much among the partners. This resulted mainly from the various level of willingness of the EaP governments to conduct Euoriented reforms. For Moldova and Georgia, the political will to integrate with the EU is clear, as proved by their determination to sign an AA. On the contrary, Armenia and Ukraine withdrew from signing such deals, a step that confirmed they were not interested in or were hesitant about EUbacked reforms. In Armenia, the EU had to stop support for DCFTA implementation and reshape its assistance, whereas for Ukraine the new pro-European government has signed the political part of the AA after an internal crisis. Azerbaijan is a case apart, as budget support was aimed to develop sector cooperation, but in the meantime it has shown it is not interested in complying with aid conditions on PFM: in this case, the EU help is rather useful in terms of advice on the directions of some reforms. Therefore, one can distinguish two groups of countries, EU-oriented and non-EU-oriented, with the latter being interested only in some sector cooperation.
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Europe is facing a substantial downturn in social support for the European integration process. This worsening attitude towards the European project, combined with low trust in national policymakers, creates fertile ground for the rise of Eurosceptic and protest parties. According to the twice-yearly Eurobarometer surveys, trust has significantly diminished in European institutions, and the future of the European project seems uncertain to many Europeans. Furthermore, this downward trend in the EU’s image in European public opinion appears persistent and widespread, giving considerable cause for concern, as this distrust characterises the majority sentiment in 20 EU countries. An absolute majority of respondents in one recent Eurobarometer survey expressed distrust of the European Union in the EU15 countries, the euro area Member States, and also in the euro-outsiders category.
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Since the onset of the Eurozone debt-crisis, Poland’s approach to the EU has gone through at least three distinct shifts as it responds to the deepening of Eurozone integration and the changing locus of power within the bloc. The first of these saw Poland acting as the bloc’s equality supervisor, defending the principle of parity between governments, particularly as guaranteed by the supranational institutions. During its presidency of the Council in the second semester of 2011, it forged a successful partnership with the Commission and Parliament. Yet that effort ended with the British “veto” at the December summit and with the signature of the fiscal compact, a parallel legal architecture potentially excluding non-Euro members. For Poland, signing the compact meant still belonging, but to a different kind of EU.
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The need for the physical integration of EU markets via the North-South Gas Corridor (NSGC or NSI), today constitutes a flagship initiative of the Visegrad Group (V4) and its closest neighbours. The idea to build the gas corridor has arisen from both the geographical proximity of these countries and the similarity of the problems they face, including limited interconnections, poor market liquidity, and the dominance of Russian supplies. It is fair to say that the V4 was able to learn a lesson from the 2009 Russia–Ukraine gas crisis. All of the Visegrad members, which at the time had around 70–80% dependence on both supplies and transport routes from the east, were, to various degrees, hit by the temporary interruption of supplies. This was thus illustrative, not only of how diversification in Central Europe is needed but also of how regional solidarity is necessary to efficiently manage the risk of sudden cuts in the future. It is worth remembering that during the crisis the Czech Republic established reverse flow to Slovakia, while Hungary made emergency supplies from its stockpiles available to the Western Balkans.
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The V4 has been and still is an important player in regional cooperation and the energy security landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. The group of four was also the driver behind the North-South Gas Corridor, which was later included as a priority of EU energy-security and energy-infrastructure policies.
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At first glance, the Czech Republic—a landlocked state with very low domestic output and a high dependence on imports—may be seen as vulnerable in terms of energy security. However, thanks to the early adoption of a resolute policy of diversification, sound prospects for additional supplies, and a well-developed domestic market and infrastructure, the country should actually be considered one of the most secure among the Visegrad states. The share of natural gas in the Czech total primary energy supply (TPES) is less than half that of Hungary’s; the Czech Republic has a higher storage capacity than Poland; and, in comparison with Slovakia, has at least partially diversified imports.
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Hungary is a resource-poor country with only limited and relatively expensive coal (lignite) and hydropower potential. It has a considerable record of hydrocarbon production dating back to the late 1930s, but much of these conventional reserves have already been depleted. Domestic supplies of gas constitute around 20%, internal oil production provides less than 8% of total demand for the time being, and both are in decline. Thus, import dependency has long been a natural, and socially and politically accepted necessity. Hungary built up a significant nuclear component during the mid-1980s in Paks (four Soviet VVER blocs meet around 40% of electricity demand) and relies heavily on natural gas imports.
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In comparison with the other Visegrad countries, Poland’s gas security seems relatively high. This coastal state, unlike the Czech Republic or Slovakia, not only has quite significant domestic output (4.3 bcm in 2012), which accounted for some 29% of the country’s demand, but also has a proportionately low level of natural gas in its TPES (13%). Poland is also a major coal producer, and coal comprises a significant portion of the country’s primary energy supply, ahead of all other sources, including gas. Thus, this data could suggest that Poland—as an insignificant natural gas customer—is not necessarily vulnerable in terms of energy security. However, although the country was only mildly affected by the 2009 cuts of supplies from the east, its position in the gas market is far from being fully protected.
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Ensuring an optimal and balanced mix ranks among the top priorities of Slovakia in the field of energy. The composition of the country’s energy mix reflects the ambition of the Slovak government to have a secure supply for affordable and competitive prices, respecting at the same time the aspect of environmental sustainability. Due to substantial investments into nuclear energy and the growing volume of renewable energy (RES), Slovakia stands a good chance to reach by 2020 the 20-20-20 policy goals. According to 2011 data, the shares of various primary energy sources in net domestic consumption (NDC) was the following: natural gas, 26%; nuclear energy, 22%; oil, 21%; coal, 22%; RES, including hydro energy, 9%.
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Croatia significantly differs from many Visegrad countries in terms of its gas security. First of all, natural gas is not the most important component of Croatia’s energy mix, accounting for only 28% of the total energy supply, significantly less than oil and its derivatives (70%). Total consumption is only 3 bcm, two times less than Slovakia’s and around four times less than Poland’s or the Czech Republic’s. Second, the country has a relevant amount of domestic natural gas production. Currently, this ranges between 1.9–2.5 bcm annually, which meets around 70% of total demand. Gas is taken from 17 on-shore and nine offshore fields. Proven reserves are estimated at 23.6 bcm, though if production is kept at current level, this is sufficient for only about 10 years. Although this significantly reduces import dependency, there are serious doubts as to whether in the future this beneficial share of domestic sources can be maintained.
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In the European Union, there is the belief that with the limited development potential of European territory, the endogenous development factors have become more important. However, there is a lack of a systematic and simultaneous assessment of the role soft factors. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion and to extend the existing knowledge of the theoretical and methodological foundation of the geographical research of the importance of “soft” factors and the importance of media image of regions as one of the intangible factors in the Czech Republic. Results of literature review showed the majority of studies of soft factors of regional development in central eastern countries of the EU have focused on the human and social capital or institution. Image of the region influenced by media (TV) is one of the intangible factor which is rarely included into evaluation of regional development factors. Anylysis revealed that media landscape of the Czech Republic does not always comply with genuine features of individual regions.
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The basic economic category providing information about market environment in particular regions is price. However, information reflecting state and development of regional economies are also disseminated through mass media. It´s relevant in case of news broadcasting of television stations via information flows affecting formation of the regional images of individuals. The news broadcasting may be different through intensity and thematic structure of economic information from individual regions. Given the obvious differences in institutional anchorage, ownership and organizational structure, method of funding, etc., possible differences between public and private media organizations became palpable. The objective of the paper is to identify potential discrepancies within regionally oriented news agendas of Czech Television and commercial organizations TV Nova and FTV Prima in the economic area between 2005-2011. It should be emphasized that it´s a thematic composition of news reports with concrete regional focus. Given the nature of the data, methodical approach is based on the contingency table that allows measure and test association between variables. We apply the nonparametric Pearson chi-squared test of independence. We use Cramer´s contingency coefficient to evaluate dependence intensity. For visualization of the relationship between variables we use correspondence analysis. Based on this methodical procedure, there were identified differences among thematic focus of TV broadcasting news programs in the area of regionally bound economic characteristics. In other words, it depends on which TV news programs population, investors as well as other actors are watching.
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It is apparent that national media substantially affect the look on individual regions. The same holds true also for TV coverage. The objective of the article is to analyze and evaluate the amount of regionally-bound contributions according to the selected news programmes. The coverage of public Czech TV is represented just by two news programmes Události and Události, komentáře. Its private counterparts, i.e. TV Nova and TV Prima are embodied by Televizní noviny and Zprávy FTV Prima news programmes. It is worth noticing that during the investigated period between 2004 and 2010 the most regionally-orientated news appeared in Televizní noviny by TV Nova. As for amounts of nationally broadcasted news that are bound just to individual self-governing regions, all four previously mentioned TV news programmes favour different regions. The degree of medialization of particular regions differs quite a lot across these news programmes.
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