Series:ECFR Policy Briefs

№ 01 NEW WORLD ORDER: THE BALANCE OF SOFT POWER AND THE RISE OF HERBIVOROUS POWERS

№ 01 NEW WORLD ORDER: THE BALANCE OF SOFT POWER AND THE RISE OF HERBIVOROUS POWERS

Author(s): Ivan Yotov Krastev,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English

Keywords: EU Soft Power;

The largest survey of public opinion in the world shows support for a more multipolar world and a greater role for ‘herbivorous powers’ – countries not widely perceived as military superpowers. There is mistrust of the Cold War powers as well as Islamist-inspired Iranian autocracy. More people want to see a decline rather than an increase in the power of Russia (29% decline, 23% increase), of China (32% decline, 24% increase), of the United States (37% decline, 26% increase), and of Iran (39% decline, 14% increase). On the other hand, there is strong support for an increase in the power of fast-developing powers such as South Africa, India and Brazil. The European Union is the most popular great power. Uniquely among great powers, more people across all continents want to see its power increase than decrease. This demand for more European power extends to many former European colonies. Whilst American soft power has declined, the rise of China has led to the resurgence in support for American power in Asia. Increasing Russian influence in Eastern Europe is paralleled by a demand for a greater American role. Outside Europe, ‘the West’ is still seen to some extent as a single actor: countries suspicious of American power tend also to be against EU power.

№ 02 A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations

№ 02 A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations

Author(s): Mark Leonard,Nicu Popescu / Language(s): English

Keywords: European Power; Russia-EU Relations;

In this project, we have tried to implement some practices which will guide our future activities as the ECFR takes its work into new policy areas. First, we have tried to look at several dimensions of European power. We have explored how Moscow sees the EU and uses its power to influence it; how each member state relates to Russia; as well as the links between Moscow and EU institutions. This report draws on data gathered by a team of researchers from all 27 EU member states. Each conducted a survey of their country’s economic, political and military relations with Russia. // Secondly, we have tried to avoid the euphemistic phrases and diplomatic practices that cloak tensions within the EU and between the EU and third countries. In order to promote a common European approach, we have illustrated some of the areas where the policies of individual member states have undercut common European objectives. The goal is not to stigmatise particular countries. Future reports on European foreign policy issues will put the spotlight on the policies of other states. // Thirdly, we have done our best to understand the issues from the perspective of policymakers. A senior EU official complained to one of the authors about the propensity of outside observers to simplify complex issues and to imply that the only thing standing in the way of a successful EU foreign policy is the stupidity of officials. We have tried to heed this plea and have not offered any easy, ready-made solutions. We are grateful to the many officials who have provided us with useful guidance at every step of the research process, in particular those who took part in a round-table discussion of the interim findings, attended by officials from all EU institutions and a majority of EU member states.

№ 05 MEETING MEDVEDEV: THE POLITICS OF THE PUTIN SUCCESSION

№ 05 MEETING MEDVEDEV: THE POLITICS OF THE PUTIN SUCCESSION

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: governance of Russia; Dmitry Medvedev;

Dmitry Medvedev’s election on 2 March 2008 offers EU leaders a new chance to overcome their disunity and put their uncertain Russia policy on a better foundation. Whatever his personal inclinations, Medvedev will be unable to behave like a democrat in his first years in office. EU leaders should cautiously welcome the new president’s election, but must wait and see whether Medvedev proves a willing interlocutor who can deliver. They should refrain from the foolish enthusiasm they displayed when the sober and coherent Putin succeeded the ailing Yeltsin in 2000. Instead they should test Medvedev with specific demands over energy policy, Kosovo, and Iran.Medvedev, a lawyer by training, has often been depicted as a “liberal”. Considering the alternatives and his own record, he may well be one of the better options to succeed Vladimir Putin, the outgoing autocratic president. Yet Putin will be looking over Medvedev’s shoulder as prime minister. In the cut-throat world of Russia’s clan politics, Medvedev needs Putin to “protect” him from the “siloviki” -- past and present members of the KGB/FSB. The new president starts in a position of weakness, as he lacks a strong clan of his own. A Putin-Medvedev double act would not be Russia’s first “cohabitation”. A similar deal was done when power passed from Yeltsin to Putin in 2000. Putin eventually broke free and became his own man when the siloviki triumphed over the former Yeltsinites during the Yukos affair in 2003. In time, Medvedev may do the same. Russia’s real power transition is likely to happen sometime after the election, if and when the new president puts his mark on the system. The time to assess Medvedev will be then.

№ 07 CAN THE EU WIN THE PEACE IN GEORGIA?

№ 07 CAN THE EU WIN THE PEACE IN GEORGIA?

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Mark Leonard,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia-Georgia-Conflict;

The EU has established itself as the main diplomatic broker in the conflict between Russia and Georgia. It should use this position to help forge a positive peace from a war which threatens the foundations of the European security order. Russia has used its conflict with Georgia to display its military power, reclaim a sphere of influence and frighten its neighbours. Rather than looking for punitive measures, the EU should respond to Russia’s demonstration of force with much stronger engagement for democracy, prosperity and security in the broader region - keeping tough measures towards Moscow on the table if Russia resists.This war was caused in part by the dysfunctionality of the previous ‘peace-keeping’ process in Georgia. The EU must work hard towards ensuring that any new arrangements are not unilateral and do not merely legitimate Russia’s de facto control. The EU should promote an international peace-keeping mission and offer to deploy a civilian reconstruction mission dealing with development, building confidence and security between both sides, and tackling wider political issues. It should also encourage the United Nations to set up a commission of enquiry to help establish the truth on the causes and conduct of the war.Instead of focusing on short-term sanctions against Russia, the EU should move quickly to raise its profile in the Eastern Neighbourhood and to help stabilise other conflict regions - paying attention both to old ‘frozen’ conflicts and potential new flashpoints. The EU should also make a special commitment to Ukraine: It should recognise its right to EU membership in the future, agree to a more liberal visa regime, offer a solidarity clause backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and move to integrate Ukraine into the EU’s energy market.

№ 09 BEYOND DEPENDENCE: HOW TO DEAL WITH RUSSIAN GAS

№ 09 BEYOND DEPENDENCE: HOW TO DEAL WITH RUSSIAN GAS

Author(s): Pierre Noël / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian Gas for Europe; gas security;

The gas relationship with Russia has become an extremely contentious issue among EU Member States. It is a major reason for the EU’s failure to develop the common policy approach towards Moscow it so badly needs. Yet the relationship is often misunderstood. Russia is the largest external gas supplier to the EU, but it is far from a monopoly provider. Since 1980, Europe’s diversification of its gas supply has seen Russia’s share of EU gas imports roughly halve, from 80% to 40%. Russian gas represents just 6.5% of the EU primary energy supply, a figure that has remained essentially unchanged over 20 years. And contrary to widely held belief, Russian gas exports to Europe are unlikely to increase significantly in the foreseeable future. So calls for Europe to diversify its energy supply even further miss the point. The problem is divisiveness, not dependence. Russian gas is divisive because Europe’s gas market is dysfunctional and segmented. Most of the EU’s imports of Russian gas go to a few countries in western Europe, where supply is diversified, while several Member States in central and eastern Europe consume relatively little Russian gas but have no other external suppliers. Only the emergence of a single competitive European gas market can create real solidarity between consumers and ‘Europeanise’ the current large bilateral contracts between European importers and Gazprom.To address the specific concerns of central and eastern European Member States, the EU should build on the 2004 directive on security of supply in natural gas, and help these Member States devise and implement national action plans for gas security.

№ 10 RE-WIRING THE US-EU RELATIONSHIP

№ 10 RE-WIRING THE US-EU RELATIONSHIP

Author(s): Daniel Korski,Ulrike Guerot,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English

Keywords: EU-US-relation; New Transatlantic Agenda; NATO;

The election of Barack Obama has seriously narrowed the policy differences between Europe and the US. While significant disagreements remain on ambition, priority and approach, both sides now agree to a large degree on the major challenges facing them. Moreover, the President-elect is likely to be America’s first “post-Special Relationship” leader, eager to see Britain play a role in making Europe work rather than to build an exclusive US-UK bilateral bond.

№ 11 SHAPING EUROPE’S AFGHAN SURGE

№ 11 SHAPING EUROPE’S AFGHAN SURGE

Author(s): Daniel Korski / Language(s): English

Keywords: ISAF; NATO;

Unnoticed by many, the last few years have seen something of a European military surge in Afghanistan. Since late 2006, 18 of the 25 EU countries participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO’s Afghan mission, have increased their troop contributions, and as a result EU member states now account for 43% of ISAF’s total deployment. This military surge has been accompanied by a steady growth in European efforts to contribute to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, from development aid to police training – although not every EU member state is pulling its weight. These measures have made the EU a major stakeholder in Afghanistan. Yet the EU’s real impact on the country has been limited. In the face of a likely request from the Obama administration to do more, European governments should now formulate a hard-headed political strategy as a complement to the coming US military surge. The overall aim of this strategy should be to begin systematic outreach to Afghanistan’s insurgency groups. To prepare the ground, the 2009 presidential elections will have to be safeguarded from insurgent attack and fraud. After the election, EU governments should push for the twin processes of reconciliation and constitutional change. But European governments cannot revert to a purely civilian role. They should continue improving their training of the Afghan army and police, and assist US and local forces in emphasising “human security” in military operations. This should be backed up by well-funded and long-term aid commitments, the launch of a European provincial reconstruction team in Kabul, a developmentbased approach to counter-narcotics, and a revived Pakistan strategy.

№ 15 THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN – 2009 REVIEW

№ 15 THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN – 2009 REVIEW

Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English

Keywords: Human Rights policy;

Last September, the European Council on Foreign Relations published a report warning that the European Union faced a “slow-motion crisis” at the United Nations, as a growing number of its former allies were beginning to oppose its vision of multilateralism and human rights. While the EU had grown increasingly internally cohesive on human rights votes, its reluctance to use ist leverage and its failure to reach out to moderate states were handing the initiative to defenders of traditional sovereignty like China, Russia and their allies. This is the first in an ongoing series of annual updates on the EU’s performance in human rights debates at the UN, published in the run-up to the opening of the UN General Assembly. It covers the most recent Assembly session, from September 2008 to July 2009.

№ 17 CLIMATE POLICIES AFTER COPENHAGEN

№ 17 CLIMATE POLICIES AFTER COPENHAGEN

Author(s): Jean-François Di Meglio,Mathieu Duchâtel,François Godement,Anne Rulliat,Thomas Vendryes / Language(s): English

Keywords: China’s foreign policy;

Strategic culture, power balances and the analysis of geopolitical shifts are a long-standing Chinese obsession. Academic institutions, think-tanks, journals and web-based debate are growing in number and quality. They work to give China’s foreign policies breadth and depth. China Analysis introduces European audiences to the debates inside China’s expert and think-tank world, and helps the European policy community understand how China’s leadership thinks about domestic and foreign policy issues. While freedom of expression and information remain restricted in China’s media, these published sources and debates are the only available access we have to understand emerging trends within China. China Analysis mainly draws on Chinese mainland sources, but also monitors content in Chinese language publications from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Reports from Hong Kong and Taiwan reflect the diversity of Chinese thinking, with occasional news and analysis unpublished in the mainland.Each issue of China Analysis in English is focused on a specific theme, and presents policy debates which are relevant to Europeans. It is available at www.ecfr.eu. A French version of China Analysis exists since 2005 and can be accessed at www.centreasia.org

№ 20 DEALING WITH YANUKOVYCH’S UKRAINE

№ 20 DEALING WITH YANUKOVYCH’S UKRAINE

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Yuliya Tymoshenko; Viktor Yanukovych;

Over the last few years, the European Union’s relationship with Ukraine has been undermined by a split on both sides. On the European side, some wanted a reform-minded, western-leaning Ukraine, either as a good thing in itself, or in order to eventually transform or at least contain Russia. Others, meanwhile, were quite happy to allow Ukraine to stagnate in order to keep the thorny question of enlargement off the table. On the Ukrainian side, some saw their future lying in Europe, while others wanted to move closer to Russia. This double split has left Ukraine adrift. However, the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010 creates a new situation. The political crisis of recent years may not be over – even after the replacement of his rival, Yuliya Tymoshenko, as prime minister, Yanukovych doesn’t yet fully control the government, let alone Ukraine’s powerful ‘oligarchs’ – but his return to power may represent a real opportunity for Europe.

№ 23 TOWARDS AN EU HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR A POST-WESTERN WORLD

№ 23 TOWARDS AN EU HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR A POST-WESTERN WORLD

Author(s): Susi Dennison,Anthony Dworkin / Language(s): English

The shift of global power away from the West threatens to undermine the EU’s hopes of supporting human rights, democracy and the rule of law beyond its borders. The success of authoritarian states like China and the problems of some new democracies have cast doubt on the benefits of liberal democracy. The EU has lost influence to emerging powers that emphasize sovereignty over human rights, and there is resistance to any idea of the West exporting its model to the rest of the world. But the EU can still make a difference on global values if it follows a three-part strategy. It should join the battle of ideas, making a case for human rights and democracy that is not rooted in Western politics but recognizes that all societies should determine their own development in a fair and inclusive way. It should focus in its engagement with other countries on key ‘pressure points’ – achievable goals that will unlock further progress on human rights and create greater political space. And it should reach out to new partners, seeking common ground to support universal values in practice. To show it is not backing down on core beliefs, the EU should also set out a series of red lines on which it will not compromise. If Europe projects confidence in the values with which it is associated and at the same time pursues a realistic approach to supporting them, it is most likely to strengthen its global standing and help bring about an international order that matches its interests.

№ 24 THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: 2010 REVIEW

№ 24 THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: 2010 REVIEW

Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English

Keywords: human rights policy; human rights in UN;

Over the last year, the EU has struggled to make an impact on human rights at the UN, despite working more closely with the Obama administration than it was able to do with the previous administration. As a result, it is now clear that deepening divisions over human rights at the UN were not just a by-product of Bushism. The EU’s ‘voting coincidence score’ – reflecting the level of support from other countries for its positions on human rights in the General Assembly – has fallen from 52% last year to 42% this year. There have also been splits within the EU on votes in the Human Rights Council on Israeli actions in the Middle East, which has weakened the EU’s reputation for coherence on fundamental values at the UN. This update – the second annual update to ECFR’s 2008 report on the EU and human rights at the UN – underlines important longterm trends. The Obama administration’s policy of engagement at the UN has only persuaded a few countries to shift their stances on human rights and big non-Western democracies – especially Brazil – continue to drift away from the EU’s positions. Attempts to reverse this trend through technical reforms in the UN’s human rights system will likely fail. A European drive for broader UN reforms such as expanding the Security Council would be a gamble but could persuade rising powers to rethink their positions on human rights.

№ 25 THE SPECTRE OF A MULTIPOLAR EUROPE

№ 25 THE SPECTRE OF A MULTIPOLAR EUROPE

Author(s): Ivan Yotov Krastev,Mark Leonard,Dimitar Bechev,Jana Kobzova,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

The EU’s ‘unipolar moment’ is over. In the 1990s, the EU’s grand hope was that American hard power would underpin the spread of European soft power and the integration of all Europe’s powers into a liberal order – embodied in NATO and the EU – in which the rule of law, pooled sovereignty and interdependence would gradually replace military conflict, the balance of power and spheres of influence. However, the prospects for this unipolar multilateral European order are fading. The dilemma facing the European Union in its own continent is somewhat similar to that faced by the US at a global level. The EU can do little to prevent Europe’s evolution from a unipolar to a multipolar order; but it can do a lot to shape the relations between its emerging poles. The new approach would take advantage of a political opening created by Moscow’s desire to modernise and Turkey’s search for a regional role, and recast the continent’s institutional order for a world in which Europe is increasingly peripheral and in which a weak neighbour can be as frightening as a strong one. It would be the first step towards creating a trilateral rather than a tripolar Europe: a new institutional order in the continent that (to paraphrase Lord Ismay) keeps the EU united, Russia post-imperial and Turkey European.

№ 04 AFGHANISTAN: EUROPE’S FORGOTTEN WAR

№ 04 AFGHANISTAN: EUROPE’S FORGOTTEN WAR

Author(s): Daniel Korski / Language(s): English

The international community has a second chance in Afghanistan. The appointment of a new UN special envoy and the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest offer a chance for the coalition partners to adopt a new strategy and avert disaster. The problems are well known. The rule of Hamid Karzai’s government extends only weakly outside of Kabul. The Taliban insurgency will continue to grow stronger as winter ends. Despite the billions of euros spent, most ordinary Afghans have yet to see the benefits in terms of security, access to justice and delivery of basic services. All these difficulties have been exacerbated by European and American policy disagreements. In their key criticisms of each other Europeans and Americans each have a valid point. While Americans tend to treat a political problem as a military one, Europeans have lagged behind the US in terms of financial and military commitments, and have even failed to co-ordinate their own activities. In the run-up to Bucharest there will be an opportunity for both partners to strike a new ‘grand bargain’ where Europeans agree to increase their investment in exchange for a change in American strategy. A new common approach should be based around a strategy for political inclusion, increased resources, and stronger international leadership. This new strategy should be cemented in a new Bonn-type conference, which would bring together heads of states from the US, UN, EU and all of Afghanistan’s regional partners.

№ 06 RE-ENERGISING EUROPE’S SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

№ 06 RE-ENERGISING EUROPE’S SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Author(s): Nick Witney / Language(s): English

Ten years after the launch of the EU’s defence effort at a Franco-British summit in St Malo, the European Security and Defence Policy badly needs a shot in the arm. Procrastination, weak coordination, and persistent absenteeism by some Member States have hobbled the Union’s ability to tackle the real threats to its citizens’ security, and to make a significant contribution to maintaining international peace. Europe’s leaders have agreed what is needed, in the 2003 European Security Strategy. They have acknowledged that security for Europeans today lies not in manning the ramparts or preparing to resist invasion, but in tackling crises abroad before they become breeding-grounds for terrorism, international trafficking, and unmanageable immigration flows. As this report will argue, this situation demands a concerted effort to revitalise the European Union’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU’s individual Member States, even France and Britain, have lost and will never regain the ability to finance all the necessary new capabilities by themselves. Today, only cooperation amongst Europeans can eliminate the massive waste associated with the duplication of resources by Member States, and help transform Europe’s armed forces into modern militaries capable of contributing to global security.

№ 08 A GLOBAL FORCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS? AN AUDIT OF EUROPEAN POWER AT THE UN

№ 08 A GLOBAL FORCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS? AN AUDIT OF EUROPEAN POWER AT THE UN

Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English

The European Union (EU) is suffering a slow-motion crisis at the United Nations (UN). The problem is not a lack of internal cohesion, which has improved markedly since the nadir of the Iraq War. The problem is fading power to set the rules of the game. The EU’s members insist that the UN is central to their vision of international order and universal human rights – but the UN is increasingly being shaped by China, Russia and their allies. This paradox has come to the fore in 2008 as the EU has tried to work through the UN on Burma and Zimbabwe, yet been unable to get Security Council resolutions for action. These defeats come on top of previous setbacks for the EU at the UN in cases from Kosovo to Darfur. This is partially due to geopolitical shifts. But this report shows that the EU has also been the architect of its own misfortune. Europe has lost ground because of a reluctance to use its leverage, and a tendency to look inwards – with 1,000 coordination meetings in New York alone each year – rather than talk to others. It is also weakened by a failure to address flaws in its reputation as a leader on human rights and multilateralism. If Europe can no longer win support at the UN for international action on human rights and justice, overriding national sovereignty in extreme cases, it will have been defeated over one of its deepest convictions about international politics as a whole. This is particularly true in cases involving the Responsibility to Protect against genocide and mass atrocities, when the humanitarian consequences of inaction are most severe.

№ 12 A POWER AUDIT OF EU-CHINA RELATIONS

№ 12 A POWER AUDIT OF EU-CHINA RELATIONS

Author(s): John Fox,François Godement / Language(s): English

Keywords: EU-China-relations;

Europe’s approach to China is stuck in the past. China is now a global power: decisions taken in Beijing are central to virtually all the EU’s pressing global concerns, whether climate change, nuclear proliferation, or rebuilding economic stability. China’s tightly controlled economic and industrial policies strongly affect the EU’s economic wellbeing. China’s policies in Africa are transforming parts of a neighbouring continent whose development is important to Europe. Yet the EU continues to treat China as the emerging power it used to be, rather than the global force it has become. A “power audit” we have conducted shows that the 27 EU Member States are split over two main issues: how to manage China’s impact on the European economy and how to engage China politically. We assigned scores to Member States’ individual policies and actions towards China, and the chart overleaf translates this evaluation on to a horizontal axis for politics and a vertical axis for economics.

№ 14 THE LIMITS OF ENLARGEMENT-LITE: EUROPEAN AND RUSSIAN POWER IN THE TROUBLED NEIGHBOURHOOD

№ 14 THE LIMITS OF ENLARGEMENT-LITE: EUROPEAN AND RUSSIAN POWER IN THE TROUBLED NEIGHBOURHOOD

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Over the past year, war in Georgia, the Ukrainian gas crisis and the burning of the Moldovan parliament have all dominated the front pages of European newspapers. But behind the headlines the story is just as bleak: politics in the “neighbourhood” is a toxic mixture of authoritarianism and stalled democracy, ongoing secessionist tensions continue to stoke fears of violent conflict, and the economic crisis is wreaking havoc throughout the region. The implications for the EU are profound. Renewed hostilities or economic collapse could see an influx of immigrants into eastern Member States. Several banks in western Member States are exposed to the imploding economies in the east. But beyond these immediate dangers, there is an emerging contest between the EU and Russia over the political rules that are to govern the neighbourhood. Since the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine, Russia has been working tirelessly to draw the countries of the region into its sphere of influence while the EU has continued to pursue a technocratic strategy best described as “enlargement-lite” – offering the neighbourhood states the prospect of eventual political and economic alignment with the EU while dampening down any hopes of actual accession.

№ 16 THE LIMITS OF ENLARGEMENT-LITE: EUROPEAN AND RUSSIAN POWER IN THE TROUBLED NEIGHBOURHOOD

№ 16 THE LIMITS OF ENLARGEMENT-LITE: EUROPEAN AND RUSSIAN POWER IN THE TROUBLED NEIGHBOURHOOD

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Putin Consensus; Russian Regime; authoritarian democracy; fake democracy; Russian political class; Medvedev Initiative;

INTRODUCTION What does Russia think? (by Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard and Andrew Wilson, pp. 1-13) THE “PUTIN CONSENSUS ”The “Putin consensus” Explained (by Vyacheslav Glazychev, pp.9-14) The School of Consensus and the War of the Majority (by Modest Kolerov, pp. 15-20) An Ideological Self-Portrait of the Russian Regime (by Leonid Polyakov, pp. 21-24) DILEMMAS OF RUSSIA’S MODERNIZATION Authoritarian Modernization of Russia in the 2000s (Olga Kryshtanovskaya, pp. 27-34) A Bit of Luck: The Development of the Political System in Russia (by Aleksey Chesnakov, pp. 35-40 )Has the Economic Crisis Changed the World View of the Russian Political Class? (by Valery Fadeev, pp. 41-46) Dilemmas of Russia’s Modernization (by Vladislav Inozemtsev, pp. 47-51) RUSSIA AND THE WORLD: MEDVEDEV’S “EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY” PROPOSAL Rethinking Security in “Greater Europe” (by Fyodor Lukyanov, pp. 55-60) Multipolarity, Anarchy and Security (by Timofey Bordachev, pp.61-66) The Medvedev Initiative: The Origins and Development of a Political Project (by Boris Mezhuyev, pp. 67-71) AFTERWORD How the West Misunderstands Russia (by Gleb Pavlovsky, pp-73-78)

№ 18 CAN THE EU REBUILD FAILING STATES? A REVIEW OF EUROPE’S CIVILIAN CAPACiTIES

№ 18 CAN THE EU REBUILD FAILING STATES? A REVIEW OF EUROPE’S CIVILIAN CAPACiTIES

Author(s): Daniel Korski,Richard Gowan,Jean-Marie Guéhenno / Language(s): English

Keywords: Failed State;

In the next two decades, the persistent weakness of some states and regions may well prove a greater strategic challenge to the international community than the emergence of new powers like China. Having been in charge of UN peacekeeping for eight years, I believe we are not prepared to meet this challenge. We have been used to balancing power with power, but we are ill-equipped to deal with weakness: fragile states may require military deployments of peacekeepers, but strengthening them or managing their collapse requires much more complex strategies, drawing heavily on civilian capacities. One would expect the European Union, supposedly the civilian power par excellence, to be at the forefront of this effort, and certainly well ahead of the US, which has often been criticised for a Pentagon-dominated approach. Yet the Americans are fast learning the lessons of their difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, and energetically building their civilian capacities. The Europeans, despite having set themselves ambitious “civilian headline goals” in 2004, are at risk of being left behind. This report is severe on the performance of the EU as a “civilian power”. Tough love, perhaps. But the good news is that no group of countries in the world has more civilian capacity potential than the EU, and that opinion polls conducted across more than 50 countries find more support for a rise in the EU’s global influence than for any other major power. This is an extraordinary vote of confidence. Can Europe live up to it?