Series:ECFR Policy Briefs

Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of the Putin Succession

Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of the Putin Succession

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: governance of Russia; Dmitry Medvedev;

Dmitry Medvedev’s election on 2 March 2008 offers EU leaders a new chance to overcome their disunity and put their uncertain Russia policy on a better foundation. Whatever his personal inclinations, Medvedev will be unable to behave like a democrat in his first years in office. EU leaders should cautiously welcome the new president’s election, but must wait and see whether Medvedev proves a willing interlocutor who can deliver. They should refrain from the foolish enthusiasm they displayed when the sober and coherent Putin succeeded the ailing Yeltsin in 2000. Instead they should test Medvedev with specific demands over energy policy, Kosovo, and Iran.Medvedev, a lawyer by training, has often been depicted as a “liberal”. Considering the alternatives and his own record, he may well be one of the better options to succeed Vladimir Putin, the outgoing autocratic president. Yet Putin will be looking over Medvedev’s shoulder as prime minister. In the cut-throat world of Russia’s clan politics, Medvedev needs Putin to “protect” him from the “siloviki” -- past and present members of the KGB/FSB. The new president starts in a position of weakness, as he lacks a strong clan of his own. // A Putin-Medvedev double act would not be Russia’s first “cohabitation”. A similar deal was done when power passed from Yeltsin to Putin in 2000. Putin eventually broke free and became his own man when the siloviki triumphed over the former Yeltsinites during the Yukos affair in 2003. In time, Medvedev may do the same. Russia’s real power transition is likely to happen sometime after the election, if and when the new president puts his mark on the system. The time to assess Medvedev will be then.

Can the EU win the Peace in Georgia?

Can the EU win the Peace in Georgia?

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Mark Leonard,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia-Georgia-Conflict;

The EU has established itself as the main diplomatic broker in the conflict between Russia and Georgia. It should use this position to help forge a positive peace from a war which threatens the foundations of the European security order. Russia has used its conflict with Georgia to display its military power, reclaim a sphere of influence and frighten its neighbours. Rather than looking for punitive measures, the EU should respond to Russia’s demonstration of force with much stronger engagement for democracy, prosperity and security in the broader region - keeping tough measures towards Moscow on the table if Russia resists.This war was caused in part by the dysfunctionality of the previous ‘peace-keeping’ process in Georgia. The EU must work hard towards ensuring that any new arrangements are not unilateral and do not merely legitimate Russia’s de facto control. The EU should promote an international peace-keeping mission and offer to deploy a civilian reconstruction mission dealing with development, building confidence and security between both sides, and tackling wider political issues. It should also encourage the United Nations to set up a commission of enquiry to help establish the truth on the causes and conduct of the war.Instead of focusing on short-term sanctions against Russia, the EU should move quickly to raise its profile in the Eastern Neighbourhood and to help stabilise other conflict regions - paying attention both to old ‘frozen’ conflicts and potential new flashpoints. The EU should also make a special commitment to Ukraine: It should recognise its right to EU membership in the future, agree to a more liberal visa regime, offer a solidarity clause backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and move to integrate Ukraine into the EU’s energy market.

Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge

Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge

Author(s): Daniel Korski / Language(s): English

Keywords: ISAF; NATO;

Unnoticed by many, the last few years have seen something of a European military surge in Afghanistan. Since late 2006, 18 of the 25 EU countries participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO’s Afghan mission, have increased their troop contributions, and as a result EU member states now account for 43% of ISAF’s total deployment. This military surge has been accompanied by a steady growth in European efforts to contribute to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, from development aid to police training – although not every EU member state is pulling its weight. // These measures have made the EU a major stakeholder in Afghanistan. Yet the EU’s real impact on the country has been limited. In the face of a likely request from the Obama administration to do more, European governments should now formulate a hard-headed political strategy as a complement to the coming US military surge. // The overall aim of this strategy should be to begin systematic outreach to Afghanistan’s insurgency groups. To prepare the ground, the 2009 presidential elections will have to be safeguarded from insurgent attack and fraud. After the election, EU governments should push for the twin processes of reconciliation and constitutional change. But European governments cannot revert to a purely civilian role. They should continue improving their training of the Afghan army and police, and assist US and local forces in emphasising “human security” in military operations. This should be backed up by well-funded and long-term aid commitments, the launch of a European provincial reconstruction team in Kabul, a developmentbased approach to counter-narcotics, and a revived Pakistan strategy.

Dealing with Yanukovych’s Ukraine

Dealing with Yanukovych’s Ukraine

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Yuliya Tymoshenko; Viktor Yanukovych;

Over the last few years, the European Union’s relationship with Ukraine has been undermined by a split on both sides. On the European side, some wanted a reform-minded, western-leaning Ukraine, either as a good thing in itself, or in order to eventually transform or at least contain Russia. Others, meanwhile, were quite happy to allow Ukraine to stagnate in order to keep the thorny question of enlargement off the table. On the Ukrainian side, some saw their future lying in Europe, while others wanted to move closer to Russia. This double split has left Ukraine adrift. However, the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010 creates a new situation. The political crisis of recent years may not be over – even after the replacement of his rival, Yuliya Tymoshenko, as prime minister, Yanukovych doesn’t yet fully control the government, let alone Ukraine’s powerful ‘oligarchs’ – but his return to power may represent a real opportunity for Europe.

BEYOND WAIT-AND-SEE: The Way forward for EU Balkan Policy

BEYOND WAIT-AND-SEE: The Way forward for EU Balkan Policy

Author(s): Heather Grabbe,Gerald Knaus,Daniel Korski / Language(s): English

Keywords: 2008 Economic Crisis; EU and the Balkans;

In the midst of a huge economic crisis, European Union leaders may be tempted to put off any further decisions on enlargement. However, now that some of the Western Balkan countries have tested the EU’s commitment by formally applying for membership, the wait-and-see approach is unsustainable. The EU has kept six of the countries of the Western Balkans – Albania, BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia – waiting for a decade. The EU has asked them to take on difficult and ambitious reforms to prepare them for membership.However, Balkan leaders are no longer even sure that the EU members really want them in the club. As a result, the EU’s credibility is fading in the region. If it continues to hesitate about the next step, its leverage could fade too. The EU should respond to these membership applications in a positive way while reinforcing ist accession conditionality. The most realistic way to do this is to employ the EU’s existing tools more fully and more effectively, and to better sequence the next steps towards accession. This would support reformers in the region without imposing any additional costs on the EU. The aim is to set out a clear, realistic and motivational programme to help the Balkan countries to get in shape for membership – which could take many years to achieve. This will strengthen governance and provide political momentum to help the region get through the current economic crisis and ist political fallout.

TOWARDS AN EU HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR A POST-WESTERN WORLD

TOWARDS AN EU HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR A POST-WESTERN WORLD

Author(s): Susi Dennison,Anthony Dworkin / Language(s): English

The shift of global power away from the West threatens to undermine the EU’s hopes of supporting human rights, democracy and the rule of law beyond its borders. The success of authoritarian states like China and the problems of some new democracies have cast doubt on the benefits of liberal democracy. The EU has lost influence to emerging powers that emphasize sovereignty over human rights, and there is resistance to any idea of the West exporting its model to the rest of the world. But the EU can still make a difference on global values if it follows a three-part strategy. It should join the battle of ideas, making a case for human rights and democracy that is not rooted in Western politics but recognizes that all societies should determine their own development in a fair and inclusive way. It should focus in its engagement with other countries on key ‘pressure points’ – achievable goals that will unlock further progress on human rights and create greater political space. And it should reach out to new partners, seeking common ground to support universal values in practice. To show it is not backing down on core beliefs, the EU should also set out a series of red lines on which it will not compromise. // If Europe projects confidence in the values with which it is associated and at the same time pursues a realistic approach to supporting them, it is most likely to strengthen its global standing and help bring about an international order that matches its interests.

TURNING PRESENCE INTO POWER: Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood

TURNING PRESENCE INTO POWER: Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy;

Since the launch of its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, the European Union has become the biggest trading partner of most of the states in the region, embarked on association and free-trade talks, deployed crisis management operations, and offered visa facilitation and visa-free dialogues. But the EU has not succeeded in turning this presence into power. In fact, as the EU has become more involved in the eastern neighbourhood, its ability to influence political developments in the region has stagnated at best. With the exception of Moldova, all of the EU’s eastern neighbours have gone in the wrong direction in the last few years. // Behind the EU’s failure to turn presence into power in the eastern neighbourhood lie three structural trends: the increasingly authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in most of the neighbourhood states; the emergence of a multi-polar world that allows countries in the eastern neighbourhood to play “neo-Titoist” games of balancing between external actors; and the EU’s own limited commitment to the ENP. The EU should continue to increase its own visibility and outreach with the public, business interests and state institutions in the eastern neighbourhood. However, it should not rely on soft power alone. Instead, it should also aim to develop a more transactional relationship with its eastern neighbours – in other words, to decide what its interests are, be less diplomatic with interlocutors and set tough conditions on issues such as visa liberalisation.

EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A bolder EU Approach

EGYPT’S HYBRID REVOLUTION: A bolder EU Approach

Author(s): Anthony Dworkin,Daniel Korski,Nick Witney / Language(s): English

Keywords: Egypt Revolution, Arab Spring;

The success or failure of Egypt’s transition to democracy will have huge consequences for the Middle East and for Europe. If the country overcomes the obstacles to political reform, it would set a powerful example for the region. But although the ruling Military Council appears committed to hand over power, it is governing in an opaque way and has resorted to summary justice to deal with protest and criticism. Some liberals also worry that the quick timetable for elections will favour the remnants of the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. The revolution has also exacerbated the precarious state of the country’s economy. // Despite Egypt’s importance, however, the EU has struggled to achieve influence in the country. In March Ashton and Barroso proposed a new policy framework, which is a good start but should be strengthened, for example by cancelling Egyptian debt. In the longer term, the EU should take a more political approach and behave more like a regional power. For example, Europeans should say clearly that military leaders who resort to summary justice to deal with protest and criticism are violating fundamental political rights. EU officials must also be ready to engage with all Egypt’s political groups, including former NDP members and the Muslim Brotherhood. Europe needs to move beyond fear about migration to see the potential for longer-term economic benefits for both sides of the Mediterranean.

EUROPE AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS: A NEW VISION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

EUROPE AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS: A NEW VISION FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Author(s): Susi Dennison,Anthony Dworkin / Language(s): English

Keywords: Arab Revolutions;

In the aftermath of this year’s revolutions, the EU has rightly recommitted itself to the support of de-mocracy and human rights in the Middle East and North Africa. However, although protesters across the southern Mediterranean share some of the EU’s values, they do not see Europe as a political model and democracy in the region is likely to produce some results with which Europeans are not comfortab-le. This brief argues that, in response, the EU should focus above all on the development of legitimate and accountable governments in post-revolutionary countries in the Arab world. Rather than backing specific political groups in countries that are in transition, the EU should work to create the building blocks and background conditions for fair and inclusive politics. // The EU should also try to support human rights through transparent diplomacy and support for civil society. In countries such as Moroc-co that remain undemocratic, the EU should develop a more political approach that pushes harder for incremental reform in return for credible benefits, while continuing to engage on other EU interests. The use of violence against civilians in countries like Syria should be a red line for limiting cooperation, dra-wing condemnation and sanctions in severe cases. EU proposals on conditionality and a new European Endowment for Democracy will be most effective if they are focused on the support of accountable and legitimate government.

FOUR SCENARIOS FOR THE REINVENTION OF EUROPE

FOUR SCENARIOS FOR THE REINVENTION OF EUROPE

Author(s): Mark Leonard / Language(s): English

Europe’s leaders see the need for “more Europe” to deal with the euro crisis but do not know how to persuade their citizens, markets, parliaments or courts to accept it. This is the root of Europe’s political crisis: the necessity and impossibility of integration. European integration has been defined by two contradictory but mutually reinforcing forces that operate on both the European and national level: technocracy and populism. But the more technocratic the EU has become, the more it has provoked a populist backlash. European leaders are now unable to solve the euro crisis because they can only force inadequate solutions through loopholes in the Lisbon Treaty. // Four routes towards solving Europe’s institutional crisis are now emerging: asymmetric integration by working around the existing treaties; a smaller, more integrated eurozone based on the existing treaties; political union through treaty chan-ge; and a deal among a new vanguard through a Schengen-style treaty. There are also calls to strengthen each of the three traditional channels for democratic participation in order to restore legi-timacy: European elections, referendums and national opt-outs. Whichever of these options Europe ultimately chooses, the challenge will be to solve the acute euro crisis without at the same time exacer-bating the chronic crisis of declining European power.

A “RESET” WITH ALGERIA: THE RUSSIA TO THE EU’S SOUTH

A “RESET” WITH ALGERIA: THE RUSSIA TO THE EU’S SOUTH

Author(s): Hakim Darbouche ,Susi Dennison / Language(s): English

Keywords: EU–Algerian relations; energy supplier; Algeria;

There are striking similarities between the ways that Algeria and Russia have handled the EU, particularly since Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power 12 years ago. Like Russia, Algeria is an important supplier of energy – in particular, natural gas – to Europe. As a result, it has traditionally enjoyed stronger relations with key member states, especially its energy clients, than with the EU as such. But Algeria’s current sense of vulnerability in a dramatically changing region presents a potential opening for increased European engagement and, over the long term, influence. It is important that the EU’s attention does not remain focused only on the other countries in the region that have been affected by the Arab revolutions in more obvious ways. // The EU is currently revising its European Neighbourhood Policy. But if Algeria does not engage fully with it, there is a risk that it could be isolated. However, the shifts currently taking place in Algeria and its neighbourhood create an opportunity for a “reset” in EU–Algerian relations. Such a reset could increase the EU’s ability to influence the course of domestic events in Algeria by using engagement to support economic modernisation and spread the rule of law. Over the longer term, as confidence builds on both sides, the EU could use a more functional relationship to increase its voice on the need for political reform.

THE LONG SHADOW OF ORDOLIBERALISM: GERMANY’S APPROACH TO THE EURO CRISIS

THE LONG SHADOW OF ORDOLIBERALISM: GERMANY’S APPROACH TO THE EURO CRISIS

Author(s): Sebastian Dullien,Ulrike Guerot / Language(s): English

Keywords: ordo-liberalism; Walter Eucken; Franz Böhm; Leonhard Miksch; Hans Großmann-Doerth; Euro-zone;

The new treaty agreed by European leaders in January reflects Germany’s distinctive approach to the euro crisis rather than collective compromise. Much to the frustration of many other eurozone count-ries, Germany has imposed its own approach – centred on austerity and price stability at the expense of economic growth – on others without considering whether the institutional flaws of monetary union beyond a lack of fiscal control may be the cause of some of the distortions and problems that the cur-rent euro crisis has exposed or whether its approach could have a negative impact on other eurozone countries. German economic orthodoxy has been widely criticised elsewhere in Europe. // This brief explores the historical and ideological foundations of German economic thinking and discusses how it differs from mainstream international economic discourse. It argues that there is more to Germany’s distinctive approach to the euro crisis than the much-discussed historical experience of the hyperinflati-on in the Weimar Republic on the one hand and simple national interest on the other. Rather, there is an ideological edifice behind German economic orthodoxy with which Germany’s partners must enga-ge. While a change in the government after the next general election, in 2013, would lead to a change in German economic policy, it is unlikely to dramatically change the country’s approach to the euro crisis.