POLITIČKI SISTEM I ELITE U SRBIJI PRE I POSLE 5. OKTOBRA
POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ELITES IN SERBIA BEFORE AND AFTER OCTOBER 5

Author(s): Slobodan Č. Antonić
Subject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Politics, Governance, Sociology, Government/Political systems, Electoral systems, Political behavior, Politics and society, Sociology of Politics
Published by: CEDET Centar za demokratsku tranziciju
Keywords: Politički poredak; političke elite; izvršna vlast; zakonodavna vlast; sudska vlast; klijentelizam
Summary/Abstract: The article analyzes the political order and structure of the ruling elites in Serbia. The author singles out four main weaknesses of today's political order in Serbia. The first weakness is the divided elite. In Serbia, there are still strong anti-reform and even undemocratic political elites, which are primarily found in the parties of the old regime: SPS, SRS and SSJ. In addition, there is a deep division within the democratic and reformist political elite. On one side, the political elite is gathered around Koštunica and the DSS, and on the other, the political elite is concentrated around Đinđić and the DS. Their relationship is not only adversarial, but in their confrontation they are too often ready to break basic democratic rules. Hence, the political system in Serbia must be assessed as a system of undetermined democracy. Another weakness is the pronounced dominance of the executive branch at the expense of the other two branches of government. Through various measures, during 2001 and 2002, the rather harsh rule of the executive over the legislature and the judiciary was restored. The third weakness is the insufficiently independent public, i.e. dependence of the media elite on the political one. Due to the weak opposition and the "dirty political game" of the two main factions of DOS, the existence of an independent and critical public is extremely important. Such a public in Serbia, however, is too weak today. And the fourth weakness is the regeneration of client structures. The patrimonial networks remained, only that a personnel change was made in their key political segments. This is particularly visible in the sphere of government-sponsored crime. The author's conclusion is that the system did not fundamentally change after the fall of the Milosevic regime. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the pressure of the liberal public on the political elite in order to approach the faster democratization of the order.

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