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Yugoslav Diplomacy 1945-1961 Cover Image
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Југословенска дипломатија 1945-1961.
Yugoslav Diplomacy 1945-1961

Contributor(s): Slobodan Selinić (Editor), Dragan Bogetić (Editor), Aleksandar Životić (Editor), Vladimir Lj. Cvetković (Editor), Jovan Čavoški (Editor), Ljubodrag D. Dimić (Editor)
Subject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Politics, History, Social Sciences, Diplomatic history, Political history, Recent History (1900 till today), International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
Published by: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije
Keywords: Yugoslavia; diplomacy; politics; international relations; USSR; Italy; United States of America; Hungary; Czechoslovakia; diplomatic missions; ambassadors; Yugoslav Embassies; history of diplomatic relations;
Summary/Abstract: У српској/југословенској и светској историографији већ је уочен значај изучавања спољне политике и позиције социјалистичке Југославије. Научници су обраћали пажњу на важност југословенско-совјетских сукоба 1948. и 1958. године, велику улогу Југославијеу стварању покрета несврстаних земаља, стварање Балканског пакта 1953/54, проучавање односа Југославије и великих сила (блокова) и позиције Југославије у хладном рату, на место које је имао Јосип Броз као државник у послератном свету, улогу Југославије у великим кризама хладноратовског периода (тршћанска криза, Корејски рат, догађаји у Мађарској 1956, окупација Чехословачке 1968), свестрану научну, културну и техничку сарадњу Југославије са иностранством... [...]

  • Print-ISBN-13: 978-86-7005-103-4
  • Page Count: 403
  • Publication Year: 2012
  • Language: Croatian, Russian, Serbian
Од војне до политичке дипломатије (Ратни почеци дипломатије „друге“ Југославије)

Од војне до политичке дипломатије (Ратни почеци дипломатије „друге“ Југославије)
(From Military to Political Diplomacy (Military Beginnings of the „Second” Yugoslavia))

  • Author(s):Milan Terzić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Military history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
  • Page Range:19-30
  • No. of Pages:12
  • Keywords:Military missions; diplomacy; international recognition; the politics of compromise; J. B. Tito; general Mihailović; Vladimir Velebit;
  • Summary/Abstract:The foundations of the diplomacy of the ,,second“ Yugoslavia were laid on the experience and pragmatism of the older generations and by creating the new one that could learn. This enabled the diplomacy of a military movement to gain access to the political sphere through military missions and to achieve international recognition already in the final phase of WWII. Military missions of the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia were harnessed to the goal of international recognition of the „second" Yugoslavia. The largest name of the partisan diplomacy was Vladimir Velebit. However, Josip Broz Tito was its real instigator and leader who skillfully held all strings of foreign policy of the movement he led in his hands. The Allies recognized the temporary Yugoslav government before the end of the war: on March 12, 1945 the British ambassador Ralf Stevenson arrived in Belgrade, followed by the Soviet ambassador Ivan Sadchikov on March 24 and in late March the USA appointed their ambassador Richard Paterson.
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Југословенска самит-дипломатија 1944-1961.

Југословенска самит-дипломатија 1944-1961.
(Yugoslav Summit Diplomacy 1944-1961)

  • Author(s):Vladimir P. Petrović
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:31-47
  • No. of Pages:17
  • Keywords:Summit-diplomacy; Josip Broz Tito; Yugoslavia; foreign policy;
  • Summary/Abstract:The paper explores the dynamics of Yugoslav summit diplomacy from the end of WWII to the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries in 1961. Particular attention is devoted to the role of Josip Broz Tito in the development of this segment of Yugoslav foreign policy.
  • Price: 4.50 €
Школовање кадрова за дипломатију у социјалистичкој Југославији од 1945. до 1960.

Школовање кадрова за дипломатију у социјалистичкој Југославији од 1945. до 1960.
(Education of Diplomatic Cadres in Yugoslavia 1945-1960)

  • Author(s):Dragomir Bondžić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Education, Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Human Resources in Economy
  • Page Range:48-68
  • No. of Pages:21
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Communist party; diplomacy; human resources; education;
  • Summary/Abstract:The new powers that be in Yugoslavia after WWII faced lack of expert and well educated, but also pro-Marxist diplomatic cadres that would also be loyal to the Communist Party. In the beginning, the problem was solved by cautious taking over of the diplomatic officials of the Kingdom of J ugoslavia, by employing the cadres who graduated from humanities faculties and by using the existing Party cadres, regardless of their expertise. Very soon higher schools were set up to broadly educate and improve Marxistically the chosen Party cadres and to enable them to work in the diplomatic service. Firstly, the one-year Diplomatic School at the Foreign Ministry was founded in 1946, and in 1948 the Journalist and Diplomatic High School in Belgrade, that had the rank of a faculty and two departments educating the cadres for diplomacy and journalism. Despite public competitions, only communists and youth activists proposed by Party committees in federal republics were accepted. The teaching staff consisted mainly of university professors, officials of the Foreign Ministry and of other institutions. Due to political problems with the Infonnbureau, the school was abolished in 1952, but it was possible for 200 students to end their studies and graduate. Only in the late 1950s the opinion within the Party leadership prevailed that a higher school for education of the Parly cadres for diplomacy and other political posts should be founded, so that within the framework of the Party school system the High School of Political Sciences started operating in 1960. In 1968 the School was turned into the Faculty of Political Sciences within the framework of the Belgrade University, that, among other things, educated diplomatic experts.
  • Price: 5.00 €
Комунисти у југословенској дипломатији 1945- 1956: број и организација партијског живота

Комунисти у југословенској дипломатији 1945- 1956: број и организација партијског живота
(Communists in the Yugoslav Diplomacy 1945-1956: the Number and Organization of Party Life)

  • Author(s):Slobodan Selenić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism
  • Page Range:69-90
  • No. of Pages:22
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; diplomacy; Communist Party of Yugoslavia; communists; basic party organizations;
  • Summary/Abstract:CPJ cadres started coming into diplomatic missions abroad immediately after WWII. The influence of the CPJ and the number of communists increased over years through sending new cadres from the country, accepting into the Party membership part of diplomatic officials who previously hadn’t been communists and through recall of old cadres home. According to the 1949 data in J ugoslav missions in 28 countries there were 602 communists. The largest number was to be found in Germany (94), Italy (70), Great Britain and the USA (55 each) and Austria (47). Until early 1952 the number of communists was increased almost by a third: from 602 to 779. The largest number of Party members was to be found in the USA some 120. Until mid-1950s the CPJ established M l domination of the diplomatic service. 1.300 communists were serving in diplomatic missions abroad then. According to the data of June 30, 1956, there were 1.562 Jugoslav representatives (including students and those specializing) in 43 countries. Out of that number there were as many as 1.341 communists, or some 86%. The largest number of communists served in the USA (117), France (114) and Great Britain (104). The presence of the communists in the diplomatic service posed the problem of their organization. Party cells were set up in most countries after WWII but they were disbanded on the decision of the Central Committee in March 1946. Instead, Party plenipotentiaries were put in charge of the communists abroad. After the Resolution of the Informbureau, the Central Committee ordered reestablishing of Party organizations in the second half of 1948. Ever since a single Party organization existed in each country that was divided into several sections in countries with several J ugoslav missions. In the early 1950s on the orders of the Central Committee new changes were introduced, so Party organizations were set up in every town with a Jugoslav mission, whereas Party committees directed the work on the national level.
  • Price: 5.00 €
Дипломатска мисија Краљевине Југославије у СССР-у 1940-1944.

Дипломатска мисија Краљевине Југославије у СССР-у 1940-1944.
(The Diplomatic Mission of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the USSR 1940-1944)

  • Author(s):Aleksej J. Timofejev
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
  • Page Range:93-114
  • No. of Pages:22
  • Keywords:Yugoslav-Soviet relations; history of diplomacy; Stalin; USSR; World War II;
  • Summary/Abstract:In late spring of 1940 the USSR enjoyed the comfortable position of the militarily and strategically strongest neutral nation in Europe that maintained diplomatic relations with both Great Britain and Germany. On the other hand, the Yugoslav neutral status on the eve of the war was rather precarious because the Kingdom of Yugoslavia „continued behind the scenes cooperation with its old allies.“ Under these circumstances the view of the official Belgrade on the USSR was quickly transformed. Between January and March 1940 the two embassies agreed on establishing diplomatic relations and on the exchange of diplomatic missions. For Yugoslav representatives who came to the USSR the situation in Moscow seemed strange, incomprehensible and very difficult. They shared a rather disparaging views on the Soviet Russia due to anti-communist ideas, Soviet losses in the Soviet-Finish war and ungainly looks of Stalin’s socialist „paradise”. They maintained only very sporadic contacts with Soviet officials. The situation changed after the coup d’etat in Yugoslavia. The contract that had been concluded couldn’t prevent Germany from attacking and dismembering Yugoslavia. After the capitulation of the Yugoslav Army had been signed in Belgrade and the government had left the country, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Yugoslav Embassy of the impossibility to continue maintaining fuehrer diplomatic relations. However, after the Gennan attack on the USSR, the Yugoslav government hurried to present its views „on its attitude toward the latest Gennan attack on Russia”. The Soviet government notified the Yugoslav one that it could reopen its Embassy in Moscow, which was duly done on August 5, 1941. The German thrust toward Moscow made the stay there extremely difficult. According to the decision of the Soviet government, foreign embassies were removed 1.000 km from Moscow, to Kuybishev. The staff of the Yugoslav embassy lost all contacts with real surroundings. The information arrived through scanty statements of Soviet officials, the Soviet press and rumors spread by officials of foreign embassies. In early 1942 changes were made at the Embassy: S, Simić was appointed ambassador and M. Lozić military attache. A significant transformation took place in the life of the Yugoslav Embassy during 1943: the heads of the mission (the ambassador and the military attache) started losing understanding for the moves of the Royal Government and started appraising diplomatic moves of the Soviet Foreign Ministry with more sympathy. Finally on March 10, 1944, in an open letter to Marshal Tilo, Simić andLozić stated they wouldn’t represent the „traitor government” any longer and that they „put themselves at the disposal of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia”
  • Price: 5.00 €
Југословенско посланство у Риму 1947-1951.

Југословенско посланство у Риму 1947-1951.
(The Yugoslav Embassy in Rome 1947-1951)

  • Author(s):Miljan Milkić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
  • Page Range:115-134
  • No. of Pages:20
  • Keywords:Mission; Rome; Mladen Iveković; Vladimir Velebit; Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
  • Summary/Abstract:The change of social order in Yugoslavia after WWII caused significant changes in the Yugoslav diplomacy. Diplomatic missions in other states and international organizations continued functioning but with personal changes. The Yugoslav government didn’t want to establish diplomatic relations with Italy deeming it could secure its political and economic interests in that country only after signing the peace treaty. The signing of the peace treaty in Paris didn’t bring about the expected solution to moot questions in Yugoslav-Italian relations. The diplomatic relations were reestablished but the two governments continued pursuing the foreign policy that disturbed the good neighborly relations. The first Yugoslav ambassador in Rome was Dr. Mladen Iveković. The Embassy worked under difficult circumstances. The staff of the Embassy strove to secure the ownership of the Embassy building and they contributed to signing of 25 agreements settling permanently or temporarily the bilateral relations.
  • Price: 5.00 €
Југословенски представници у Чехословачкој 1945-1949.

Југословенски представници у Чехословачкој 1945-1949.
(Yugoslav Representatives in Czechoslovakia 1945-1949)

  • Author(s):Slobodan Selinić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Military history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
  • Page Range:135-158
  • No. of Pages:24
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Czechoslovakia; diplomats; representatives; Embassy; Military delegation; Trade delegation; social attache;
  • Summary/Abstract:The most important Yugoslav representations in Czechoslovakia after WWII were the Embassy in Prague, Consulate in Bratislava, Military Mission, Commercial Delegation and the Department of the Social Attache. Due to the developed cooperation with Czechoslovakia in all spheres of life (politics, culture, economy, education of Yugoslav apprentices and students), there were several hundred Yugoslav representatives in that country. The most important persons in these missions were ambassadors Darko Čemej and Marijan Stilinović, attache Zdenko Štambuk, social attache Jovan Petrović, coimnercial delegate Ivan Barbalić, consul Ivan Mahulja, chairman of the Investment Commission Milan Bulja and the military delegate Miladin Ivanović. Apart from them a number of delegates of Yugoslav companies and agencies should be mentioned, particularly Milena Spasojević, the delegate of the Main Administration of the Federal Motor Industry and Oldrih Strelecki, the delegate of the Motor Industry Rakovica.
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Југословенске дипломате и службеници на Дунаву у вријеме сукоба Југославије са Информбироом

Југословенске дипломате и службеници на Дунаву у вријеме сукоба Југославије са Информбироом
(Yugoslav Diplomats and Officials on the Danube during the Conflict with the Informbureau)

  • Author(s):Milan Gulić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Peace and Conflict Studies
  • Page Range:159-173
  • No. of Pages:15
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; diplomats; officials; Danube; Djerdap; Informbiro; Romania; Danube Commission; Velizar Ninčić;
  • Summary/Abstract:After the passing of the Resolution of the Informbureau a perceptible deterioration of the relations between socialist countries set in. The change in relations was felt to a large degree on the Danube. Between 1948 and 1953 the position of Yugoslav diplomats and officials in the Danube Commission and the Iron Gate Administration, but also in the ship agencies, was extremely difficult. Constant surveillance, checking of documents, searches, preventing of reception of written materials from home country, expulsions etc. became frequent forms of pressure. During 1949 and 1950 the Yugoslav shipping agencies in Romania, Bulgaria and the USSR were closed down and their officials expelled. The situation in the sector of the Iron Gate was particularly difficult because it comprised the border zone of two countries, and was at the same time, the most difficult part of the Danube for navigation. A considerable number of Yugoslav officials was expelled from Orsova that was the seat of the Temporary' Committee directing the Iron Gate administration. The Yugoslav Permanent Delegation with the Temporary Committee headed by permanent delegate Velizar Ninčić. left Or§ova in September 1949. The situation on the Danube changed drasticly after death of Joseph Visarionovich Stalin.
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Из дипломатије у ИБ емиграцију. Догађаји у југословенским дипломатским представништвима у САД-у поводом резолуције Информбироа 1948. године

Из дипломатије у ИБ емиграцију. Догађаји у југословенским дипломатским представништвима у САД-у поводом резолуције Информбироа 1948. године
(From Diplomacy to the Informbuerau Emigration: Goings-on in the Yugoslav Diplomatic Missions in the USA on Occasion of the Resolution of the Informbureau in 1948)

  • Author(s):Ondřej Vojtěchovský
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
  • Page Range:174-204
  • No. of Pages:31
  • Keywords:diplomacy of the FNRJ; the Soviet-Yugoslav interruption of relations; the Communist Party of Yugoslavia; the Informbiro movement; the Informbiro emigration;
  • Summary/Abstract:The diplomacy represents one of the spheres of Yugoslav State and Party apparatus that were extraordinary affected by the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute in June 1948. The communists (most of them former partisans) in ranks of diplomats and consular staff were in a different position compared to other Party members. Working abroad they had an opportunity to relatively openly express their opinions. This paper tries to reconstmct and analyze the events during the summer of 1948 that occurred in the Yugoslav Embassy and other representative bodies in the United States. The Cominform critique of the Yugoslav leadership, namely, received among the staff there stronger support than in any other diplomatic mission of Yugoslavia in the world. The supporters of the Cominform gathered around two high rank diplomats Pero Dragila and Slobodan Ivanović. After several weeks they spent in internal discussions, controversies with loyal officials, and consultations with American communists as well as with Soviet diplomats, they left America and were accepted as political emigres in Czechoslovakia. Dragila and fvanović became the crucial persons of the new established exile organisation, on the editorial staff of its journal Nova Borba and in the external Cominformist movement in general. The group of former diplomats within the framework of the organisation made up a consistent unit that expressed radical views and advocated militant means in struggle against the Titoist regime. The so called ,,Americans“ were labelled by their adversaries among Czechoslovak Party officials and other emigres with the mark of leftist faction and gradually they lost their confidence. The author of this paper assumes that the origin of such a political style should be partly sought in the group’s collective experience since the suimner of 1948. The very hard decision-making had frustrating impact on them and contributed then to the cementing of their unity in pro-Soviet radicalism. The reasons for their decision could be found mainly in the following aspects: Diplomats in the USA were not infonned well about the situation in their country; they did not have ordinary communication with Belgrade and in critical moments they did not get any instmctions; they orientated themselves on the ground of opinions of American Communist Party leaders; far away from Yugoslavia and confronted with the worldwide scale antagonism of the Cold War, they preferred the supposed interest of international communist movement. On the other hand there were also less ideological reasons: the conflicts of communist diplomats with the ambassador Sava Kosanović who was a non-Party person; the lost of trust toward Yugoslav Party leadership because of chaotic and non adequate instructions for Party members working abroad. Finally it was the reason mentioned routinely by all adherents of the Cominform resolution, namely, their high emotional admiration for the Soviet Union and its leader.
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Дипломатске мисије ФНРЈ у Софији, Букурешту и Тирани 1953-1954: повратак амбасадора, услови рада и инциденти

Дипломатске мисије ФНРЈ у Софији, Букурешту и Тирани 1953-1954: повратак амбасадора, услови рада и инциденти
(Diplomatic Missions of the FPRY in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana 1953-1954: Return of Ambassadors, Working Conditions and Incidents)

  • Author(s):Vladimir Lj. Cvetković
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Peace and Conflict Studies
  • Page Range:205-220
  • No. of Pages:16
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Bulgaria; Romania; Albania; diplomatic missions; incidents;
  • Summary/Abstract:After the conflict with the Informbureau in 1948 Yugoslavia’s relations with all countries of „people’s democracy", including the neighboring Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, deteriorated rapidly. The staff of the diplomatic missions in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana was subject to police surveillance, isolation, coldshouldering in the local ministries and other institutions, as well as to constant incidents in public places. After Stalin’s death, during 1953 and 1954 as Yugoslavia’s normalization of relations with the countries of „people’s democracy" was in its „formal" phase, i.e., in the phase of reestablishing of severed ties in the field of diplomatic relations and communication, the situation of Yugoslav diplomats in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana was a good indication of Bulgaria’s, Romania’s and Albania’s governments’ true intentions regarding the normalization of relations with Belgrade. Gradual improvement of living and working conditions of members of Yugoslav diplomatic missions in Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana was proportionate to „warming up" of the policies of these countries toward Yugoslavia, but also in correlation with the decisive foreign player - Moscow - and its policy toward Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia the gradual improvement of the situation of its diplomats in these neighboring countries or unexpected incidents were perceived exactly as hints of new - sometimes good, sometimes bad - measures of the official Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana.
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Станоје Симић: Прилог биографији

Станоје Симић: Прилог биографији
(Stanoje Simić: a Contribution to the Biography)

  • Author(s):Aleksandar Životić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, Interwar Period (1920 - 1939), WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:223-241
  • No. of Pages:19
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; diplomacy; The Second World War; Cold War; Stanoje Simić; biography;
  • Summary/Abstract:Stanoje Simić started his diplomatic career in the first days of the existence of the Yugoslav state. He was born and raised in the family of the distinguished diplomat and national activist Svetislav Simić. He was a pupil of the Second Male High School in Belgrade, a student of the Faculty of Law, wartime volunteer, devoted to the state and the people, aware that regimes and ideologies were transient and that state and popular interests stood above all else. He represented one of the few personages in the discontinuity-riddled history of the Yugoslav diplomacy who left their mark on the activities of the Yugoslav diplomacy during the inter-war period, in the whirlpool of WWII and during the first post-war decade. Possessing expert and general education, Slavophile and Russophile by conviction, a republican by determination he stood out by his looks, behavior and lifestyle from his postwar environment. He was at the helm of the Yugoslav diplomacy in hard moments as the postwar society and its institutions were being built, when Yugoslavia forged close ties with the USSR and the countries of „people’s democracy” in all fields and antagonized the West. Closeness to the Soviets decisively conditioned his withdrawal from diplomacy, but not from political life in which he remained active until his retirement.
  • Price: 4.50 €
Вељко Мићуновић – два различита искуства из дипломатских службовања у Москви

Вељко Мићуновић – два различита искуства из дипломатских службовања у Москви
(Veljko Mićunović - Two Diverging Experiences From Diplomatic Service in Moscow)

  • Author(s):Đoko Tripković
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:242-255
  • No. of Pages:14
  • Keywords:Veljko Mićunović; Ambassador; Moscow; Tito; Khrushchev; Brežnjev; relations; Yugoslavia; USSR;
  • Summary/Abstract:The prominent political functionary of Tito’s Yugoslavia, Veljko Mićunović, changed into diplomatic service in early 1950s, where he would remain for the next twenty-odd years. Apart from serving on high posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Federal Parliament, for more than 20 years he was also on the most prominent diplomatic positions abroad as ambassador to the USSR and the USA. He served in Moscow two times: 1956-1958 and 1969-1971, and in Washington between 1962 and 1967. He represented with decision and successfully the foreign political orientation of Josip Broz Tito and the Yugoslav government and worked actively to improve the bilateral cooperation with two leading powers of the time of which the international position of Yugoslavia mostly depended. Mićunović’s experiences from serving in Moscow were clearly different, although on both occasions he was appointed ambassador at the time Yugoslav-Soviet relations were improving: for the first time after reconciliation after the several years long conflict that started in 1948 and for the second after a severe cooling down that lasted for a year due to the events in Czechoslovakia. On the first occasion Mićunović established very good communication and even friendly relations with Nikita Khrushchev and many other persons from the top of the State and Party establishment. Basically he managed to retain that position until the end of his tenn in Moscow, despite the significant deterioration of the bilateral relations due to the events in Hungary, and the deepening of the ideological gap because of the adoption of the new Program of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia. This circumstance enabled him to send to Belgrade and to Tito in person first hand information that certainly were important element for determining the political course regarding the USSR. However, during his second tenn Mićunović didn’t manage to build up such relations. The Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev received him only fifteen months after his arrival in Moscow, this being, together with the farewell visit couple of months later, the only opportunity to talk to him. He also met Kosygin, Gromyko and other high officials several times, but this was still much less than his first stay in Moscow, and probably less than Mićunović had expected. As the main reasons for such treatment he adduces the fact that the ruling set didn’t forget his friendly relations with Khrushchev and his public speeches in which he condemned the intervention in Czechoslovakia. One should add that political circumstances, both international and bilateral, as well as the operating style of the Brezhnev leadership in the early 1970s, were substantially different then those of the times of his first term of office in Moscow.
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Doprinos Vladimira Velebita jugoslavenskoj diplomaciji

Doprinos Vladimira Velebita jugoslavenskoj diplomaciji
(The Contribution of Vladimir Velebit to Yugoslav Diplomacy)

  • Author(s):Lidija Bencetić
  • Language:Croatian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:256-270
  • No. of Pages:15
  • Keywords:Vladimir Velebit; mission in the West; Trieste crisis; ambassador to Rome; ambassador to London; functions in international bodies; Informbiro Resolution;
  • Summary/Abstract:The article analyzes the contribution to the Yugoslav diplomacy of one of the most important Yugoslav diplomats, Dr. Vladimir Velebit. Dr. Velebit spent 18 years in Yugoslav diplomacy, out of that two in partisan diplomacy. He was one of trailblazers and organizers of the diplomacy of the ,,new“ Yugoslavia. He entered diplomacy during WWII in 1943 when he was appointed chief of the mission of the People’s Liberation Movement in Egypt. During the negotiations in Egypt he acquitted himself excellently so he became the pennanent representative of the People’s Liberation Movement with the Western allies. He played one of the key roles during the negotiations with the emigre Yugoslav government in London concerning the formation of the postwar government and the idea of introducing a regency as a transitional government originated with him He was the man in whom Tito had special confidence, the person who broke through the international isolation of the People’s Liberation Movement, Tito’s personal aide acting on his orders. During the first six months of the Tito-Šubašić government he was the sole aide foreign minister. Considering his intimacy with Tito it is likely that Velebit was then the most important person in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more important than the minister Šubašić himself. He took part in resolving the most important Yugoslav postwar matters - the Trieste crisis, negotiations about a loan from the World Bank, negotiations with USA on aid in food and annament, organization of Tito’s visit to Great Britain. He served as ambassador in Rome and in London. The list of his achievements and contributions to the Yugoslav diplomacy would perhaps have been even larger but for two factors: firstly, Velebit wasn’t a high ranking Party official but just an ordinary Party member, and secondly he was accused of being a British spy in the Informbureau resolution. He spent the last 14 years of his career serving on international bodies (secretary of the European Economic Commission of the UN in Geneva, director for planning in the International Labor Organization, he chaired the project of reconciliation between the Jews and the Arabs within the framework of the Carnegie Endowment, he organized a round table on Cyprus in Rome between 18 and 22 November 1973). Velebit was one of the best known Yugoslav diplomats in international circles, respected in the diplomacy of the United Nations and of other international organizations.
  • Price: 4.50 €
Caba H. Косановић – југословенски амбасадор у Вашингтону 1946-1950.

Caba H. Косановић – југословенски амбасадор у Вашингтону 1946-1950.
(Sava N. Kosanović - The Yugoslav Ambassador to Washington 1946-1950)

  • Author(s):Vesna Đikanović
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949)
  • Page Range:271-290
  • No. of Pages:20
  • Keywords:Sava Kosanovic; Washington; Diplomacy; Yugoslavia; United States of America;
  • Summary/Abstract:The three and a half years the former leader of the Independent Democratic Party had spent on the post of the Jugoslav ambassador to Washington were spent in the atmosphere of post-war reconstruction; new enmities, block divergences, changes that put the country he was representing in a particular situation. The internal transformation of Jugoslavia, deterioration of relations with the USA during the first postwar years, but also the basic change of Jugoslavia’s situation that was soon caused by the Resolution of the Informbureau as well as the responsibility the new circumstances were imposing, made the post of the ambassador in Washington extremely important. Kosanović’s term of office devolved in the atmosphere of these events. However, apart from representing the interests of his country, his diplomatic activity comprised also other, on the first glance less relevant tasks, such as maintaining contacts with other diplomats, journalists, public persons, participation in social events, establishing relations with numerous emigrant communities in America. At the same time, a diverging approach to certain problems that was often opposed to the stance of the official Belgrade, diverging views on working methods in America, on fonns of propaganda activities, clearly stated differences in approach to emigrants, but also to the American public, were a constant feature throughout his term of office. The functioning of the Embassy was additionally encumbered by bad relations with the Communist Party members in America, ideological, methodological and even personal divergences. The final result and the corollary was Kosanović’s dismissal from the post of the ambassador. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction, and even bitterness caused by his recall, didn’t estrange Kosanović from the new authorities nor did they jeopardize his position of a loyal official of the new Jugoslavia.
  • Price: 5.00 €
Спољнополитичка делатност Милована Ђиласа 1944-1953.

Спољнополитичка делатност Милована Ђиласа 1944-1953.
(Foreign Political Activity of Milovan Đilas 1944—1953)

  • Author(s):Aleksandar V. Miletić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:291-312
  • No. of Pages:22
  • Keywords:Milovan Djilas; Tito; Stalin; Yugoslavia; USSR; West; foreign policy; Moscow;
  • Summary/Abstract:In many respects the first ten years of socialist Yugoslavia’s existence were an important, dynamic and decisive period. Yugoslavia was transformed from an ally of the USSR and an enemy of the West into the enemy no. 1 of the USSR and an ally of the West. As a member of the innermost circle of the Yugoslav State and Party leadership Milovan Đilas took active part in all these developments - from meetings and negotiations with Stalin and state delegations to foreign countries to the representative of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and one of the first Yugoslav delegates to the so-called Third World countries.
  • Price: 5.00 €
Узроци неславног епилога дипломатске мисије амбасадора Џорџа Кенана у Југославији 1961-1963.

Узроци неславног епилога дипломатске мисије амбасадора Џорџа Кенана у Југославији 1961-1963.
(The Reasons for the Deplorable End of the Mission of Ambassador George Kennan in Yugoslavia 1961-1963)

  • Author(s):Dragan Bogetić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:315-350
  • No. of Pages:36
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; United States of America; USSR; George Kennan; Josip Broz Tito; cooperation; aid;
  • Summary/Abstract:During the period the distinguished American diplomat and doctrinaire George Kennan spent in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav-American relations have reached their nadir since Tito’s clash with Stalin in 1948. Aware of incapability to reverse this trend, soon after his accreditation in Belgrade, Kennan asked of his government to be recalled from Yugoslavia so he could continue his career of a scholar and professor. Since his diplomatic mission to Moscow in 1952 had a similar ending as he had been declared persona non grata after an inadvertent statement, it seemed that there was a large discrepancy between Kerman’s political capability to observe the rules set by the logic of diplomatic service and his extremely high doctrinaire achievement that was inbuilt into the platform on which the relations within the Cold-War tinged international community were based throughout four decades. However, it is dubitable if any person who would have taken over the duty of the ambassador to Yugoslavia could have prevented the obvious cooling of the Yugoslav-American relations. It is impossible to answer this question without a comprehensive reconstruction of the events that decisively influenced the international relations, but also of the events that decisively determined the international position of Yugoslavia and her foreign political priorities. It is obvious that Kennan came to Belgrade when a turn for the worse could have been detected in the Yugoslav-American relations. It was the time when the powers that be in Belgrade and in Washington saw in the international strategy that would, in near future, lead to a degree of mutual confrontation, the means of overcoming the negative results of foreign political actions of the previous period. Namely, at the time Kennan was taking over the duty of US ambassador and explaining the tenets of the future American policy in the developing countries, Tito was finishing the last preparations to unite these countries into a single front aimed directly against the attempts of the former colonial powers and the USA to establish their dominant influence in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Obsessed with fear of uncontrolled spreading of the „virus of Marxism- Leninism“ in poor countries, American officials saw everywhere in the Third World the dominoes set and ready to fall upon slightest disturbance. In the wake of such thinking, the conclusion imposed itself that if the malady isn’t nipped in the bud, it could spread from Cuba - only 90 miles off the US coast - to other Latin American nations. On the other hand, almost simultaneously, in the Yugoslav political circles the doctrine was taking shape of necessity to form a movement of non-aligned countries that would secure for Yugoslavia a role of an important factor in the international relations and that would boost its prestige in the world. Trying to become the leader of the poor and disenfranchised peoples of the world, during their meeting in Belgrade in September 1961, Tito adopted the stance of the most severe critic of the rich Western states in which he saw the main culprits for the existence of the deep gap between the developed and the undeveloped parts of the world. Tito’s unrestrained and unbalanced anti-American attitude didn’t contribute to the realization of his idea of the need to fonn a non-aligned movement, but it did cause a hale of dissatisfaction in the Western public and made relevant the cessation of further American economic and financial aid to Yugoslavia. It is less than likely that any ambassador, no matter how able and enterprising, could have stop an anti-Yugoslav campaign in the American Congress after the calumnies Tito aimed against the USA during the Belgrade summit. The corollary was passing of restrictive Congress amendments concerning economic aid to Yugoslavia and decrease of the interest of the American administration in cooperation with Yugoslav officials. Under such circumstances Kennan had less elbow-room to organize the previously proposed Tito’s visit to the USA, on which the Yugoslav side doggedly insisted. Kennan’s real contribution to the normalization of the Yugoslav-American relations could be seen only after his recall from Yugoslavia. During the time that lapsed between his demand to the State Department to be recalled from Belgrade and the time it was conceded, Kennan contributed significantly to the toning down of the animosity between Belgrade and Washington. His benevolent explanations concerning the ways out of the crisis that paralyzed the bilateral relations, influenced the positive change in the foreign political approach of the Yugoslav officials. Kennan’s presentations in Washington, as well as his exhaustive telegrams, had an extremely positive effect. At the time he returned to his academic profession at the Princeton University, he could be satisfied. It was the time when Tito finally visited Washington and restrictive Congress amendments concerning Yugoslavia had been repealed. The age of close Yugoslav-American cooperation set in again.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Юрий Андропов - дипломат. Начало одной головокружительной карьеры

Юрий Андропов - дипломат. Начало одной головокружительной карьеры
(Yuri Andropov – The Diplomat. A Start of a Dazzling Career)

  • Author(s):Aleksandr S. Stikalin
  • Language:Russian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:351-383
  • No. of Pages:33
  • Keywords:Yuri Andropov; Soviet Union; Yugoslavia; Hungary; Budapest; diplomacy;
  • Summary/Abstract:Јуриј Андропов је био јсдан из плсјаде совјетских политичких и партијских делатника који су пресудно обележили другу половит XX века како у унутрашњем животу Совјетског Савеза тако и у свстској политики. Своју дипломатску каријеру је започео крајем 1953. као саветник совјетске амбасаде у Буднмпешти на почетку крупних политичких промена у Совјетском Савезу након Стаъинове смрти. Убрю, средином 1954. је постао совјетски амбасадор у Мађарској - земљи која је за Совјете имала посебан војни и политички знанај у нутар посебног војног блока који је у тим моментима добијао своју ко начну форму. Како је сам положај амбасадора у високоцентралнзованој совјетској дипломатији тог доба давао малу слободу деловања, и сам Андропов није имао превише слободног простора за своје активности. Револуционарна дешавагьа у тој земљи 1956. су избацила Андропова у први план. Његово деловање на месту амбасадораје било пресудно за даље напредовање у партијској и државној номенклатурu. Такође, ис куст во које је стекао као амбасадор у кризној ситуацији и трену цима тешке политичке и идеолошке турбуленције је посебно утицало на начин његовог успињања унутар совјетског паргијског и државног апарата.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Политичка и дипломатска каријера Ву Сјућуена, првог амбасадора HP Кине у Југославији

Политичка и дипломатска каријера Ву Сјућуена, првог амбасадора HP Кине у Југославији
(Diplomatic and Political Career of Wu Xiuquan, China’s first Ambassador to Yugoslavia)

  • Author(s):Jovan Čavoški
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, International relations/trade, Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:384-407
  • No. of Pages:24
  • Keywords:Wu Xiuquan; KPK; diplomacy; China; Yugoslavia;
  • Summary/Abstract:The paper deals with the revolutionary and diplomatic career of Wu Xiuquan the first ambassador of the PR of China to Yugoslavia. The article follows his life and work from the first days of his participation in the Chinese revolutionary movement to his recall from Yugoslavia and the subsequent events in his career. By understanding all traits of his professional life, through this paper we can understand why China decided to appoint such a big political figure as its first ambassador to Yugoslavia as well as his contribution to the bilateral relations. However, by using the Chinese archival sources and the very ambassador’s reports, it becomes clear that Wu was one of big champions of good relations with Yugoslavia, which would cost him dearly in his political career later on during the ideological conflicts between the two countries. Exactly these new sources provided an objective view of the personality of the ambassador and his contribution to the positive development of the bilateral relations, since the then Yugoslav officials often had a wrong perception of his role in the flaring up of the ideological conflict.
  • Price: 5.00 €
Подаци о ауторима

Подаци о ауторима
(About the Authors)

  • Author(s):Author Not Specified
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Essay|Book Review |Scientific Life
  • Page Range:11-15
  • No. of Pages:5
  • Price: 4.50 €
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