Some Reflections on Quine’s Criticism of Logical Positivism Cover Image
  • Price 3.90 €

Рефлексии върху критиката на Куайн срещу логическия позитивизъм
Some Reflections on Quine’s Criticism of Logical Positivism

Author(s): Hristo Ivanov Valchev
Subject(s): Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
Published by: Институт по философия и социология при БАН
Keywords: Quine; logical positivism; reductionism; analyticity; meaning; synonymy

Summary/Abstract: Quine criticizes two of the main theses of logical positivism: reductionism and the view that there is a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. In the present inquiry, I present the main line of this critique and consider a possible defense of the view that there is a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. I argue that this view can be defended by distinguishing between two senses of the word “meaning” – one in which it refers to a mental entity, and another in which it refers to a certain property of behavior. Here it must be assumed that, when we refer to “meaning” in relation to the concepts of analytic and synthetic, we use the word in the latter sense. We have reasons to believe that Quine himself would have accepted this way of defense.

  • Issue Year: XXVII/2018
  • Issue No: 6
  • Page Range: 41-53
  • Page Count: 13
  • Language: English, Bulgarian