Epistemiczne układy odniesienia a problem interteoretycznej niewspółmierności — część 2
Epistemic Frameworks and the Problem of Intertheoretical Incommensurability — Part 2

Summary/Abstract: This paper is a continuation of the considerations contained in the paper “Epistemic Frameworks and the Problem of Intertheoretical Incommensurability — Part 1”. In it, I set out to explain why followers of different epistemic frameworks pursue science “in different worlds”. These worlds “appear” as a result of changes with respect to fundamental metaphysical convictions about what exists.I also show that the methodological decisions on which epistemic frameworks are based are not philosophically neutral. They derive their raisons d’être from metaphysical theses (their respective hard cores) that inform convictions about what exists. Existing methodological decisions cannot be replaced unless those metaphysical theses are themselves surrendered. Followers of different epistemic frameworks perceive the world differently. Accepting a concrete theoretical perspective not only makes any theory-independent verification of evidence impossible, but also determines the way in which the facts themselves are ordered.In this paper, I also show that some terms which are collectively in use in different epistemic frameworks nevertheless have distinct meanings.

• Details
• Contents