Kako objasniti varijaciju u nezavisnosti centralnih banaka
How to Account for Variation in Central Banks’ Independence

Summary/Abstract: The article deals with two questions: how to account for the proliferation of independent central banks worldwide and how to explain the variations among the independent central banks themselves. In addressing the former, predominant functionalist approaches are supplemented with “isomorphistic” ones – a central bank can be made independent not only because of rational anti-inflationary concerns, but also due to an increased “supply” of the model across the international community. As to various degrees of independence of central banks, which we have empirically observed, certain political factors prove to be relevant determinants. Specifically, bicameralism, social heterogeneity, as well as prospects of the opposition overthrowing a government – all impact upon how much a central bank will be independent. While stronger bicameralism and “overthrowing” likelihood are positively correlated with central banks’ independence, social heterogeneity turns out negatively correlated with the dependant variable.

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