Why Aesthetic Value Judgements Cannot Be Justified Cover Image

Why Aesthetic Value Judgements Cannot Be Justified
Why Aesthetic Value Judgements Cannot Be Justified

Author(s): Tomáš Kulka
Subject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Ústav dějin umění Akademie věd České republiky
Keywords: analytic aesthetics; appreciation; aesthetic judgement; justification; work of art

Summary/Abstract: The article is part of a longer argument, the gist of which stands in direct opposition to the claim implied by the article’s title. The ambition of that larger whole is to offer a theory of art evaluation together with a theoretical model showing how aesthetic value judgements can be inter-subjectively tested and justified. Here the author therefore plays devil’s advocate by citing, strengthening, and inventing arguments against the very possibility of justification or explanation of aesthetic judgements. The reason is his conviction that such arguments have not been fully met. The article is thus intended as a challenge: any theory of art evaluation which assumes, or tries to establish, that some works of art are better than others or that aesthetic judgements are not just statements expressing personal likes and dislikes, should show how such arguments can be demolished.

  • Issue Year: XLVI/2009
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 3-28
  • Page Count: 26
  • Language: English