Modalny argument na rzecz dualizmu w ujęciu Uwe Meixnera
Uwe Meixner’s modal argument for dualism
Author(s): Mariusz GrygianiecSubject(s): Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Special Branches of Philosophy
Published by: Uniwersytet Warszawski - Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii, Instytut Filozofii
Keywords: Meixner; modal argument; physicalism; dualism; conceivable; possible; coherent; scenario
Summary/Abstract: The paper provides a critical analysis of Uwe Meixner’s modal argument in favour of psychophysical dualism. It delivers, first, a formal reconstruction of the proof which was originally presented by Meixner in 2004, second, a detailed scrutiny of some premises of the argument in question, and third, a careful assessment of the whole reasoning. My analysis aims at justifying the belief that although the version of the modal argument invented by Meixner is formally valid and represents a significant progress when compared with the original version, it is still based on two disputable premises which make the whole reasoning difficult to regard, in a completely collision-free way, as a materially sound one.
Journal: Filozofia Nauki
- Issue Year: 24/2016
- Issue No: 4 (96)
- Page Range: 129-147
- Page Count: 19
- Language: Polish