Jerrolda Levinsona ontologia dzieł muzycznych a zagadnienie indywidualnej esencji dzieła muzycznego
Jerrold Levinson’s Ontology of Musical Works and the Question of the Individual Essence of the Musical Work

Summary/Abstract: In this paper, I set to analyze the kind of metaphysical essentialism that follows from Jerrold Levinson’s ontology of musical works. This paper is structured into three sections. In the rst, I reconstruct those parts of Levinson’s ontology of musical works that entail essentialism. In the second section, I reconstruct Mackie’s (2009) and Forbes’ (1985) arguments for the indispensability of the individual essences of particular objects and show that they apply equally well to musical works. In the third, nal section, I combine the conclusions of the two previous ones to prove that Levinson’s ontology of musical works is com- patible with Mackie and Forbes’ postulate for the individal essences. I show, however, that even though Levinson correctly ascribes essential properties to musical works, his choice about which of those properties count as essential leads to counterintuitive consequences. I end this paper with a new argument showing that musical works do have essential properties but that they are different from those postulated by Levinson.

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