The Bundle Theory of Particulars and Accidental Properties
The Bundle Theory of Particulars and Accidental Properties

Summary/Abstract: In this paper I evaluate four arguments formulated against the Bundle Theory of Particulars: the argument from tautologous subject-predicate discourse, the argument from essentialism, the argument from the impossibility of diachronic change, and the argument from the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. I propose a general strategy to deal with those and structurally similar problems and show how this strategy solves the four objections. The offered solution consists in analysing subject-predicate discourse in terms of coexemplification of properties rather than set-inclusion and in postulating that ordinary particulars are not bundles of properties but bundles of higher-order: either bundles of temporal parts (that are bundles of properties), which allows us to escape the problem of impossibility of change over time; or bundles of modal parts, which enables us to refute the argument from essentialism; or bundles of modal parts that are bundles of temporal parts that are bundles of tropes — which clears up both difficulties.

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