Argument and Signification in Sextus Empiricus: against the Mathematicians VIII.289–290
Argument and Signification in Sextus Empiricus: against the Mathematicians VIII.289–290

Summary/Abstract: In M VIII.277–279, Sextus has the dogmatists contend that the sceptics can neither argue nor even state that there are no signs without presupposing that signs exist. in M VIII.289–290, a surprisingly neglected passage in scholarly literature, Sextus offers two fascinating but obscure and uncharacteristically laconic responses to these two objections: although the sceptics suspend judgement on the indicative sign, they accept the mnemonic sign; while sceptical arguments do not show, nor sceptical statements signify, that there is no sign indicatively, both do so mnemonically. The paper analyses the conceptions of mnemonic argumentation and verbal signification that underlie this response. Sextus’ account of dogmatic theories of signification and the mnemonic sign elucidates why he maintains that the sceptics may both argue against the sign, and reap the therapeutic benefits of this activity, without committing themselves to the judgements which, according to the dogmatists, are the logical and cognitive corollaries of doing so. in the past, the premisses of the arguments against the sign induced the agent who is now a sceptic to infer that there are no signs; they now remind the mature sceptic of the considerations which favour that inference. in conjunction with the equipollent dogmatic arguments for the sign, these arguments thus generate epochê and, consequently, ataraxia. i argue that this model is ultimately untenable: by recognising the transmission of warrant from the premisses to the conclusion that there are no signs the sceptic must presuppose, however momentarily, precisely what Sextus criticises as indicative signification. i suggest that, although Sextus’ mystifying notion of verbal mnemonic signification is irremediably obscure, it gestures towards the notion that assertoric sentences signify the impressions mnemonically concomitant with speaking them. Despite their difficulties, Sextus’ replies in M Viii.289–290 offer a striking and unique conception of the sceptic’s participation in linguistic and dialectical exchange.

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