D’une science descriptive de l’expérience en première personne: pour une phénoménologie expérientielle
D’une science descriptive de l’expérience en première personne: pour une phénoménologie expérientielle

Summary/Abstract: would like to propose an interpretation of Ricoeur’s fi rst phenomenological works in the light of what I call an “experiential phenomenology”, by answering three important questions. Th e fi rst is a factual and historical interrogation: why has Ricoeur abandoned his project of a descriptive phenomenology after publishing his fi rst volume of the Th e Voluntary and the Involuntary and why did he afterwards direct his philosophical research towards the problem of interpretation? Th e second interrogation is an epistemological and a methodological one: in what way is the Husserlian phenomenology a fi rst-person approach and how does Ricoeur’s phenomenology of the will lead us towards an experiential phenomenology in fi rst person? Th e fi nal question is heuristical: what criteria should we point out in order to establish a phenomenological science that is 1) descriptive and 2) approaching the experience in fi rst-person?

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