Objektivnost i istina: bolje bi bilo da verujete
Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It

Summary/Abstract: Author argues in this paper that value judgements are objectively true. He di­ferentiates between the internal value skepticism and Archimedian value skep­ti­cism; while internal skepticism rejects one set of the moral principles and accepts the other, Archimedian skepticism rejects objectivity of any possible va­lue judgement and develops meta-theory that exposes their subjectivity. Author de­nies Archimedian scepticism neutrality and austerity – it is not neutral since its basic distinction between the metastatments on value judgements and the ve­ry value judgements. Further, it is not austere because diversity of moral con­vic­tions is not good enough reason to dismiss universality of ethics on one hand, and there is no direct linkage between knowing certain ideal and its motivating for­ce. In concluding remarks author discusses internal scepticism, which he holds for only relevant ethical standpoint.

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