Atgrasinimo Strategijos Raida Ir Pagrindiniai Iššûkiai
Evolution Of The Strategy Of Deterrence And Its The Major Challenges

Summary/Abstract: The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone’s actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive and credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfil when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defence. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defence actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state’s defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, and the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information and advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political and military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one.

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