Theory Of Coalitions And Formation Of Government Cover Image

Teorija koalicija i formiranje vlade
Theory Of Coalitions And Formation Of Government

Author(s): Slaviša Orlović
Subject(s): Politics / Political Sciences
Published by: Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu
Keywords: theory of coalitions; formation of government; sectors; pro­gramme; negotiations; agreement

Summary/Abstract: Formation of government is one of the most important issues in parlia­mentary democracies. The text elaborates propositions of the theory of coalitions. It enumerates the factors influencing the formation of coali­tions. Formation of excessively large coalitions derives from potential unreliability of certain partners, in „extraordinary“ circumstances, when there are some external or internal threats, when the two-third majority rule is required, for some decisions: constitutional amendments, budget, for larger legitimacy and due to insecurity of certain partners and reduc­tion of risk. Minority government can be a single-party minority gov­ernment and a minority government composed of several partners. In negotiations on formation of government, care is taken of harmonization of policy and distribution of resources. Parties often set one eye on the government and another on the mood of their members and supporters. Ministerial posts are observed quantitatively and qualitatively. Success­ful negotiations about the formation of government result in coalition agreement. It can be formal and informal, for internal use or publicly announced. Coalition negotiations depend on institutional and behav­ioural factors. Coalition governments have their advantages: broader representation in executive power; increased level of agreement, nego­tiation and compromises in executive power; flexibility and adjustability. Critics of coalition governments are as follows: majority coalition gov­ernments are most often the result of post-electoral coalitions, frequent secret negotiations of party leaders unclear and non-transparent for citizens, as being led behind closed door, and therefore the connection between elections and formation of government is weak; it is thought that coalition governments take less care of pre-electoral promises due to the need for mutual adjustment and achievement of compromise, but also because one party is hiding behind another; small parties can have disproportional higher influence in executive power than is their electoral support; coalition government can be inefficient as it requires agreement of all coalition partners which is not always easy to achieve; coalition governments are potentially unstable. In fragmented multiparty systems, derivation of the will of voters from the electoral results it is not easy at all. Coalition negotiations decide about who will rule more than the elections. In formation of ruling coalitions, will of voters expressed at elections is often changed. Coalition is, above else, a compromise without losers and winners, with an aim to make everybody satisfied.

  • Issue Year: 2010
  • Issue No: 04
  • Page Range: 97-127
  • Page Count: 29
  • Language: Serbian