SCHRÖDINGER’S RIGHTS OF NATURE. THE PARADOX OF THE EARTH JURISPRUDENCE
SCHRÖDINGER’S RIGHTS OF NATURE. THE PARADOX OF THE EARTH JURISPRUDENCE

Summary/Abstract: From the realist-positivist point of view, rights of nature are merely an instrument of environmental justice. It is a political and economic reality, along with implementing provisions, that determines their effectiveness, not the shifting ideology behind them. Thus, in certain conditions, the environmental law may do more for nature than the rights of nature. In an analogy to thin rights of animals, a concept developed, among others, by Saskia Stucki, we propose to seek the thin rights of nature: rights that are not explicitly vested in nature by an act of law, but result from a broad protection, its enforceability and claimability, and are recognized by a public authority. Our thesis is: thin rights of nature are theoretically normatively possible, and are, in fact, valid in practice. Only ideological factors determine that certain institutions of environmental law are interpreted anthropocentrically. In our reading of the Polish environmental law, national parks could be seen as vested with TRON, despite the lack of legal personhood for nature.

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