Нещото само по себе си
The Thing-In-Itself

Summary/Abstract: A fundamental distinction in Kantian philosophy is that between “appearance” and the “thing-in-itself.” Kant builds both his epistemology and his influential critique of metaphysics on this distinction. What is even more, traces of this distinction can be found also in the framework through which Kant develops his practical philosophy. This paper argues that with his conception of the “thing-in-itself” Kant firmly stands within – and even reinforces some aspect of – a certain philosophical tradition; a tradition that most likely begins with Parmenides and is exemplarily continued by Plato. This tradition is characterized by its disregard for, first, the notion of (shared) lifeworld practice and, second, the natural intuitions that arise from it (the so-called “common sense”). Further evidence to support this stance could be found in the semantic turn in philosophical discourse initiated by Frege. The analysis of our linguistic relation to the world and the intentions that make it comprehensible reveals the untenability of Kant’s thesis that the genuine objects of our knowledge are “appearances,” while “things-in-themselves” remain fundamentally inaccessible to us.

• Details
• Contents