İbnü’l-Mutahhar el-Hillî’de Burhân Teorisi
The Theory of Demonstration (Burhān) in Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī

Summary/Abstract: This article examines the theory of demonstration (burhān) developed by Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, a multifaceted thinker who lived in the 13th century. Employing an analytical method, this article aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of Ibn al-Mutahhar's theory of demonstration, which has not yet been scientifically studied in Turkish. Primarily known as a Shi‘i theologian and methodist, al-Ḥillī authored numerous works in various disciplines. Some of these works dealt with religious problems, while others focused on rational issues. Living after figures like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, who are considered representatives of the philosophical theology (al-kalām alfalsafī), al-Ḥillī is particularly recognized as a thinker closely associated with al-Ṭūsī in terms of his ideas and doctrine. In his works dealing with rational sciences, al-Ḥillī focused particularly on the ontological problems of philosophical theology, especially those referred to as umūr ʿāmma. However, he also centered his works on the issue of method and methodology, a fundamental problem of philosophical theology. Therefore, in many of his works, al-Ḥillī discussed the problem of knowledge and attempted to systematically ground his thoughts on this subject. In this context, one of the most important topics he addressed in detail was the problems of logic. Al-Ḥillī wrote two types of works on logic: The first are commentaries, examples of which include al-Jawhar al-Naḍīd fī Sharḥ al-Tajrīd and al-Qawāʿid al-Jaliyyah fī Sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsiyyah. The second type are original works. His work, al-Asrār al-Khafiyyah fī ʿUlūm al-ʿAqliyyah, serves as an example for this group. In these works, the thinker particularly focuses on Peripatetic logic and attempts to explain the foundation of his own thought system. Essentially, al-Ḥillī considers logic within the context of the knowledge acquisition process. Initially existing without knowledge, humans begin to acquire information primarily through their sensory faculties. However, these faculties are insufficient for distinguishing truth from falsehood. Therefore, to perform the process of verification and falsification, they are forced to resort to another method or tool. According to al-Ḥillī, the tool that performs this process is nothing other than logic. In some of his works, the thinker refers to logic as a tool, defining it as "a tool that protects the mind from error in thought/idea, as long as it is adhered to." It is possible to say that this definition, which he includes in his works, was known before him. Although he includes this definition in his works, he criticizes some concepts contained in the definition of logic. The most important concept he criticizes is the term "instrument". Al-Ḥillī believes that logic is not an instrument but an independent science by stating that logic is an independent science, Al-Ḥillī argues that the desired outcome of this science is proof (burhān). Proof consists of premises whose truth must be accepted as necessary. Agreeing with most logicians, Al-Ḥillī identifies six types of demonstrative premises: self-evident (awwaliyyāt), observation (mushāhadāt), empirical (mujarrabāt), intuition (ḥadsiyyāt), widely transmitted (mutawātirāt), and natural syllogisms (fiṭrī qiyāsāt). However, he particularly criticized other Peripatetic logicians from various perspectives regarding self-evident and widely transmitted premises. A similar critical stance can be seen in some issues of syllogism. In fact, al-Ḥillī's critical approach in these matters forms a whole with his other philosophical tendencies. Indeed, he largely built his thought system on intellectual and religious matters upon the approach he demonstrated in matters of logic.

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