FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ULTIMA RATIO SOCIETATIS
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ULTIMA RATIO SOCIETATIS

Summary/Abstract: Writing about freedom of expression and ultima ratio societatis essentially means engaging in the analysis of the relationship between the individual and the authorities. Freedom of expression is closely related to the principle of dignity and the free choice of each individual, providing a way for them to express their uniqueness, connect with other members of society, in one word, to establish social relations on which a certain legal and political system is based. It is precisely this system, which owes its existence significantly to “freedom of expression,” that can, provided certain conditions are met, turn against its founder. The analysis conducted in this paper confirms that this path begins in accordance with the well-known saying about good intentions. From the efforts to protect the values of the Roman Republic from acts but not from words, as the spoken or written word was responded to in the same way, it has come to the protection of the emperor who was not interested in conducting discussions or writing replies, but rather included the word under crimen laesae maiestatis and not just the act. The Church had no particular reason to deviate from the established standard, as heresy, blasphemy, and similar offenses against the Holy Scripture and church teachings pose a danger not only to religious but also to secular authorities. After all, Jesus is attributed with the words that what belongs to Caesar should be given to Caesar, and what belongs to God should be given to God. A period followed in which, after the values of the republic, the unlimited power of the emperor and church dogma, ideology and parties as their bearers came to the forefront, and freedom of expression was, as in previous cases, under attack from the new bearers of power. Regardless of whether it was an absolutist or totalitarian authority, the goal was the same; only the means of achieving it differed. Medieval bonfires on which heretics were burned have been replaced by the burning of books in the squares, persecution, sending to camps, or execution of political dissenters, where, unlike the procedures conducted by the Inquisition, in the not-so-distant history of state and political upheavals and turmoil, trials for verbal offenses were often seen as unnecessary because the outcome was known in advance or, when raison d ’é t a t required it, conducted with clearly defined roles and concluded with the conviction of the accused who was convinced that he would not be punished for spoken words or written works. Such behavior can be associated with an activist type of state in which the individual is subordinated to the common good, that is, the interest of the community, and it is not unusual that the shadow of “Big Brother” looms over his freedom of expression. On the other hand, the reactive type of state was supposed to represent a more favorable, and it could even be said a natural environment for freedom of expression. The change in the attitude towards freedom of expression occurs particularly after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the year when mass surveillance, military interventions in the world, and the restrictions faced by media representatives testify that things are moving towards restrictions on freedom of expression. Political dictates come to the fore, and the role of the judiciary becomes secondary. Moreover, for certain states of Western democracies, it can be said that they use the criminal system in a way that, although not in the form of blatant repression, treats representatives of the journalistic profession as potential perpetrators.

• Details
• Contents