THE OPPOSITION OF THE USA ADMINISTRATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF SLOVENIA AND CROATIA Cover Image

THE OPPOSITION OF THE USA ADMINISTRATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF SLOVENIA AND CROATIA
THE OPPOSITION OF THE USA ADMINISTRATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF SLOVENIA AND CROATIA

Author(s): Ana N. Petković
Subject(s): Diplomatic history, Transformation Period (1990 - 2010), Present Times (2010 - today), Wars in Jugoslavia
Published by: Филозофски факултет, Универзитет у Београду
Keywords: USA; Yugoslav crisis; unilateralism; disintegration; secession; independence; international recognition; the EC

Summary/Abstract: The period of the rapid changes began upon the fall of the Berlin Wall and after more and more obvious decrease in the confrontation between the East and the West. Th e disintegration of Yugoslavia coincided with the birth of American unilateralism and the fundamental alterations on the international scene. The earlier strategic signifi cance of Yugoslavia, the communist multinational federation which maintained good relations with the West from the beginning of the 1950s, diminished. As the Cold War was getting close to its end, diminishing the danger of the Soviet threat, the attitude that prevailed was that Yugoslavia was less and less important to American national interests. The maintenance of the status quo and the opposition to “retrograde nationalism” and “separatism” were expected to provide the protection from the uncertain alternative. While being focused on the Gulf War and the guidance of the process of transformation of the Soviet empire, America had less and less time and fewer resources to deal with Yugoslav conflict. At the beginning of the crisis the USA objected, in a principled manner, the disintegration of the multinational and multicultural Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. American administration regarded the crisis in Yugoslavia, in the first place, as a local, European conflict which, at its very beginning, did not represent any kind of serious threat to American national interests, to the European stability and the credibility of the international organisations – the most important being the UN and NATO. It was estimated that nothing could be done to prevent the disintegration of the country and that there were not enough well justified reasons to approve of military intervention. The upcoming year of the election represented the period during which no foreign policy risks were taken. Yugoslav protagonists interpreted the messages of the American offi cials individually, each in their own way, which was particularly noticeable after the visit of Secretary of State, James Baker, to Belgrade. As the crisis in Yugoslavia grew, the Bush administration withdrew more and more, with the conclusion to leave the problematic question of Yugoslavia to the European Community. This policy reached its turning point already at the beginning of 1992. Th e decision of the USA to recognise Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina at the same time marked its return to the Balkan scene and its greater involvement in crisis resolution, which was by and large announced in his presidential campaign by Bill Clinton, a Democratic Party candidate.

  • Issue Year: 2013
  • Issue No: 4
  • Page Range: 165-183
  • Page Count: 19
  • Language: English
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