Clauza penală, între executarea eficientă şi (ne)executarea (in)eficientă
The penalty clause, between effective enforcement and (in)effective (non-)enforcement

Summary/Abstract: This study analyzes the influence that liquidated damages exert on the economic efficiency of contract performance, based on a simplified model that seeks to delimit the area of efficient performance from those of efficient breach, inefficient performance and inefficient breach, taking into account the (negative) hypothesis of the increase in execution costs and the (positive) hypothesis of alternative opportunities. This model evaluates the profitability of the execution or non-execution decision for each of the parties, as well as the alteration of the overall efficiency of the transaction in the case of over-compensatory liquidated damages (which may induce inefficient performance) or under-compensatory ones (which may induce inefficient breach), generating redistributive effects.

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