Wittgenstein on Truth: Some Remarks on Paragraphs 134–137 of Philosophical Investigations
Wittgenstein on Truth: Some Remarks on Paragraphs 134–137 of Philosophical Investigations

Summary/Abstract: Investigations say about truth. I start, however, with a discussion of the remarks on truth contained in the Tractatus because the thoughts expressed in the former should be read in the context of the thoughts expressed in the latter. According to my interpretation of paragraphs 134–137 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein aims to show that the relationship between the concept of truth and the concept of a proposition may consist in the fact that truth and falsity, in certain language games, are constitutive elements of what a proposition is, but it must be added that these concepts cannot be comprehended independently from each other. I also come to the conclusion that in his opinion the concept of truth is expressed in various ways in our language, it being conveyed by such expressions as “… is true” and “this is how things are: …,” and that this shows that while asserting that something is true one can emphasize, on the one hand, that it is a proposition that says that things are a certain way, and on the other, just the fact that things are thus and so.

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