Ескиз върху една феноменология на фантазията
Towards a Phenomenology of Phantasy

Summary/Abstract: The main objective of the following article lies in detailed examination of core aspects of Husserl's phenomenology of phantasy, developed in his lecture course from 1904/1905. Scrutinizing similarities and differences between phantasy, image consciousness [Bildbewusstsein] and memory, Husserl distinguishes visual representations [anschauliche Vergegenwärtigungen], which differ from perception as presentation [Gegenwärtigung], from polysemous expression [Ausdruck] as non-intuitive representation. In consequence, his attempt results in reduction of phantasy to imagination [Imagination] or to image representation [Bildlichkeitsvorstellung]. However, Husserl's endeavour confronts the justified doubt in that possibility which he expresses explicitly in the lecture, but does not carry his intuition to its conclusion. In other words, phantasy acts, which have no image-object [Bildobjekt] in contrast to those of image consciousness, would lose their intentional character, and this would necessarily lead to radical transformation of phenomenology. Namely, this aporetic situation is the point of departure for Richir's refoundation of phenomenology in his work Phénoménologie en esquisses (2000), as far as phantasy incorporates the basis [Boden] for the most archaic register of phenomenology, primarily related to affectivity and corporeality [Leiblichkeit].

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