Władze Związku Sowieckiego wobec katastrofy czarnobylskiej
The Authorities of the Soviet Union towards the Chernobyl Disaster

Summary/Abstract: In my article, I will investigate the reaction of the Soviet authority to the Nuclear Power Plant disaster in Chernobyl on 26 April 1968. To date, no one has shed sufficient light on this problem, and there are also no published works that refer to accessible Soviet documents on this topic. I managed to gain access to some declassified documents gathered in Fond 89, located in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History in (RGANI), as well as access to the protocols of Operation Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This group, headed by the then Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, seems to have played a significant role in the decision making process following the accident in Chernobyl. The documents mentioned above and the existing literature on the subject will be the basis for my text. In my manuscript, decisions made by authorities in the crucial period directly following the accident concerning the reactor fire, decontamination of polluted area, as well as the protection of the people’s health and life will be assessed. Finally, information policy in the USSR and abroad will be discussed. According to the circulating information, the crucial mistakes that were made, particularly in the first hours and days, were as a result of a policy of secrecy and a reluctance to provide reliable information to the domestic and international public. It appears the main reason for the lack of quick and decisive actions could be attributed to an underestimation of the scale of the disaster by relevant authorities. This underestimation was mainly influenced by false reports delivered by the management of the power plant. Nonetheless, when the Soviet authorities realised the aftermath of the accident, it took concrete steps to prevent further escalation of the situation.

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