Sztuczna inteligencja a fundamenty odpowiedzialności karnej państwa demokratycznego
Artificial Intelligence and the Foundations of Criminal Liability in a Democratic State

Summary/Abstract: The author seeks to address the question of whether there exists a relationship between the growing importance of advanced algorithms (commonly referred to as “artificial intelligence”) and the currently prevailing foundations of criminal liability. The appearance of such a relationship may stem from the human tendency to personify artificial intelligence and, in some sense, to equate the “thinking” of a computer program with human thought. The author concludes that artificial intelligence— contrary to certain predictions found in the literature—will neither disrupt the foundations of contemporary criminal law nor lead to the rejection of the principles upon which the doctrine of liability for a prohibited act is built. This is because artificial intelligence is not capable of altering the system of values that we seek to protect through criminal law. However, the uncontrolled development of artificial intelligence could, under unfavorable conditions, signal the end of democracy in its current—albeit imperfect—form, due to the emergence of new forms of social pathology. Combating such pathologies could create a temptation to alter the very foundations on which modern criminal law rests, resulting in an unconstitutional modification of the criteria for the attribution of criminal liability.

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