Regulacja instrumentów polityki makrostrożnościowej we Francji: referencyjny model organizacyjny
Regulation of macroprudential policy instruments in France: A reference organizational model

Summary/Abstract: The analysis of the mechanisms for regulating of macroprudential instruments implemented in individual EU countries indicates a separation of the roles of the decision-maker and the de facto regulator, with the legal authority to issue legal acts that may undermine the effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools. This anomaly is present in most Member States, both in cases where the mandate is exercised by central banks or by separate and independent macroprudential authorities. Against this backdrop, a unique institutional solution has been implemented in France. The paper aims to enrich the existing state of research on macroprudential policy by defining the administrative mechanism for the regulation of macroprudential instruments in France, the type of legal forms of action, and the role of the central bank in this regard. Using interdisciplinary analysis at the intersection of law and finance, as well as dogmatic and comparative legal methods, the paper also attempts to define criteria for assessing institutional frameworks and regulatory mechanisms. The paper concludes that the French model of shared responsibility among different authorities and institutions in the financial safety net, by bringing decision-making processes and regulatory powers together in a single body, achieves a high level of consistency in macroprudential policy actions and strengthens accountability. This solution best balances the organizational dilemma between the need for central bank involvement and the need to provide a broad regulatory framework for decision-making.

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