Czy sprawca czynu zabronionego w prawie karnym postępuje zawsze racjonalnie?
Does the perpetrator of a prohibited act in criminal law always act rationaly?

Summary/Abstract: The article presents the results of an analysis of some theoretical assumptions that underlie the concept of 'carnist interpretation' – understood as a criminal law-based interpretation – created by Wojciech Patryas in light of the currently applicable code regulations. In examining the area of institutions not thoroughly explored by Patryas, the study employed the instruments of general scientific methodologies, legal theory and formal-dogmatic methods. The article aims to locate the error as to the circumstance constituting an element of a prohibited act – as a circumstance that currently also excludes culpability – within the structure of the model of legal rationality. The author concludes that the perpetrator's lack of awareness of essential elements of reality eliminates the possibility of making rational decisions in the sense understood by criminal law. In this respect, the repeal of the key assumptions that make up the structure of the model of legal rationality in criminal law allows for the thesis that an erring perpetrator does not fit into the canon of the subject making decisions according to the utility criterion. This conclusion exemplifies the lack of adaptation of some assumptions of the criminal law-based interpretation to today's statutory realities, which may, in the near future, contribute to a broader discussion on the extent to which this variety of humanistic interpretations should be adapted to the normative reality. The interpretation of an act – whether from an abstract perspective or under conditions of assigning criminal liability to a specific perpetrator – has consistently remained one of the main tasks of criminal law for decades.

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